• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.287-325
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• 2017

Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.145-152
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• 2017

As a popularization of small UAS to have improved flight performance and easiness of controlling, the UAS industry is increased and also small UAS is to be a new threat for airspace security of national strategic infrastructure. Rising the new threat makes the negative side effect of small UAS operation. This phenomena brought to new R&D needs "defense system" for small UAS/UAV - called Anti-Drone. The paper addressed case study of defects, accidents and threats by small UAS/UAV as world wide level, and research and development trend of UAS defense system as each technical category - CONOP (Concept of Operation), identification/recognition method and control/supremacy techniques. As a result, this suggests the direction what and where drone defense system should be applied first and required for Korean society in the view of society system (regime) and a point of view for minimizing side effect as UAS popularization.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.129-138
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• 2017

This paper has been shown for the extraction of Doppler signature from the radar signal for an air-breathing targets tracked in the ground radar. For the extractions, a Doppler resolution is confirmed from mathematical modeling of PT(pulse train) waveform. Doppler signatures of air-breathing target are varied to radar aspect angle of engine and are determined from physical parameter of jet engine. To confirm such Doppler signatures, the radar signal reflected from the air-breathing target is obtained by our radar signal storage. After this extraction, radar aspect angle of engine has estimated from tracking information. Relative differences of Doppler signatures to radar aspect angle of engine is verified from these results and Doppler profiles for radar target identification appliance are presented.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.33-42
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• 2020

There has been difficulties in identifying objects by relying on the naked eye in various surveillance systems. There is a growing need for automated surveillance systems to replace soldiers in the field of military surveillance operations. Even though the object detection technology is developing rapidly in the civilian domain, but the research applied to the military is insufficient due to a lack of data and interest. Thus, in this paper, we applied one of deep learning algorithms, Convolutional Neural Network-based binary classification to develop an autonomous identification model of both friend and foe helicopters (AH-64, Mi-17) among the military weapon systems, and evaluated the model performance by considering accuracy, precision, recall and F-measure. As the result, the identification model demonstrates 97.8%, 97.3%, 98.5%, and 97.8 for accuracy, precision, recall and F-measure, respectively. In addition, we analyzed the feature map on convolution layers of the identification model in order to check which area of imagery is highly weighted. In general, rotary shaft of rotating wing, wheels, and air-intake on both of ally and foe helicopters played a major role in the performance of the identification model. This is the first study to attempt to classify images of helicopters among military weapons systems using CNN, and the model proposed in this study shows higher accuracy than the existing classification model for other weapons systems.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.22 no.6
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• pp.566-572
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• 2021

A methodology for the identification and coordinates estimation of air cavities under urban ground or sandy soil using its natural poles and natural resonant frequencies is presented. The potential of this methodology was analyzed. Simulation models of PEC (Perfect Electric Conductor)s with various shapes and dimensions were developed using an EM (Electromagnetic) simulator. The Cauchy method was applied to the obtained EM scattering response of various objects from EM simulation models. The natural poles of objects corresponding to its instinct characterization were then extracted. Thus, a library of poles can be generated using their natural poles. The generated library of poles provided the possibility of identifying a target by comparing them with the computed natural poles from a target. The simulation models were made assuming that there is an air cavity under urban ground or sandy soil. The response of the desired target was extracted from the electromagnetic wave scattering data from its simulation model. The coordinates of the target were estimated using the time delay of the impulse response (peak of the impulse response) in the time domain. The MP (Matrix Pencil) method was applied to extract the natural poles of a target. Finally, a 0.2-m-diameter spherical air cavity underground could be estimated by comparing both the pole library of the objects and the calculated natural poles and the natural resonant frequency of the target. The computed location (depth) of a target showed an accuracy of approximately 84 to 93%.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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• v.25 no.6
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• pp.572-579
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• 2022

The analysis of foreign aircraft appearing suddenly in air defense identification zones requires a lot of cost and time. This study aims to develop a pre-trained model that can identify neighboring military aircraft based on aircraft photographs available on the web and present a model that can determine which aircraft corresponds to based on aerial photographs taken by allies. The advantages of this model are to reduce the cost and time required for model classification by proposing a pre-trained model and to improve the performance of the classifier by data augmentation of edge-detected images, cropping, flipping and so on.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.201-224
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• 2017

The main subject of this article focused on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas. For this the legal status of the military aircraft, the freedom of overflight, the right of hot pursuit, the right of visit and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) were dealt. The 1944 Chicago Convention neither explicitly nor implicitly negated the customary norms affecting the legal status of military aircraft as initially codified within the 1919 Paris Convention. So the status of military aircraft was not redefined with the Chicago Convention and remains, as stated in the 1919 Paris Convention, as a norm of customary international law. The analyses on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas are found as follows; According to the Article 95 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military aircraft in the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. According to the Article 111 (5) of the UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised by military aircraft. According to the Article 110 of the UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. As for Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) it is established and declared unilaterally by the air force of a state for the national security. However, there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention and there are no international standards to recognize or prohibit the establishment of ADIZs. ADIZ is not interpreted as the expansion of territorial airspace.