A Liner Conference can be defined as "a group of two or more vessel operating carriers which provide international liner services for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes within specific geographical limits and which has an agreement or arrangement within the framework of which they operate under uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provisions of the liner services". This study reviews maritime transport policy regarding liner conference and the changes in the liner market over the decades. Liner shipping industry has long been protected from competition by block exemption. The repeal of the block exemption for liner conferences and the abolition of any special EC antitrust regime for the shipping industry marks an important step in European maritime competition policy. This article examines the origins and the rationale of the EC antitrust immunity granted so far th the shipping industry and explains the causes of this historic changes. The abolition of Regulation 4056/86 and of the EU commitment to the UN Code of Conduct marks an historical evolution in international maritime policy, which will have an influence far beyond the EU.
The present paper investigates the potential value of strategic antitrust policy in an oligopolistic international market. The market is characterized by a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium and by asymmetry in costs among firms in the world market. The model is useful for two reasons. First, it is important in the context of policy-making to examine the conditions under which it may be beneficial to relax antitrust law to enhance competitiveness. Second, the explicit derivation of the level of cost-saving required for a gain in total domestic surplus provides an empirical rule for excluding industries that do not satisfy the requirements for a socially beneficial antitrust exemption. Results of the analysis include a criterion that tells how the cost-saving and concentration effects of a merger offset each other. The criterion is derived from fairly general assumptions on demand functions and is simple enough to be applied as a part of the merger guidelines. Another interesting policy implication of our analysis is that promoting mergers would not be a beneficial strategy in a net importing industry where cost-saving opportunities are thin. Cost-saving domestic mergers are more likely to increase national welfare in exporting industries. The best candidate industries for application of strategic antitrust policy are those with the following characteristics: (i) a large potential for efficiency enhancement; (ii) high market concentration at the world but not the domestic level; (iii) a high ratio of exports to imports. Recently, many policymakers and economists in Korea have also come to believe that the appropriate antitrust policy in an era of increased foreign competition may actually be to encourage rather than to prohibit domestic mergers. The Industry Development Act of 1986 and the proposed bill for Mergers and Conversions in the Financial Industry of 1990 reflect this changing perspective on antitrust policy. Antitrust laws may burden domestic firms in the sense that they have a more constrained strategy set. Expenditures to avoid antitrust attacks could also increase costs for domestic firms. But there is no clear evidence that the impact of antitrust policy is significant enough to harm the competitiveness of domestic firms. As a matter of fact, it is necessary for domestic financial institutions to become large in scale in this era of globalization. However, the absence of empirical evidence for efficiency enhancement from mergers suggests caution in the relaxation of antitrust standards.
독점금지법과 지적재산권 양자간에는 항상 긴장관계가 존재해 왔다. 이러한 근본적인 대립관계에도 불구하고, 양자는‘소비자 복지의 극대화’와‘창조적 활동과 공정한 경쟁의 촉진’이라는 공통된 경제적 목적을 공유하고 있다(WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,PATENT & ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL & ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1-14 (1973). 그럼 과연 독점금지법이 지적재산권자
의 권리행사를 제한할 수 있을까? 만약 그것이 가능하다면, 어떤 경우에 지적재산권의 행사가 금지되는 것인가? 이하에서는 최근의 ‘마이크로소프트(MS)의 끼워팔기(tying) 사건’과 특허권자에 의한 거래거절행위의 위법성 여부가 문제됐던 미국의‘코닥사건’을
살펴봄으로써 이러한 궁금증을 해결하고자 한다.
Historically shipping conference has enjoyed antitrust immunity in consideration of the importance of liner service in international trade in that it is essential to ensure stable movement of international freight. However, shipping deregulation which has been carried out for last decades in the US and EU has caused significant changes to the liner shipping market. In fact, most of shipping conferences have broken up or transformed as discussion agreement since shipping regulatory reform. However, on the other hands, it is also true that it has contributed to developmore efficient and responsive negotiating process that are better tailored to the needs of individual shippers.
