• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.57-85
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• 2018

The debates continue on the conceptualization of Southeast Asia and the ways in which those of us who are concerned to attempt scholarly interventions in the region define, conceive, understand and engage with it. But, in an important sense, the region has now been defined for us by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and whatever academic researchers might wish to impose on Southeast Asia in regard to their priorities and interests, it may make little difference. Given the politically-derived, nation-state definition of Southeast Asia, are all our problems of regional definition resolved? In some respects, they have been. ASEAN has constructed and institutionalized a regional organization and an associated regional culture. But in certain fields of research we still require academic flexibility. We cannot always be confined by an ASEAN-derived regional definition. The paper will explore other configurations of 'region' and its sub-divisions and propose, that in the spirit of academic freedom, we can continue to generate imaginative depictions of Southeast Asia and its constituents both within and beyond the region.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.77-94
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• 2016

The paper examined Southeast Asia as a whole and focused on similarities among countries composing what is now known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In order to determine these similarities, the analysis focused on the fact that during World War II the whole of Southeast Asia was occupied by one political power: Japan. The policies the Japanese implemented in the region were to a degree very similar in terms of pressures and tensions that occurred in the different countries. The paper argues that these pressures and the responses of the various peoples of Southeast Asia instilled a nucleus of common identity in Southeast Asia as a whole. Basically, the policies that the Japanese implemented all over Southeast Asia were the following: the setting up regional administrations; the extraction of resources and emphasis on local self-sufficiency; the implementation of cultural Japanization; and local indigenization policies. The Southeast Asian responses that crystalized this joint Southeast Asian identity may be described as: accommodating and resisting the Japanese; commemorating portraying; and collectively remembering the era. The process of action and reaction between Japan and Southeast Asia was formative of this joint Southeast Asian identity.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.81-118
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• 2020

Despite its centrality at a pivotal crossroads of both land and sea of East-West trade, communications and travel, the region now known as Southeast Asia provides very few scholarly works situating or featuring it in an international context. Because of this paucity, there is immense scope for exploration. But prior to further explorations, justification is needed to establish that Southeast Asia, as a region, is a subject of interest, relevance, and significance in a global context. Southeast Asia was home to several empires whose reach transcended the region and beyond. Southeast Asia in, and as part of international history as an area of study is therefore justifiable. Moreover, other factors come into play, viz. geography, resources, migration, diffusion of ideas and beliefs from without and accommodation from within, shared experience of imperialism and colonialism, decolonization, and the Cold War, and the collective fate under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that further bolster its rationalization as a component of international history. Explorations, on the other hand, examine issues and obstacles that contribute to the paucity of works on Southeast Asia in international history. Furthermore, in contextualizing Southeast Asia in international history, there might appear challenges that need to be identified, confronted, and resolved.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.269-303
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• 2022

Since the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the main objective of creating a "prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations" through regional integration remains slow. While the aims and purposes of the ASEAN include accelerating, promoting active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters concerning culture and cultural development, the desired ASEAN Integration through culture is still in question. As a multicultural region, the richness and diversity of cultures constitute both prospects and challenges. This paper discusses 1) the concept of integration vis-a-vis the ASEAN; 2) the ASEAN's goals, policies, and initiatives, concerning culture as stipulated in the key documents of ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community-Culture and Arts sector; and 3) the ASEAN identity and community vis-a-vis culture. In the end, this paper proposes a framework on the ASEAN integration through culture in the context of a single identity amidst cultural diversity.

• Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention
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• v.15 no.19
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• pp.8521-8526
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• 2014

In many countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), cancer is an increasing problem due to ageing and a transition to Western lifestyles. Governments have been slow to react to the health consequences of these socioeconomic changes, leading to the risk of a cancer epidemic overwhelming the region. A major limitation to motivating change is the paucity of high-quality data on cancer, and its socioeconomic repercussions, in ASEAN. Two initiatives have been launched to address these issues. First, a study of over 9000 new cancer patients in ASEAN - the ACTION study - which records information on financial difficulties, as well as clinical outcomes, subsequent to the diagnosis. Second, a series of roundtable meetings of key stakeholders and experts, with the broad aim of producing advice for governments in ASEAN to take appropriate account of issues relating to cancer, as well as to generate knowledge and interest through engagement with the media. An important product of these roundtables has been the Jakarta Call to Action on Cancer Control. The growth and ageing of populations is a global challenge for cancer services. In the less developed parts of Asia, and elsewhere, these problems are compounded by the epidemiological transition to Western lifestyles and lack of awareness of cancer at the government level. For many years, health services in less developed countries have concentrated on infectious diseases and mother-and-child health; despite a recent wake-up call (United Nations, 2010), these health services have so far failed to allow for the huge increase in cancer cases to come. It has been estimated that, in Asia, the number of new cancer cases per year will grow from 6.1 million in 2008 to 10.6 million in 2030 (Sankaranarayanan et al., 2014). In the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), corresponding figures are 770 thousand in 2012 (Figure 1), rising to 1.3 million in 2030 (Ferlay et al., 2012). ASEAN consists of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. It, thus, includes low- and middle-income countries where the double whammy of infectious and chronic diseases will pose an enormous challenge in allocating limited resources to competing health issues. Cancer statistics, even at the sub-national level, only tell part of the story. Many individuals who contract cancer in poor countries have no medical insurance and no, or limited, expectation of public assistance. Whilst any person who has a family member with cancer can expect to bear some consequential burden of care or expense, in a poor family in a poor environment the burden will surely be greater. This additional burden from cancer is rarely considered, and even more rarely quantified, even in developed nations.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.17-53
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• 2016

