• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• 대순사상논총
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• 제29집
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• pp.241-278
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• 2017

이 논문은 한국 종교에 대한 비판적인 견해의 대대적인 표출 현상(안티 종교운동)을 정리하고 유형화한 뒤 그 의미를 분석한 글이다. 이를 위해 먼저 현대의 범세계적인 종교변동부터 살폈다. 세계종교는 지구촌 의식 출현에 영향을 받아왔다. 그 결과 그들은 과거와의 연속성을 유지한 채 여러 종교의 공통 기반 위에서 보편성을 획득하려하고 있다. 그러한 모습은 스스로의 정체성을 계속 유지하려들거나, 전통을 재창조하려하거나 혹은 현대에 맞게 변용시키거나, 혁신적으로 변화를 추구하거나, 민족주의와 결탁하거나 하는 여러 유형으로 중첩되어 나타나곤 한다. 세계종교에서 살필 수 있는 이러한 변동들이 한국 사회에서는 어떻게 관찰되는가? 대체로 현 시대의 한국 종교상황은 개신교에 대한 비판이나 혁신 요구, 소수종교에 대한 공격, 학계와 언론의 종교 개혁요구, 종교무용론 전파, 유튜브 등 인터넷과 멀티미디어를 활용한 종교 비판 등으로 나타나고 있는 것으로 보인다. 이러한 종교 비판은 안티 종교운동으로 읽혀진다. 종교 외적으로는 서구 학자들이 제기하고 있는 종교무용론이나 과학 또는 역사적 관점에서의 종교 비판 이론이 서점을 중심으로 전파되고 있으며, 종교 내적으로는 개신교를 중심으로 자신의 내부를 반성하고 새로운 초종교적 영성을 강조하는 방향으로 흐르고 있다는 것이 그 내용이다. 과거에도 물론 종교 일반과 특정 종교에 대한 비판은 제기되었다. 그러나 최근에 우리나라에서 진행되고 있는 안티 종교운동은 그 내용과 맥락에서 과거와는 다른 양상으로 전개되고 있다. 특히 개신교에 대한 적극적이고 전반적인 비판 운동은 분명 새로운 현상임에 틀림없다. 적어도 개신교가 주요 대상이기는 하지만 현재 우리나라에서 진행되고 있는 안티 종교운동은 앞으로 우리나라의 종교변동을 살필 수 있는 주요 자료가 될 수 있을 것이다.

• 지능정보연구
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.155-174
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• 2022

2020년 1월부터 2021년 10월 현재까지 COVID-19(치명적인 호흡기 증후군인 코로나바이러스-2)와 관련된 학술 연구가 500,000편 이상 발표되었다. COVID-19와 관련된 논문의 수가 급격하게 증가함에 따라 의료 전문가와 정책 담당자들이 중요한 연구를 신속하게 찾는 것에 시간적·기술적 제약이 따르고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 LDA와 Word2vec 알고리즘을 사용하여 방대한 문헌의 텍스트 자료로부터 유용한 정보를 추출하는 방안을 제시한다. COVID-19와 관련된 논문에서 검색하고자 하는 키워드와 관련된 논문을 추출하고, 이를 대상으로 세부 주제를 파악하였다. 자료는 Kaggle에 있는 CORD-19 데이터 세트를 활용하였는데, COVID-19 전염병에 대응하기 위해 주요 연구 그룹과 백악관이 준비한 무료 학술 자료로서 매주 자료가 업데이트되고 있다. 연구 방법은 크게 두 가지로 나뉜다. 먼저, 47,110편의 학술 논문의 초록을 대상으로 LDA 토픽 모델링과 Word2vec 연관어 분석을 수행한 후, 도출된 토픽 중 'vaccine'과 관련된 논문 4,555편, 'treatment'와 관련된 논문 5,791편을 추출한다. 두 번째로 추출된 논문을 대상으로 LDA, PCA 차원 축소 후 t-SNE 기법을 사용하여 비슷한 주제를 가진 논문을 군집화하고 산점도로 시각화하였다. 전체 논문을 대상으로 찾을 수 없었던 숨겨진 주제를 키워드에 따라 문헌을 분류하여 토픽 모델링을 수행한 결과 세부 주제를 찾을 수 있었다. 본 연구의 목표는 대량의 문헌에서 키워드를 입력하여 특정 정보에 대한 문헌을 분류할 수 있는 방안을 제시하는 것이다. 본 연구의 목표는 의료 전문가와 정책 담당자들의 소중한 시간과 노력을 줄이고, 신속하게 정보를 얻을 수 있는 방법을 제안하는 것이다. 학술 논문의 초록에서 COVID-19와 관련된 토픽을 발견하고, COVID-19에 대한 새로운 연구 방향을 탐구하도록 도움을 주는 기초자료로 활용될 것으로 기대한다.

