• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2022

Purpose: This study predicted cost asymmetry as a determinant of investment efficiency, and empirically analyzed the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Research design, data and methodology: Using a sample of 4,382 Korean firm-year observations over 2011-2017 period, I examined the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Asymmetrical cost behavior is measured as model of Homburg and Nasev (2008) and model of Park, Koo, and Pae (2012). Investment efficiency is measured as Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2011)'s model. Results: Firms with cost stickiness are less efficient in their investment than firms with non-cost stickiness. In other words, cost stickiness is an empirical result that supports the previous research on cost decision-making from perspective of managers pursuing private benefits due to information asymmetry. Conclusions: By showing that the manager's decision-making on the cost behavior affects the investment efficiency corresponding to capital management, the implications for the mechanism for efficient capital management are provided. Through the empirical results, it was shown that the cost stickiness is a product of opportunistic cost decision-making due to information asymmetry, and it is to present evidence that expands the meaning of the causes of asymmetric cost behavior.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.29-41
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• 2019

As users' interests of cryptocurrency has been increased, investment volume of it also increases. In the cryptocurrency market, it cannot always be distributed homogenous information to all investors, similar to the stock market because it reflects the characteristics of a market microstructure. Cryptocurrency traders, thus, like stock investors, can experience the information asymmetry in the market and cannot but help to depend on private information. The purpose of this study is to estimate the trading intensity of informed traders and uninformed traders among cryptocurrency investors around the world based on PIN (Probability of Informed Trading). We have an aim to compare the difference of information asymmetry according to the ten types of cryptocurrency. The results of this study are expected to prevent the continuous increase of suspicious transactions related to cryptocurrency and contribute to the development of a sound cryptocurrency market.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.137-167
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• 2013

This article estimates the scale of impact of expanding governmental fiscal expenditure for R&D investment on the private business enterprise's investment for R&D, and the relationship between business enterprise and university for expanding investment of R&D. According to my results, first, an expanding fiscal expenditure from government for R&D investment leads to increase R&D investment from business enterprise. However, an expanding expenditure from university rather leads to decrease R&D investment from business enterprise. Secondly, the crowding-out effect of expanding R&D investment from University on business enterprise's is very strong, and it is affected by structural changes such as the country's economic power, fiscal stance and cyclical volatility. Third, the more governmental expenditure on university expansive is, the stronger asymmetric relationship between business enterprise and university is, and investment sources of university from business enterprise is the main factor of this relationship. Finally, it is not easy to solve out this asymmetric relationship even through the governmental subsidy.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.127-135
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• 2021

We analyze the information asymmetry in the capital market by examining the long-term performance by the insider's trading behavior in the companies that made investment announcements for the construction of the new office building. The results are summarized as follows. On average, the long-term abnormal returns on share prices of sample firms represent a significant positive value. The regression analysis confirmed that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the factor of the change in equity of large shareholders and the long-term performance. On the other hand, negative correlation was observed between change in equity of small individual investors and long-term performance. These results mean that an insider can determine the authenticity of a manager's private intention. In other words, it supports that the insider is in a position of information superiority. In addition, it is expected to provide practical usefulness to investors in that the change in equity can be used as a predictor of long-term performance.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.33-50
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• 2014

Though South Korea has world-class volume of Venture Capital Investment, as a share of GDP, early stage venture investments are still short, and investments are concentrated in high technology area and Capital area. Because of the high barriers to entry of the new IPO and M&A market, the venture capital companies undergo difficulties in profit. High-tech ventures face difficulties in raising money from outside investors due to information asymmetry between venture investors and venture companies. To resolve these problems, developed countries's government make a co-funding investment scheme with private sectors and design incentive mechanism such as receiving knowledge of the reputable investors' joint venture. Korean central and local government can benchmark those of things. For example, the expansion of the investment volume with private sector, region-specific matching fund and venture capital's exit path diversification such as M&A through the establishment of a business venture eco-system. At the same time, venture companies are to make an efforts to enhance the ability of screening for venture companies and the value for investment activities through a joint venture investments.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.95-120
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• 1990

The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.33-57
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• 2020

