• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.47-55
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• 2012

This paper describes the developed HILS and test equipment in order to test the performances of MMW(Millimeter-Wave) seeker which can detect and track a high speed of short-range ballistic missile and aircraft. This system is used to 141 horn antenna array, array switching, and gain and phase control algorithm to simulate various kind of targets and trajectory of high speed and maneuver moving target. In addition, it simulates not only velocity and range for these targets but also clutter and jamming environments. System configuration and implementation and the measurement results of major subsystems such as target motion simulator, simulation signal generator, high speed data aquisition unit, and central control unit are presented. These systems could verify the detection and tracking performance of MMW seeker through dynamic real-time test based on simulation flight scenario.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.175-181
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• 2024

The U.N. Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee estimated that the amount of North Korea's cyberattacks on virtual asset-related companies from 2017 to 2023 was about 4 trillion won. North Korea's cyberattacks have secured funds through cryptocurrency hacking as it has been restricted from securing foreign currency due to economic sanctions by the international community, and it also shows the form of technology theft against defense companies, and illegal assets are being used to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and develop nuclear and missile development. When North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, and declared the completion of its national nuclear armament following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on November 29 of the same year, the U.N. imposed sanctions on North Korea, which are considered the strongest economic sanctions in history. In these difficult economic situations, North Korea tried to overcome the crisis through cyberattacks, but as a result of analyzing the changes through the North's cyber attack cases, the strategic goal from the first period from 2009 to 2016 was to verify and show off North Korea's cyber capabilities through the neutralization of the national network and the takeover of information, and was seen as an intention to create social chaos in South Korea. When foreign currency earnings were limited due to sanctions against North Korea in 2016, the second stage seized virtual currency and secured funds to maintain the Kim Jong-un regime and advance nuclear and missile development. The third stage is a technology hacking of domestic and foreign defense companies, focusing on taking over key technologies to achieve the five strategic weapons tasks proposed by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At the national level, security measures for private companies as well as state agencies should be established against North Korea's cyberattacks, and measures for legal systems, technical problems, and budgets related to science are urgently needed. It is also necessary to establish a system and manpower to respond to the ever-developing cyberattacks by focusing on cultivating and securing professional manpower such as white hackers.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.114-153
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• 2017

고도화 및 가시화되고 있는 북한의 '잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile)'위협에 대응하기 위한 효과적인 전략수단으로써 핵추진잠수함의 필요성에 대한 국민적 관심이 고조되고 있다. 핵추진잠수함의 전략적 가치에 대한 논의가 활발히 진행되고 있는 가운데, 주변국과의 갈등과 국제사회의 비핵화 규범의 미 준수 논란 등 핵추진잠수함 확보과정에서 야기될 수 있는 대·내외의 정치·외교적 파장에 대한 우려의 목소리 또한 높아지고 있다. 그러나, 핵추진잠수함의 필요성 및 확보와 관련한 지금까지의 대부분의 논의들은 한국의 '내부적 논의(Just our own scenario)'에 그치는 한계를 보이고 있다. 전략무기체계로써의 상징성과 그에 따르는 대외적 민감성을 고려 시 일방적이고 독자적인 핵추진잠수함 확보노력은 과정상의 시행착오와 불확실성을 더욱 가중시켜 정책적 실패로 귀결될 수 있는 위험성을 내포하고 있다. 특히, 한반도 평화와 아태지역의 안전보장이라는 공동의 전략적 목표를 공유하고 있는 동맹국인 미국의 공감대와 지지가 뒷받침되지 않은 독자적인 핵추진잠수함 확보노력은 큰 난항이 예상되며 자칫 서로간의 '전략적 신뢰(Strategic Trust)'를 무너뜨려 '한미동맹의 결속력(Alliance Cohesion)'을 약화시키는 요인으로 작용할 수 있다. 미국의 동의와 지지에 기반한 핵추진잠수함 확보를 위해서는 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보가 동맹의 전략목표 및 미국의 전략적 이해관계에 미칠 수 있는 긍정적, 부정적 효과에 대한 충분한 검토와 논의가 선행되어야 한다. 한미동맹의 공동의 전략목표와 미국의 전략적 이익에 상충하는 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보시도는 성공 가능성이 낮기 때문이다. 본 연구에서는 현실화되고 있는 북한의 핵위협에 대응하고 지역안전보장에 기여할 수 있는 미국과의 연합방위력 증강차원에서의 한국의 핵추진잠수함의 전략적 효용성을 분석하였다. 더불어, 한국의 핵추진잠수함 확보과정에서 야기될 수 있는 대·내외의 기술적, 정치·외교적 사안들을 살펴본 후 한미동맹 차원에서의 정책적 해결방안을 제시하였다. 연구목적을 위해 유사한 역사적 사례연구를 통해 교훈을 도출하였으며, 미국 오바마 1기 행정부에서 미국의 아태지역 및 대북정책을 주도한 전 미국 국무부부장관 제임스 스타인버그(James Steinberg) 및 여러 미국 내 한반도 전문가들의 의견을 수렴하였다. 본 연구가 한국의 핵잠수함 확보를 위한 한미간 발전적 논의의 시발점이 되기를 기대한다.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Mechanical Engineers A
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.761-768
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• 2013

