韓国におけるドロ?ンの定義と法規制 (The Definition and Regulations of Drone in Korea)
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- 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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- 제34권1호
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- pp.235-268
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- 2019
본 논문에서는 한국법제상의 드론 규제에 관한 전반적인 규정 내용들을 개괄적으로 살펴보았다. 먼저 드론 개념에 관한 항공안전법상의 정의규정과 2019년 제정된 드론법상의 규정들을 검토하였다. 이후 항공안전법을 중심으로 드론 규제와 관련한 비행공역 제한 및 비행방법 규제들을 검토해 보았다. 동시에 일본항공법상의 무인항공기의 개념 및 그 규제체계에 관해서도 구체적으로 비교 검토하면서 분석해 보았다. 드론 규제에 관한 우리법과 한국법의 비교분석의 결과로서, 다음과 같은 몇 가지 시사점들을 생각해 볼 수 있었다. 첫째, 항공안전법상 드론에 관한 일반적인 정의규정이 필요하다고 생각된다. 항공안전법은 항공기의 한 종류로서 '무인항공기'를 규정하고, 초경량비행장치의 한 종류로서 '무인비행장치'를 규정하여 개별규제를 실시한다. 반면에 드론법은 조종자가 탑승하지 아니한 상태로 항행할 수 있는 비행체로써 드론을 정의하지만, 기본적으로는 항공안전법상의 정의 규정을 준용한다. 이러한 입법방식으로는 드론에 관한 일관적인 규제가 쉽지 않게 된다는 문제가 있다. 규제 내용 역시 산재되어 있어 그 체계를 파악하기도 어렵다. 따라서 항공안전법상 드론에 관한 일반적인 정의규정을 마련하고 그 대상요건을 명확하게 지정할 필요가 있다. 둘째, 항공안전법은 인구밀집지구에서의 드론 비행을 금지시키고 있으나, 무엇이 인구밀집지구인지에 대해 명확한 기준이 없다. 일본항공법의 경우에는 이에 관한 세부적인 기준이 있는데, 우리법에서도 인구밀집지구에 대한 구체적인 판단기준을 규정해야만 적용상의 혼란을 피할 수 있을 것이다. 셋째, 항공안전법은 드론 비행의 경우, 사람 물건과의 근접비행을 금지하고 있지만, 근접비행에서의 구체적인 거리가 명확하지 않다. 즉, 이와 관련한 안전거리 지정이 필요할 것으로 보인다. 일본항공법의 경우에는 직선거리 30m라는 안전거리 확보 규정이 있는데, 지상에 있는 인명 물건의 피해를 적극적으로 예방하기 위해서는 이와 관련한 명시적인 규정이 필요하다고 생각한다. 넷째, 항공안전법상 위험물 수송 금지에 관한 명시규정이 필요할 것으로 보인다. 위험물 수송은 단 한번의 투하 또는 사고로도 수많은 인명피해와 재산손해를 초래할 수 있다. 따라서 이 부분에 대해서는 명확한 금지 규정을 두어 규제하는 것이 옳다고 본다. 넷째, 수색 구조 활동을 수행하는 드론에 대해서는 특별한 허가나 승인 없이 이러한 활동을 수행할 수 있도록 하는 항공안전법상의 특별한 예외규정이 필요하다고 생각한다. 항공안전법의 경우에는 수색 구조와 관련하여 국가기관 등의 항공기에 대한 적용특례를 두고 있으나, 드론에도 이와 같은 특례 적용이 가능한지 명확하지 않으므로, 일반적 규제 적용이 배제되는 명시적인 예외규정이 필요할 것으로 보인다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.