• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.101-132
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• 2019

Why do some local rebel groups choose to form asymmetric alliances with large transnational terrorist organizations? This paper examines asymmetric terrorist alliance patterns by studying the international ties of domestic insurgencies in Southeast Asia. It uses data from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to construct a theory defining the determinants of the choice of alliance strategies by terrorist groups. The findings conclude that rebels with limited aims prefer to act alone out of fear of entrapment. They are cautious of becoming associated with the struggle of transnational radical groups and provoking organized response from international and regional counterterrorism authorities. Local groups are more likely to seek alliance with an established movement when they have ambitious final objectives, challenging the core interests of the target state. In this case, the benefits of training and logistic support provided by an experienced organization outweigh the costs of becoming a target for coordinated counterterrorist campaign.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.333-358
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• 2016

This study investigates the relative effect of symmetric and asymmetric relationship between franchiser and franchisee on the relational outcome of franchise alliance in education industry. To verify the research model, 240 samples, which is related with eduction service, were collected, among which 200 were used for the analysis. The outcome suggests that the asymmetric relationship in an alliance negatively influenced the relational quality, among which asymmetric alliance-specific investments had the most significant effect. On the other hand, the relational quality was positively influenced when the alliance relationship was symmetric, especially when the interactional fairness was high. Furthermore, compared to foreign franchise, local franchise presented higher level of role and responsibility imbalance, along with higher likihood of franchisees' opportunistic behaviors.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.55-66
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• 2019

For the past 66 years, the Korea-U.S. alliance has been a typical asymmetric alliance in which the U.S. supports South Korea's security during the Cold War and South Korea gives some of its policy autonomy to the U.S. But Lee Myung-bak government military alliance the 'comprehensive strategic alliance' of the character, 'value of alliance', Park Geun-hye ' a global, 'Frontier of cooperation', the government.'reciprocal, comprehensive alliance' Moon Jae-in, the government and partnerships developed with ' euroui the development of national security strategy said. The purpose of this study is to explore ways to build a reciprocal and comprehensive Korea-U.S. alliance for the development of the Korea-U.S. alliance policy in order to ensure South Korea's policy autonomy following changes in the Trump administration's alliance policy. The results of the research show the need for Korea to participate in the U.S.-led 'India-Pacific Strategy' continue diplomatic efforts for the mutual economic benefits of the two countries and strengthen public diplomacy in order to build the Korea-U.S. alliance in a reciprocal and comprehensive manner.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.215-234
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• 2004

With enormous changes in market condition, firms try to collaborate with their transaction partners. Recently, the diffusion of the Internet has made it possible for firms to directly collaborate with their partners. Accordingly, the importance of the Collaborative Commerce( C-Commerce) based on the Internet and IT has been emphasized. The literature in relational marketing and strategic alliance, however, has focused on the relational characteristics among firms. Therefore, the fundamental objective of this study is to investigate whether C-Commerce can enhance the positive relationships among firms. Based on theoretical and empirical research, some meaningful discussions can be made. First. the asymmetric commitment between buyers and suppliers decreases the C-Commerce utilization. Second, when specific investment is made to facilitate transactions, firms try to trade efficiently and depend on partners in a long-term period.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.180-214
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• 2015

The Republic of Korea navy challenged from the unexpected surprise attacks by the North Korea navy, albeit, the developments of up-to-date naval forces' technology, and the ceaseless efforts for war preparedness. My study divided into two categories. Qualitative methods used for literature review of international relations theory related to the war onset and for investigating events occurred on the Peninsula and its surrounding seas from 1968 to 2007. Quantitative method used such as the analyses of national power index of the two Koreas, the United States, and China, the uses of equation model to calculate power index of alliance, COPDAB(Conflict and Peace Data Bank) index analysis. Like Choi's study on East Asia maritime conflict, as a conclusion, considering both AT theory and maritime national power as a tool for predicting maritime conflict in the Peninsula proved significant. Based on the study, ROK navy need to prepare for the maritime conflict because the results showed North Korea would initiate maritime disputes sooner or later using fatal asymmetric forces and methods. As a policy suggestion, we are required to maintain a concrete ROK-US alliance ties and to construct naval forces due to the deterring functions of maritime national power.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.138-156
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• 2021

The aim of this article is to describe direction of Sino-Russian relations toward a new epoch - as the decision-making centers of both countries define them - indicating the commitment to building the future international order. It includes the synthesis of evolution of relations, descriptions of cooperation building of mutual confidence by both sides in variety of institutions; analyses of geo-economic relations emphasizing their geostrategic dimension and finally dynamics showing how two great powers want to achieve new areas of cooperation focused on building multipolar world order which is the essence of "new epoch". The argument goes towards recognizing the relationship as a "hhybrid alliance". This hybridity is a structural factor that can constrain the use of new dimensions of asymmetric interdependence as political leverage especially by United States against the two non-western powers but also facilitate to use it against West.

• Information and Communications Magazine
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.112-124
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• 1999

본 논문에서는 FTTC/VDSL (Fiber-to-the-Curb/Very High-speed Digital Subscriber Line) 전송시스템의 개발동향과 ANSI, ETSI, ITU등의 표준화 위원회에서 현재 진행중인 VDSL 시스템의 표준화 작업에 대해 기술하였다. 특히, POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service), BA-ISDA(Basic Access Integrated Services Digital Network), HDSL(High-rate Digital Subscriber Line), SDSL (Single-pair HDSL), ADSL(Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) 등의 다양한 xDSL (Digital Subscriber Line) 서비스들에서 발생하는 NEXT (Near-end Crosstalk)/FEXT (Far-end Crosstalk)와 같은 crosstalk를 최소화하기 위해 제안된 VDSL시스템의 주파수 대역과 PSD (Power Spectral Density) mask에 관해 설명하고, 순방향(down-stream) 채널과 역방향(upstream) 채널의 데이터 전송률이 대칭적인 VDSL전송시스템과 비대칭적인 VDSL 전송시스템 간의 주파수대역의 호환성 문제, RFI(Radio Frequency Interference) ingress/egress 문제의 해결 방안에 관해 기술하였다. 또한, 현재 VDSL Coalition과 VDSL Alliance 간에 논의 중인 VDSL 전송시스템의 변복조 방식에 관한 표준화 작업과정 및 순방향과 역방향에 할당될 band 개수에 따른 시스템 성능의 장단점 등에 관해 살펴보았다. 끝으로 현재 국내에서 개발되고 있는 FTTC/VDSL 전송시스템의 전체구조를 요약하고, 네트워크에서 가입자쪽으로 순방향 데이터 전송에 사용된 51.84 Mb/s 19-CAP (Carrierless Amplitude/Phase Modulation) 전송시스템과 가입자 댁내에서 네트워크 방향으로 역방향 데이터 전송에 사용된 1.62 Mb/s QPSK (Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) burst-mode TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) 전송시스템 등의 동작 원리 및 구조를 기술하였다.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.239-270
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• 2010

This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.