• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.1-8
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• 2016

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the development of North Korea's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), and its influence on South Korea's maritime strategy. While research studies on North Korea's ballistic-missile capabilities and South Korea's ballistic-missile defense systems are proliferating, less analytical attention has been given to the way that the strengthening of North Korea's ballistic-missile capacities presents a critical threat to the ROK's navy and lines of communication. The authors of this paper identify the continuing development of unique ASBM capabilities by China and Iran, and determine that such processes are mutually interactive and in accordance with threat perceptions; furthermore, North Korea can enact the same process by learning lessons from these nations. The findings of this paper provide an implication for the formulation of South Korea's maritime strategy and the related assets in consideration of the ASBM as a future threat.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.59-93
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• 2015

A Paradigm shift is in process in China's foreign policies during Xi Jinping's era. Such changes occur with changing national identities from developing country to great power, and from continental power to continental-maritime power. China's pursuit for sea power embraces its global strategy. Accommodating the new identity of maritime power, China is developing its maritime strategy. New silk-road strategy actively utilizes China's advantage in economy, while avoiding direct military challenges against the U.S. China seeks an associated balance of power with the U.S. On the other hand, China make its determination clear to protect its core national interests, particularly Taiwan straits issue, deploying Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategy. 'Pax-Americana 3.0' and 'China's rise 2.0' have convoluted and evolved in complexity. South Korea faces much tougher challenges ahead in its foreign and security environments.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.239-243
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• 2023

Due to recent small unmanned aircraft threats by North Korea and unsuccessful reponses, severe concerns about future national security have been being increasingly surged. Especially it is notable and unaccpetable to see that North Korea's small drones flying over capical areas over 7 hours were not efficiently detected and identified even though South Korea already recognized the threats since early 2010s. Meanwhile a US military troop operating THAAD system on Seung-Joo, South Korea successfully shot down unidentified small drone on Jan 2023. The threats caused by small unmanned aircraft is worrisome not only to South Korea, but also to international nations. This paper surveyed US DoD Strategy for countering small aircraft systems and suggest how to improve our current anti-dron systems so that small unmanned aircraft threats will be dynamically diminished or neutralized as fast as we can.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.533-544
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• 2024

This study aims to analyze North Korea's cognitive warfare capabilities against South Korea based on Russia's reflexive control and China's Three Warfares strategy, and to derive implications thereof. Cognitive warfare, a new form of conflict that aims to distort the enemy's decision-making by influencing their cognitive processes, has gained prominence in recent international disputes. The research findings indicate that North Korea has both the capability and intention to conduct cognitive warfare against South Korea, emulating strategies from Russia and China. This includes various means such as cyber attacks, psychological warfare, and dissemination of false information. To counter these threats, the study proposes several measures: establishing a dedicated national-level organization, enhancing information collection and analysis capabilities, expanding public education on cognitive warfare, developing proactive response strategies, and strengthening international cooperation. This study contributes to raising awareness about the threat of North Korea's cognitive warfare and emphasizes the need for systematic preparedness. It calls for further research on specific countermeasures and the development of relevant policies to effectively address this emerging security challenge in the Korean Peninsula.

• Clinical and Experimental Pediatrics
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.690-695
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• 2008

The age-specific anti-hepatitis A virus (HAV) seroprevalence rates in South Korea have changed markedly since the last 2030 years with an improvement in the socio-economic, housing, and environmental-sanitation conditions. These changes are characterized by very low anti-HAV seropositive rates among individuals less than 30 years of age; however, nowadays, most adolescents and young adults at an increased risk of developing symptomatic HAV infections. The Korea Center for Disease Control Sentinel Surveillance System has recently revealed an increase in the incidence of hepatitis A infection since 2001 and has revealed a potential endemic nature of the hepatitis A infection. Hepatitis A vaccines that were introduced in 1997 in Korea have made the current anti-HAV IgG positive rates in children (less than 10 years of age) approximately 50% of the rates observed in Seoul in 2006. However, in the same year, a few children were diagnosed as having anti-HAV IgG antibodies in Busan. This suggests the presence of some difference in the vaccination policy among doctors practicing in Seoul and Busan. Thus, the current recommendation of vaccinating 12-year-old child with HAV vaccination should be emphasized and a new strategy should be developed for the vaccination program to cater to the adolescents and young adults who are not immune, as well as for persons who are at a high risk for hepatitis A viral infection such as military personnel and hospital and day care center employees. Further, urgent hepatitis A vaccinations are also needed in patients with chronic liver diseases.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• ALGAE
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.341-349
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• 2018

Sargassum horneri is edible brown seaweed abundant along the coasts of Jeju Island, South Korea. In addition to the native S. horneri population, a large amount of S. horneri has been found to invade Jeju Island from the east coast of China. Thus, S. horneri of both Korea (SK) and China (SC) strains now inhabits along with the shore of Jeju Island and have become a threat to the coastal biodiversity. However, they could be used in obtaining functional ingredients for industrial level applications provided an optimized cost effective strategy. In the present study, we compared SK and SC strains for the extraction efficiency, components, antioxidant, and anti-inflammatory properties of 80% methanolic extracts and their partially purified fractions. According to the results, two strains indicated similar bioactive properties such as DPPH and alkyl radical scavenging activity as well as anti-inflammatory activities on lipopolysaccharide-stimulated RAW 264.7 cells. The yield of 80% methanol extract from SC was higher than SK. However, the yields of the ethyl acetate and chloroform fractions from SK were higher than those of SC strain. The major peaks in the high-performance liquid chromatography chromatograms, which was identified as Apo-9 fucoxanthinone, indicated that both methanolic extracts of SK and SC contains major target peaks but with different amounts. This study might be useful for developing functional materials from SC and SK in future.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.251-267
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• 2016

한국과 인도 간 관계(이후 한국-인도 관계)는 오랜 역사를 통해 정치, 사회, 경제 및 전략적 측면에서 지속적으로 발전되었다. 특히 인도의 "동방정책(Look East Policy)" 채택과 한국의 "중견국 외교(Middle-power diplomacy)" 선언 간 동질성을 모색하는 차원에서 최근에 더욱 긴밀히 발전되고 있다. 즉 최근에 이르러 갑자기 발전된 관계가 아니라는 논지이다. 이에 본 논문에서는 한국과 인도 간 관계를 역사적 시각, 탈냉전 이후 시각, 경제적 시각 및 교육 및 문화적 그리고 지정학적 시각에서 평가하고자 한다. 특히 역내 중견국(middle power) 대표적 국가를 활용한 긴밀한 전략적 협력을 강조하고자 한다. 이를 위해 2004년 노무현 대통령의 인도 공식 방문 이후 2015년 1월 박근혜 대통령의 방문까지의 양국 간 전략적 협력 관계를 조명해 본다. 이에 따라 양국 관계는 이미 공개된 바와 같이 이는 사이버, 방산, 군사협력 및 정보교환 등의 분야로 구체화되고 있다. 일부는 이를 중국을 견제하는 양국 간의 협력이라고 평가하나, 본 논문은 특정 국가를 지목하기보다, 역내 중견국으로서의 전략적 관계 증진을 통한 역내 이익 보호에 있다고 평가한다. 특히 양국 간을 지리적으로 연결하는 해양을 통한 해양협력에 대한 논의를 추가한다. 예를 들면 역내 자연재난 구조작전(DR operation) 및 인도주의 지원작전(HA operation) 해양협력과 현재 진행되고 있는 아덴만 해적퇴치작전(Anti-piracy naval operation)이다.