• Title/Summary/Keyword: Actor-Network

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How does Man and Non-human beings meet? (인간과 비인간 존재는 어떻게 만나는가?)

  • Sim, Gui-yeon
    • Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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    • v.147
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    • pp.239-260
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    • 2018
  • Is an artificial intelligence robot, a non-human beings newly emerging in the age of technology, a threat to human beings, or a mutual cooperation or ensemble with human beings? The desire to control nature through the use of the power of science and technology is manifested in the fear that humans can annihilate themselves. This study attempts to identify the problems of Cartesian epistemology underlying these questions and fears and to answer these questions based on Merleau - Ponty 's ontological ontology using the Ontology and Latour' s ontology and technological philosophy. The cogito derived from the Cartesian philosophy became the basis of the structure of dichotomous epistemology of 'subjectivity and objectivity' based on human - reason. In the human-centered world, all non-human beings were tools or controls for humans. The problem of the modern people is not only to get help from the natural scientific methods to control the nature including man, but also to think that scientific method is the only way to understand the world. In criticizing this, Merleau-Ponty shows that the body mediates between human beings and non-human beings, and provides a possible ontological basis for the ontology. Merleau - Ponty 's phenomenological methodology and ontology are newly developed by Simondon under the influence of phenomenological philosopher and phenomenology. The relationship between human beings and nonhuman beings by Simondon appears as an ensemble of human and technical objects or a mutual co - operation of human and technical objects. In particular, Latour goes a step further in Simondon and defines all the bodies living in the world as actor-network theory, denying the core concept of modernity. Merleau - Ponty 's phenomenological view can be a new possible basis for the philosophical discussion of the technological age. We will see that the problem itself can be solved by shifting modern fear to a phenomenological attitude.