• 동남아시아연구
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.37-76
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• 2017

베트남이 메콩 델타로 영토를 팽창하는 역사 속에서 완거정은 두 개의 얼굴을 갖는다. 하나는 현재 베트남 영토 내에 있는 메콩 델타 거의 전부를 획득하는 데서 그의 공헌이다. 또 하나는 베트남 역사를 읽는 독자들의 눈을 현재의 베트남 영역에만 머물게 하는 그의 역할이다. 독자들에게 완거정의 메콩 델타 획득은 베트남 남진사의 마지막 단계로 인식된다. 그러나 완거정의 업적은 부분적이었을 뿐이다. 이 연구는 메콩 델타에서의 영토 팽창 추이에서 완거정 보다 무왕에 주목한다. 무왕의 목표는 완거정의 공헌에 의해 성취된 영토 획득보다 더 야심적이었다. 그리고 이 야심은 새로운 세계, 새로운 국제 질서를 건설한다는 그의 꿈에 의해 추동된 것이며, 그가 건설한 수도 푸쑤언은 이 새 국제 질서의 중심지였다. 여기서 그는 황제가 되기를 희망했다. 주장을 입증하기 위해서 필자는 세 가지의 요소를 검토하고 있다. 첫째는 무왕 왕권의 성격이다. 두 번째는 메콩 델타에서의 군사 작전을 위한 준비 과정이다. 셋째는 새로이 무왕의 판도로 편입된 땅의 성격에 대한 것이다. 북부 홍하 델타에 근거한 레 황실의 신하를 자처하던 선대 지배자들의 태도와 결별하면서 무왕은 즉위한 지 6년 뒤인 1744년 자신이 왕임을 선포했다. 행정 조직이 개편되었고 의복과 풍속도 북부의 것을 버리고 남국의 것을 제정하였다. 무왕은 캄보디아, 참파, 수사, 화사, 만상, 남장 등 조공국도 충분히 확보했다. 레 왕조와 비교해 이 조공국의 숫자는 더 많았으며 19세기 대남 제국의 조공국 수와 맞먹었다. 필자는 이 시점에서 무왕이 실제로 원했던 자리는 왕이 아니라 황제였음을 지적한다. 비록 무왕의 시도는 실패했지만 그는 자신을 천왕이라고 칭함으로써 통상적인 왕은 아님을 분명히 했다. 캄보디아 왕이 캄보디아 영토 내의 참족을 공격한 게 무왕에게는 캄보디아에 개입하는 충분한 이유로 작용했다. 무왕은 이 참족이 자신의 신복이라 여겼다. 왕은 그들이 자신의 판도 내에 있는 참 즉 순성진 참인의 일부라고 간주했기 때문이다. 무왕은 1750년에 캄보디아에 전쟁을 선포했다. 동시에 그는 태국왕에게 외교 서한을 보냈는데 여기서 그는 캄보디아가 자신의 배타적 조공국임을 천명했다. 캄보디아의 영토였던 메콩 델타에의 공격을 개시하기 전에 무왕은 푸쑤언을 새로 건설해 제국의 위상에 걸맞는 권력중심지로 삼았다. 인플레이션, 기근, 경제 왜곡 등도 이 시기를 특징짓는 면모였다. 그러나 이 연구는 무왕의 메콩 델타 진출 이유라고 이야기되어 온 이런 경제적인 측면보다 제국 건설자로서 무왕이 보이던 적극적 정책에 더 관심을 가지며 이런 정책에 기초한 영토 팽창의 욕구가 메콩 델타의 광활한 땅을 차지하고자 하는 데 결정적인 이유가 되었다고 주장한다. 1754년부터 3년 동안 현재 베트남의 영토에 해당하는 메콩 델타 대부분이 무왕의 영토로 편입되었다. 여기에는 완거정의 역할이 컸다. 그러나 무왕이 차지하고자 한 영역의 범주는 여기에 더해 메콩 오른편에 해당하며 현재의 사이공보다 위쪽에 있는 껌뽕짬, 프레이비엥, 스바이리엥을 포괄했다. 많아진 조공국의 수에 걸맞게 제국의 영토는 넉넉히 확대되어야 했다. 무왕의 전략은 '잠식지계'와 '이만공만'의 변주곡이었다고 이 글은 주장한다. 무왕은 하부캄보디아에 해당하는 델타를 야금야금 차지했다. 이는 누에가 뽕잎을 먹는 것과 같다는 게 일반적인 이해 방식이다. 그러나 무왕의 최종적 목표는 위에서 언급한 메콩 델타 세 개의 주까지 다 먹어치우는 것이었다. '다 먹어치운다'는 건 '잠식'의 또 다른 의미이자 적용이었다. 무왕은 현 롱안 지역으로부터 쩌우독에 이르기까지의 땅을 차지하는 과정에서 참인을 이용해 캄보디아를 쳤다. 이것은 '이만공만'의 표준적 적용이었다. 이에 더해 그는 막씨가 관할하던 중국인 망명자들을 이용해 하띠엔과 그 주변 지역을 캄보디아 왕으로부터 취했다. '이만공만'의 또다른 적용이라고 할 수 있다. 결론적으로, 필자는 19세기에 출현할 응우옌 왕조의 제국 질서 뿌리를 바라보는 새로운 방식을 주장한다. 제국 질서는 홍하 델타에 근거한 대월 제국 왕조들의 오랜 역사의 결과물이 아니라 푸쑤언에 앉은 무왕의 신 세계질서를 계승한 것이라는 주장이다. '이만공만'과 '잠식지계'는 무왕의 후손들에게 여전히 유용했다. 그의 손자인 쟈롱은 타이, 크메르, 라오, 중국인, 산지민, 유럽인 같은 '만'을 이용해 또다른 '만'인 '떠이썬 도적떼(西賊)'를 이겼다. 떠이썬에는 수많은 중국인 및 중국 해적이 활동하고 있었으며 참인, 산지민이 있었다. 무왕의 증손자인 민망 황제는 화려한 제국을 건설했다. 동시에 그는 캄보디아와 참 영역을 몽땅 먹어치우면서 영토 확장에도 골몰하고 있었다.