• The Korean Journal of Pesticide Science
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.1-11
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• 2001

New technologies will have a large impact on the discovery of new herbicide site of action. Genomics, combinatorial chemistry, and bioinformatics help take advantage of serendipity through tile sequencing of huge numbers of genes or the synthesis of large numbers of chemical compounds. There are approximately $10^{30}\;to\;10^{50}$ possible molecules in molecular space of which only a fraction have been synthesized. Combining this potential with having access to 50,000 plant genes in the future elevates tile probability of discovering flew herbicidal site of actions. If 0.1, 1.0 or 10% of total genes in a typical plant are valid for herbicide target, a plant with 50,000 genes would provide about 50, 500, and 5,000 targets, respectively. However, only 11 herbicide targets have been identified and commercialized. The successful design of novel herbicides depends on careful consideration of a number of factors including target enzyme selections and validations, inhibitor designs, and the metabolic fates. Biochemical information can be used to identify enzymes which produce lethal phenotypes. The identification of a lethal target site is an important step to this approach. An examination of the characteristics of known targets provides of crucial insight as to the definition of a lethal target. Recently, antisense RNA suppression of an enzyme translation has been used to determine the genes required for toxicity and offers a strategy for identifying lethal target sites. After the identification of a lethal target, detailed knowledge such as the enzyme kinetics and the protein structure may be used to design potent inhibitors. Various types of inhibitors may be designed for a given enzyme. Strategies for the selection of new enzyme targets giving the desired physiological response upon partial inhibition include identification of chemical leads, lethal mutants and the use of antisense technology. Enzyme inhibitors having agrochemical utility can be categorized into six major groups: ground-state analogues, group specific reagents, affinity labels, suicide substrates, reaction intermediate analogues, and extraneous site inhibitors. In this review, examples of each category, and their advantages and disadvantages, will be discussed. The target identification and construction of a potent inhibitor, in itself, may not lead to develop an effective herbicide. The desired in vivo activity, uptake and translocation, and metabolism of the inhibitor should be studied in detail to assess the full potential of the target. Strategies for delivery of the compound to the target enzyme and avoidance of premature detoxification may include a proherbicidal approach, especially when inhibitors are highly charged or when selective detoxification or activation can be exploited. Utilization of differences in detoxification or activation between weeds and crops may lead to enhance selectivity. Without a full appreciation of each of these facets of herbicide design, the chances for success with the target or enzyme-driven approach are reduced.

• Korean Journal of Environment and Ecology
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• v.35 no.5
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• pp.548-557
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• 2021

Cypripedium japonicum Thunb. is an endemic plant in East Asia, distributed only in Korea, China, and Japan. At the global level, the IUCN Red List evaluates it as "Endangered Species (EN)," and at the national level in Korea, it is evaluated as "Critically Endangered Species (CR)." In this study, we investigated the characteristics of the age structure and the sustainability of the population based on the data obtained by demographic monitoring conducted for seven years in the natural habitat. C. japonicum habitats were observed in 7 regions of Korea (Pochoen, Gapyeong, Hwacheon, Chuncheon, Yeongdong, Muju, Gwangyang), and 4,356 individuals in 15 subpopulations were identified. The population size and structure differed from region to region, and artificial management had a very important effect on the size and structural change of the population. Population viability analysis (PVA) based on changes in the number of individuals of C. japonicum showed a very diverse tendency by region. And the probability of population extinction in the next 100 years was 0.00% for Pocheon, 10.90% for Gwangyang, 24.05% for Chuncheon, and 79.50% for Hwacheon. Since the above monitored study sites were located within the conservation shelters, which restricted access by humans, unauthorized collection of C. japonicum, the biggest threat to the species, was not reflected in the individual viability. So, the risk of extinction in Korea is expected to be significantly higher than that estimated in this study. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect population information in several regions that may represent various threats to determine the extinction risk of the C. japonicum population objectively. In the future, we should expand the demographic monitoring of the C. japonicum population known in Korea.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.