Although cryptocurrency which can promote innovation in the blockchain ecosystem is published for many useful purposes, in Korea, cryptocurrency is recognized only as a means of investment for the profit. The fact emphasizes only the speculative nature of the cryptocurrency, so investor negates the fundamental purpose of cryptocurrency and hinders innovation in the blockchain ecosystem. The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause of cryptocurrency perception and speculative behavior of domestic cryptocurrency investors from an academic perspective. We use a model that reflects the traditional considerations and cryptocurrency's characteristics in investment. Using the model, we can explain the cause of misperception of cryptocurrency through the theory of bounded rationality. In building the research model, we use variables of venture and angel investor's consideration used in investment decisions and collect the keywords from indexes of whitepaper to reflect the properties of cryptocurrency. This study mentions that, due to the imitations presented by Simon, individuals are forced to perceive cryptocurrency as a means of speculation and to make irrational decisions that impair ecosystem health. We analyze whether there is a significant difference in rationality in decision made by the sample under limited knowledge and imperfect information constraints. As a result, imperfect information constraints led investors to consider only irrational criteria in decision making. From this result, this study suggests that information asymmetry needs to be relaxed so that investment can be pursued together with rational investment and development of blockchain ecosystem. In addition, the industry can capture strategic insights for successful financing through ICO by enabling better understanding of investor decision-making.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.9
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• pp.51-61
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• 2020

This research investigates the consequences of the increase in corporate use of short-term debt in China over the past decades. Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2007 to 2018, we empirically explore the effect of corporate use of short-term debt for long-term investment (SFLI) on audit pricing. We first examine the relationship between SFLI and audit pricing for different groups of firms. Then, we investigate the role of the increase in short-term debt in alleviating principal-agent conflicts and reducing agency costs. We have four primary empirical findings. First, auditors tend to charge SFLI clients higher fees. Second, the negative relationship between SFLI and audit fee is found in private firms, firms audited by Chinese domestic auditors, and firms with higher information asymmetry. Third, the time auditors spent on SFLI clients is significantly more than that spent on non-SFLI clients, suggesting that the decrease in audit fee is not due to the decrease in cost. Fourth, SFLI significantly reduces the agency costs of the firm, which auditors regard as a low risk signal and grant an audit fee discount. Our findings suggest that the decrease in debt maturity, not only influences managerial behaviors, but also influences auditors' risk assessment and pricing decisions.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.99-123
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• 2004

We focus in this study on incremental financing decisions and estimate a logit model for the probability a firm will choose a private placement over a public bond issue. We hypothesize that information asymmetry, financial risk, agent cost, and proprietary information may affect a firm's choice between public debt and private placements. We find that as the size of firm increases, the probability of choosing a private placement declines significantly. The age of the firm, however, is not a significant factor affecting the firm's choice between public and privately-placed bond. The coefficients on the firm's leverage and non-investment grade dummy are significantly positive, meaning firms with high financial risk and credit risk select private placements. The findings regarding agency-related variables, PER and Tobin's Q, are somewhat complex. We find significant evidence that firms with high PER prefer private placements to public bonds, suggesting that borrowers with options to engage in asset substitution or underinvestment are more likely to choose private placements. The coefficient of Tobin's Q is negative, but not significant, which weakly support the hold-up hypothesis. When we construct an interaction term on the Tobin's Q with a non-investment rating dummy, however, the Tobin's Q interaction term becomes positive and significant. Thus, high Tobin's Q firms with a speculative rating are significantly more likely to choose a private placement, regardless of the potential hold-up problems. The ratio of R&D to sales, proxy for proprietary information, is positively significant. This result can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a role for proprietary information in the debt sourcing decision process for these firms.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.145-158
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the ownership structure of unlisted firms on KOSDAQ listing. There are few studies analyzing the characteristics of listing success based on ownership structure. For startup executives, there is not enough data to refer to the ownership structure that can increase the possibility of listing. This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on IPO success through comparison between listed successful and failed companies among the companies in application for KOSDAQ listing eligibility review. The major findings are as follows; (1) Venture capital investment and shareholding have a statistically positive effect on the success of KOSDAQ listing. This results indicate that the venture capital's investment alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, and it is a valid signal for market participants. The result means the role of venture capital seems to be important when companies are listed on the KOSDAQ. (2) The largest shareholder's stake has an inverted-U shape relationship with listing success. In other words, the ownership concentration mitigates moral hazard problem, which leads to listing success. However, if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, the chances of success in listing will decrease due to concerns over the pursuit of private interests. The result suggests that the largest shareholder's stake reduce agency problem. This study academically contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the ownership structure affects IPOs, and explaining the results based on agent theory and signal theory. Our results provide practical implications for companies preparing for an IPO on the KOSDAQ.