The International Civil Aviation Convention (Chicago Convention) has been a backbone of international air transport system whereby air transport between States should be based on bilateral agreements, and in particular, international airfares, which are set up through IATA(International Air Transport Association) rate-fixing machinery could be approved by the governments concerned. International airfares are fares for transporting passenger and freight and their conditions between two or more countries. However, since U.S. pursued th deregulation policy in 1978 whereby routes, capacity and fares could be freely determined by airlines, many States have been following so called open-skies agreements. In many cases, aeronautical and competent authorities have been reviewing whether airlines' commercial activities including air fares could possibly conflict with free competition rules envisaged in relevant laws and regulations. As competition among airlines gets intense, airlines often resort to cooperation with other airlines in the forms such as equity exchange, M&A, code-sharing, fares consultation and resource pooling, mainly with a view to effectively use resources available and to avoid monopoly situation resulting from excessive and destructive competition among players. Whereas bearing in mind that application of competition laws is important to secure consumers' interests by preventing airlines's malpractices such as bargaining exorbitant fares, it is also important to comprehensively consider as many factors as possible, from that unilateral measure by governments may bring about retaliatory measures by the governments affected, to that airlines' cooperative practices may rather increase consumers' benefits by lowering air fares.
Proceedings of the Technology Innovation Conference
/
1996.12a
/
pp.196-238
/
1996
Because global innovation-based competition is increasing and the amount of R&D expenditures becomes severely large, it is more likely that mergers and collaborative ventures tend to affect adversely to R&D competition Against this trend, enforcing agency of advanced countries including U.S.A are reassessing certain aspects of competition policy toward mergers and acquisition to ensure that procompetitive, efficiency-enhancing transactions are permitted. The role of competition policy is developing and appropriating new technology and protects the risks involved in the licensing contract of technologies. The role of intellectual property rights is also contrived to promote technological innovation and to increase consumer welfare. That is to say, dynamic efficiency of intellectual property rights includes (l) increase in social welfare and (2) promotion of growth by improvement of quality through invention and commercialization of new product as well as enhanced productive efficiency thorough appropriating new process. Because intellectual property rights are licensed to make use of complementary inputs, the rule of reason approach seems proper when applying antitrust law. To analyze the "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property"by DOJ and FTC in U.S.A, the author surveyed pros and cons on innovation market approach. This approach will only be used in a narrow range of situations when the evidence is solid, concentration numbers are extremely high, and the agencies can predict with a high degree of certainty that the merger will likely lead either to a slowing in the pace of innovation or the loss of an alternative research track that is likely to lead to a product beneficial to consumers. The author introduces the studies on licensing contract of intellectual property rights and competition polices on behalf of potential inquirers. Also the author invites the interdisciplinary researchers to analyze further with a model on the aspects of the "Notice 1995-10 for Types and Criteria on Unfair Transaction Behavior in International Contracts" by Fair Trade Committee of Korea.
Recently, the antitrust tribunal of Seoul High Court revoked the disposition of Korea Fair Trade Commission(hereafter 'KFTC'). While KFTC determined that the restriction of Korea Pediatrician Association violated article 26 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(Korean antitrust law), Seoul High court viewed that KFTC failed to prove the compulsory measures and the restraint of competition required in article 26. The 'restriction' of article 26 should be interpreted as 'excessive restriction'. Since entrepeneurs' organization is allowed to limit its member's activities, KFTC could regulate entrepeneurs' organization on a very exceptional basis. In addition, though entrepeneurs' organization did not use compulsory measures to enforce its resolution, its 'excessive restriction' could fit into the notion of 'restriction' of article 26. Under the current medical care system, the price of medical care is decided by Korean government. Therefore the restriction of Korea Pediatrician Association is not likely to have effect on the price. However, the resolution of Korea Pediatrician Association was aimed to decrease the supply of medical care. Therefore the resolution is capable of having effect on the competition. In this sense, though KFTC failed to submit direct evidence to support the decrease of quantity, there could be possibility of restraint of competition. The Seoul High Court's decision has important implications. The leading case on restraint of competition(Supreme Court 2002Du8628, Posco case) was delivered in 2007. However the remaining issue such as the standard and scope of restraint of competition is not clear. Through reappeal case of this decision, Supreme Court has to decide the line between competition and its restraint.
