• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제26권1호
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• pp.93-125
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• 2011

제2차 세계대전 이후 국제항공체제의 근간이 되는 1944년의 시카고협약에 의하면 국가 간 항공 운송은 양자협상체제로 규율되며, 특히 운임은 IATA의 운임설정기구를 통한 항공사간 협의와 관련국 정부의 인가로 운영되고 있다. 항공 운임은 여객, 수하물 및 우편물을 제외한 화물의 운송에 대해 부과되는 가격과 그 가격의 가용성 및 사용을 지배하는 조건이다. 전통적인 양자협정이 질서 있고 원만한 항공 시장의 발전에 주안점을 두고 있는 반면 자유화협정 체제는 운임의 자유 경쟁을 비롯하여 가능한 한 모든 규제를 철폐하고 있다. 또한 EU를 비롯한 지역적인 블록은 역내 항공자유화를 추구하고 있다. 한편 자유화와는 별개로 전 세계적인 차원에서 자원의 효율적인 활용과 파괴적인 경쟁으로 초래되는 시장의 독과점 상태를 방지하기 위하여 항공사간 다양한 형태의 협력(합병 및 인수, 공동 운항, 운임협의, CRS, 지상조업 등)이 추구되고 있다. 이들 자유화를 지향하는 국가에서는 항공 운임을 포함한 항공사간 협력이 경쟁을 저해함으로써 소비자 후생에 반하는지 여부를 판단하여 반독점 면제(antitrust immunity)를 부여할 것인가를 결정하고 있다. 운임을 비롯한 항공사간 협력이 항공사간 공정한 경쟁을 유지하고 소비자 이익을 증진할 경우 반독점 면제를 부여하고 있다. 면제의 허용 여부는 관련 국가와의 원만한 관계 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 신중하게 결정하여야 한다.

• 한국항공운항학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.