• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.700-721
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• 2012

This paper deals with methods for determining the reasonable royalty rates in the valuation of patents. To calculate the reliable reasonable royalty rate of a patent, we review pros and cons of the 25% rule royalty calculating method and the recent trend of this method. We also review the game theory of Nash Bargaining equation and review the Investment of Rate of Return Method according to the financial analysis. Next, we refer to the reasonable royalty damage cases among the recent patent infringement cases in USA and analyze the corresponding patents. We extract the patent indicators from the patent bibliographic information. Finally, we obtain a regression model for calculating a reasonable royalty rate using the patent indicators and the reasonable royalty rates in the recent patent infringement cases.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.3-19
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• 2010

Anyang-cheon(stream) runs through southern metropolitan area of Seoul to Han-river in Korea. Due to fast growth of Seoul, the water quality and quantity problems in Anyang-cheon have occurred. To cope with the problems, the Integrated Watershed Management program for Anyang-cheon was adopted and a KRW 26.1 billion (USD 21.8 million) pilot project (construction of 4 facilities such as reservoir) is suggested for 4 sub-watersheds of Anyang-cheon, which cost will be shared by the 12 local governments (LG). Three cost division schemes are compared. By Scheme 1, if the cost is borne by the LG in a watershed where the facilities are constructed (no cost division scheme), the LG in I is to bear 0.58% of the total construction cost, LG in watershed II 29.54%, LG in IV 0%, LG in V 69.88%. In particular, LG in IV in this scheme bears no cost because no facility is constructed, even though watershed IV is the major beneficiary of the facility construction. Scheme 2 is to share the cost by length of streams in each sub-watershed and the suggested cost share for each sub-watershed is 13.76% by I, 7.34% by II, 45.87% by IV, and 33.03% by V. However, this cost division scheme is fair only under the false assumption that the bargaining powers of group of LGs are identical. To suggest a better and fair division rule, Shapley Value, a cooperative game solution, is used to suggest Scheme 3. In Scheme 3, Shapley Value measures the summation of average marginal contribution of each player in all possible coalitions as cost division scheme and is known to provide a fair division considering bargaining power. In the context of Anyang-cheon, LGs in upper stream have superior bargaining position. The result suggests the cost division is fair under Scheme 3, when the cost shares are 0.29% by I, 14.77% by II, 50% by IV, and 34.94% by V, respectively.