• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.13 no.9
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• pp.47-57
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• 2015

Purpose - The aim of this paper is to investigate the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory (the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information) among Korean retail firms from the perspective of debt capacity. According to the Pecking-order theory, a firm's first preference is to use internal funds for its capital needs, its next preference is the issuance of debt, and its last preference is the issuance of equity; this is due to the information asymmetry problem between existing shareholders and investors. However, prior empirical studies, such as Lemmon and Zender (2010), argue that the entire sample test for the Pecking-order theory could be misleading due to the different levels of debt issuance capability of each of the individual firms; in fact, they confirm that the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory improves after taking into account the differences in debt capacity of the U.S. firms they examined. This paper implements a case study approach among Korean retail firms to examine the relationship between debt capacity and the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory in Korea. Research design, data, and methodology - This study uses the sample of public retail firms on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) from the time period of 1990 to 2013. We gather related financial and accounting statements from the financial information firm WISEfn. Credit rating information is provided by the Korea Investor Service. We employ the models of Lemmon and Zender (2010) and Son and Kim (2013) to measure a firm's debt capacity. Their logit models use the rating dummy variable as a dependent variable and incorporate other firm characteristics as independent variables to estimate debt capacity. To test the Pecking-order theory, we adopt variants of the financing deficit model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In the test of the Pecking-order theory, we consider all of the changes in total debt obligations, current debt obligations, and long-term debt obligations. Results - Our main contribution to the literature is our confirmation of the predicted relationship between debt capacity and the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory among Korean retail firms. The coefficients on financing deficits become greater as a firm's debt capacity improves. This is consistent with the results of Lemmon and Zender (2010). The coefficients on the square of the financing deficits are also negative for the firms in the largest debt capacity group, which is also consistent with the predictions in prior literature. Conclusions - This study takes a case study approach by examining Korean retail firms. We confirm that the Pecking-order theory explains the capital structure of retail firms more appropriately, after taking into account the debt capacity of each firm. This result suggests the importance of debt capacity consideration in the testing of the Pecking-order theory. Our result also implies that there has been a potential underestimation of the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory in existing studies.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.109-141
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• 2006

The central factor in the pecking order theory of financial structure is the asymmetric distribution of information between managers and less-informed outside investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that this asymmetry leads managers to prefer internal funds to external funds. Funds are raised through equity issues only after the capacity to issue debt has been exhausted. In contrast, according to static tradeoff theory, an optimum financial structure exists by the tradeoff between tax saving by debt and bankruptcy costs. This study examines the recent changes of Korean firms' financial structure and financing behavior and the determinants of financial structure. The sample of firms comes from the period of $1996{\sim}2004$, and the number of firms is 32,003. The major findings are as follows. First, in contrast with previous studies using US firms as sample, Korean firms have been using debt financing as their major financing instrument. Especially, the firms in the fund deficit situation relies much more on $long{\sim}term$ and $short{\sim}term$ debts rather than on equity issues. Second, as is the case with previous studies using US firms sample indicates, the financing deficit variable can not explain perfectly the net debt issue. However, compared with net equity issue variable, net debt issue variable is more closely related to the financing deficit variable. Third, when financing deficit variable is added to the current list of explanatory variables of financial structure determinants model, it has a significant and positive explanatory power. In addition, the coefficients of determinants are much improved. Thus, it is concluded that although pecking order theory is not perfect, it appears to be more useful compared to static tradeoff theory, at least in explaining the recent financing behavior of Korean manufacturing firms.