New warheads are designed and developed to be highly lethal when used as part of ballistic missile payloads. There are many trades associated with the design of a central warhead core, mainly dealing with the projectiles or penetrators. Obviously, a payload-type configuration is very susceptible to kills from one projectile because of the high impacts required for bomblet or submunition payloads. Based on these requirements, the optimum kill vehicle configuration will have the smallest mass and relative velocity that will kill all the submunitions. The designs of the penetrator shape and size are directly related to the space and weight of the warhead. The shape, size, L/D, penetrator material, and manner in which they are inserted inside the surrounding explosive segments are critical in achieving successful penetrator design. The AUTODYN-3D code was used to study the effect of penetrator penetration. The objective of numerical analysis was to determine the penetration characteristics of the penetrator produced by hypervelocity impacts under different initial conditions such as initial velocity, shape, and L/D of the penetrator.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.120-125
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• 2018

Various security threats, such as North Korea's nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile developments, are becoming issues. Considering the current security situation in South Korea, proper selection of weapons and efficient defense acquisition systems are essential. In this paper, we conduct a survey and analysis of the defense core technology necessary for the development of weapons systems, and review whether current defense research and development is carried out efficiently. A theoretical study was conducted on ways to enhance the linkage between defense core technology and weapons systems development. As a result of the study, the necessity for development of weapons systems and the linking of defense core technology planning with the need for institutional improvement in enhanced utilization of defense core technology were derived. We propose a method for a long-term weapons systems concept plan that integrates defense core technology planning with forces planning and pre-project research programs to improve planning efficiency.

• Journal of Biomedical Engineering Research
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.50-54
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• 2014

It is being tried to control robot arm using brain signal in the field of brain-machine interface (BMI). This study is focused on applying guidance laws for efficient robot arm control using 3D coordinates obtained from Magnetoencephalography (MEG) signal which represents movement of upper limb. The 3D coordinates obtained from brain signal is inappropriate to be used directly because of the spatial difference between human upper limb and robot arm's end-effector. The spatial difference makes the robot arm to be controlled from a third-person point of view with assist of visual feedback. To resolve this inconvenience, guidance laws which are frequently used for tactical ballistic missile are applied. It could be applied for the users to control robot arm from a first-person point of view which is expected to be more comfortable. The algorithm which enables robot arm to trace MEG signal is provided in this study. The algorithm is simulated and applied to 6-DOF robot arm for verification. The result was satisfactory and demonstrated a possibility in decreasing the training period and increasing the rate of success for certain tasks such as gripping object.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.103-112
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• 2021

In recent years, public bicycle systems are widely spread over the world according to the development of ICT technology. Since the public bicycle systems in large cities need to secure both publicity and convenience for citizens, analysis of various their issues from introduction to operation is required. In addition, it is also necessary to prepare for various scenarios for coexistence with the PM business, which is recently in the spotlight as a last mile means and normally managed privately. This paper introduces modeling and simulation for efficient operations of public bicycle systems. In particular, the proposed method was developed in a form that can be easily used in other cities by modeling the general structure and behavior of the public bicycle system, and it was developed to facilitate modification and expansion of the future model with a component-based model configuration. This paper provides a case study of the propose method, which is the public bicycle simulation in Sejong City. The simulation results were derived by applying the data from the public bicycle system of Sejong City, and they were verified with the associated real data of Sejong City. Using the verified model, it is expected that it can be used as a tool to design and analyze various services on the public bicycle systems, which were especially suitable for Sejong City.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.273-302
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• 2015

The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.