Debates continue to multiply on the definition and rationale of Southeast Asia as a region and on the utility of the multidisciplinary field of area studies. However, we have now entered a post-colonialist, post-Orientalist, post-structuralist stage of reflection and re-orientation in the era of globalization, and a strong tendency on the part of insiders to pose these issues in terms of an insider-outsider dichotomy. On the one hand, the study of Southeast Asia for researchers from outside the region has become fragmented. This is for very obvious reasons: the strengthening and re-energizing of academic disciplines, the increasing popularity of other non-regional multidisciplinary studies, and the entry of globalization studies into our field of vision. On the other hand, how has the local Southeast Asian academy addressed these major issues of change in conceptualizing the region from an insider perspective? In filling in and giving substance to an outsider, primarily Euro-American-Australian-centric definition and vision of Southeast Asia, some local academics have recently been inclined to construct Southeast Asia in terms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): a nation-state-based, institutional definition of what a region comprises. Others continue to operate at a localized level exploring small-scale communities and territories, while a modest number focus on sub-regional issues (the Malay-Indonesian world or the Mekong sub-region are examples). However, further reflections suggest that the Euro-American-Australian hegemony is a thing of the past and the ground has shifted to a much greater emphasis on academic activity within the region. Southeast Asia-based academics are also finding it much more important to network within the region and to capture, understand, and analyze what Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars are saying about Southeast Asia, its present circumstances and trajectories, and their increasingly close involvement with the region within a greater Asia-Pacific rim. The paper argues that the insider-outsider dichotomy requires considerable qualification. It is a neat way of dramatizing the aftermath of colonialism and Orientalism and of reasserting local priorities, agendas, and interests. But there might be a way forward in resolving at least some of these apparently opposed positions with recourse to the concepts of culture and identity in order to address Southeast Asian diversities, movements, encounters, hybridization, and hierarchies.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.57-90
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• 2023

China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as part of the existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its influence in digital and technological development across Asia, Europe, and Africa. Southeast Asia is one of the key targets of the Digital Silk Road due to its geographical proximity to China and the rapid growth of the digital sphere. Although the DSR opens several potential opportunities for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to foster the digitalization process in the region, how each country reacts to projects under the DSR is varied. Secondly, Vietnam is the only ASEAN member state that has not signed any official agreement under the BRI framework, and thirdly, Vietnam opted out of Huawei technology. This paper aims to understand the perspective of Vietnam and how Vietnam has responded to the growing technological presence of China in Southeast Asia until 2021. By using qualitative methods, the author argues that the DSR has allowed Beijing to overcome the limitations of the original strategy, BRI, and strengthen its influence in the field of information and communication technologies, particularly fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications. Furthermore, the paper examines Vietnam's digital development and digital diplomacy and how the Vietnamese government has responded to DSR projects. In light of both the potential threats and economic benefits that the DSR has brought to Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries, in the last section, the policy implications for cooperation are discussed.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.31-40
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• 2014

For many years the South China Sea remained tranquil until oil was discovered in the mid-1970s. After that discovery, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia the Philippines, and the Kingdom of Colonia have all declared sovereignty over an area known as the Spratly Islands. Despite recent efforts by international organizations including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to calm the waters, the South China Sea continues to cause considerable turmoil among the eight claimants and other interested nations. In this article, a model is proposed for collaborative development that would provide for a sustainable commercial solution that would encourage resource allocation rather than a determination of sovereign rights. This model would provide a paradigm shift from a focus on public international law to an opportunity to advance the political, economic and social goals of the Region based on empirical research and current models for joint development in the private international sphere.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.119-140
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• 2020

Emerging from Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupation to become one of the newest states, Timor-Leste is an interesting example of modern nation-building. Geographically, Timor-Leste is located in the area covered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In such context, Timor-Leste has a strong claim to belonging to Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste nevertheless has not yet been admitted formally as a member despite its application for membership in March 2011. This paper locates Timor-Leste in a broader context of their construction of regional identity and as part of Southeast Asia. Drawing upon the constructivist approach, this paper suggests that the complexity of Timor-Leste's regional affiliation with ASEAN is made more challenging with its quest to assert itself as a nation-in-the-making.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-45
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• 2012

Among political scientists, Japan's free trade agreements (FTA) with member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been considered to be a political tool that can compete against China for regional leadership in East Asia. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's so-called FTA diplomacy towards ASEAN nations serves the broad interests of Japanese actors in both the political and economic sectors. Given the attention to Japanese domestic political issues, it is argued that diplomacy primarily facilitates a need for free trade with ASEAN and ASEAN markets for Japanese corporations to compete in the global economy and for the government to nurture Japan's stagnant economy by assisting these corporations. This work also contends that the unclear function of FTA as an economic good is due to the lack of the government capacity to effectively manage FTA diplomacy. This partly results from the conventional view with regard to Sino-Japanese rivalry.