On May 16, 2014 the Supreme Court of Korea rendered its decision with respect to litigation filed by All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. ("ANA") for revocation of an order of correction and payment of a penalty imposed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC"). On or around September 2002, ANA and various airlines operating air cargo service from Japan to Korea were allegedly to have agree to introduce of fuel surcharge into their rates on cargo fares in an attempt to recoup falling profits from rising of oil price. As this hard core cartel was per se prohibited under Korean competition law (The Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act), KFTC began an investigation and consequently with fruitful results imposed an amount of penalty and issued an order of prohibition. ANA protested against this imposition by filing suit against KFTC under the reasons that (1) their agreement was simply pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations including Air Transport Agreement between Korea and Japan, (2) there was an administrative guidance from Japanese government to allow this agreement, (3) extraterritorial application of Korean competition law to the agreement in this matter was improper as it was made within Japan and targeted only for the shipment from Japan to Korea: accordingly there is not a direct and serious effect between the agreement and any result of anti-competitive. This article aims to review ANA's allegation and the judgement delivered by Korean court under some issues respectively; (1) whether there is an effectively actual anti-competitive cartel between airlines including plaintiff, (2) whether filed rate doctrine is reasonable and applicable in this case for precluding wrongfulness, (3) what is the reasonable limitation of boundaries in extraterritorial application of Korean competition law. Additionally, this article also suggests to concern particular features of air transport business as an regulated industry in judging the unfair restrain on competition.
Fair Competition policy in aviation field has been discussed since open skies policy began in 1970s. This issue has been also the main topic in the ICAO's Worldwide Air Transport Conference, the Air Transport Symposium, etc. ICAO defines competition as the existent or potential rivalry between two or more operators, carriers or groups, striving for advantages in the same market based on different prices, qualities and services. In a broader sense, the definition includes more various meanings; reasonable, fair, effective, and unrestricted competitions. Nowadays, competition laws and regulations to air transportation have been applied more frequently and the issues varies from antitrust immunity, mergers and alliances, abuse of dominant positions, capacity dumping and predatory pricing, sales and marketing, to airport charges and fees, state aid and loan guarantees. Now, the competition among the airlines or nations in aviation industry is changing to cooperation level. A lot of airlines try to survive by various cooperation methods. Therefore the policy of Korean aviation industry should be developed, taking so-called "the viewpoint of national aviation industry ecosystem" into consideration and Korean government should prepare a policy of fair competition to cope with it. First, in the process of open skies policy with neighboring countries such as China, Japan and the Middle East, it is necessary to apply the fair competition act and prepare laws and regulations to implement it. Second, the standards of effective ownership and control of air transportation business should be reviewed. Third, in preparation for aviation agreements and liberalization, the Korean aviation industry needs to study and review competition and cooperation issues through the analysis of strict aviation market structure for airlines and airport operations. Fourth, it is necessary to create a fair air transportation environment for the development of air transportation and competitiveness through preemptive policies such as the approval of mergers, acquisitions, JV and the ripple effects analysis.
Resale price maintenance has long been employed in book distribution, perhaps longer than for any other product. Another unusual practice in the book trade that has proven to be quite durable in spite of its substantial cost in real resources is the returns policy. Publishers typically grant the right to return unsold books within a stipulated time for full credit against future orders. This paper investigates the functions and effects of resale price maintenance in the book trade, and argues that resale price maintenance and returns are substitute methods of providing the same economic function. Resale price maintenance can be used to compensate booksellers for initially stocking books with uncertain prospects and for providing a conduit through which manufacturers acquire information about consumer demand (market testing services). Permitting the return of unsold books for full credit places a floor under retail prices and transfers a considerable portion of the cost of introducing a new product line back to the publisher. Both reflect publishers' needs to have their books displayed. In the U.S. returns privileges were first proposed in 1913, roughly coincident with the Macy decision outlawing RPM. Publishers slowly granted return privileges, which become nearly universal by 1970. The decline in margins in recent years has been accompanied by an increase in returns as the return policy served to substitute for lost margins on successful titles as a methods of compensating full-line booksellers. In contrast, returns privileges are unusual in countries where price maintenance in books has been practiced. These observations are consistent with our analysis. In Korea, resale price maintenance of books is practiced under an exception to Korean antitrust law. The availability of effective price maintenance is likely to reduce the use of returns programs. Since consumers prefer to obtain books at outlets where they know the books are likely to be stocked rather than taking a chance on stores that carry a more limited line, it also provides a strong incentive for booksellers to expand. But the privilege of resale price maintenance should be confined to books which publishers want to be price maintained. Resale price maintenance and returns system differ in the transactions costs associated with inventory holding, and publishers' judgement on the comparative advantage of the two schemes should be honored. Publishers should also remain free to authorize sales at discount at any time not to impair the ability of booksellers to dispose of product variants that prove unpopular.
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