• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.98-104
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• 2016

This research describes the functional requirements of anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) defense systems, which depend on the threat characteristics of the ASBM. Recently, China has carried out a training launch of the DF-21D strategic countermeasures for the placement of Korean terminal high-altitude air defense (THAAD). The ASBM is being used as a primary means of attacking aircraft carriers, using an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. Considering the missile technology connection between China and North Korea, there is a very high probability that North Korea already owns an ASBM. From this point of view, work with Aegis operational concepts provided implications for an ASBM threat. Utilizing quality function deployment (QFD) based on the operational concepts, the functional requirement were calculated.

• Asian-Australasian Journal of Animal Sciences
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• v.16 no.7
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• pp.1020-1024
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• 2003

Five barrows (average initial body weight 58.6 kg) were used to determine the apparent ileal digestibilities of amino acids, DM, N and energy in various soybean meal, rapeseed meal and coconut meal in finishing pigs. Dietary treatments included 1) KSBM (Korean soybean meal), 2) CSBM (Chinese soybean meal), 3) ASBM (Argentine soybean meal), 4) RSM (Rapeseed meal), and 5) CNM (Coconut meal). The diets were corn starch-based and formulated so that each protein source provided the same amount of total ME (3,490 kcal/kg), CP (15.70%), lysine (1.00%), Ca (0.80%) and P (0.60%). Protein content of the KSBM was higher than the CSBM and ASBM, with all values similar to those expected, and protein content of the CNM was lower than that of the SBM preparation and RSM. Apparent ileal digestibilities of histidine, lysine, threonine, alanine, asparatic acid, cystine, glutamic acid and serine were greater for the KSBM, CSBM, ASBM and RSM than for the CNM (p<0.05). Also, the apparent ileal digestibilities of methionine, leucine, phenylalanine, valine and tyrosine were greater for the KSBM than for the CSBM, ASBM, RSM and CNM (p<0.05). Overall, the apparent ileal digestibilities of total essential amino acids were greater for the KSBM than for the CSBM, ASBM, RSM and CNM (p<0.05), and the apparent ileal digestibilities of total non essential amino acids were greater for the KSBM, CSBM, ASBM and RSM than for the CNM (p<0.05). No difference (p>0.05) in apparent digestibility of DM at the small intestine was observed among the treatments. However, the apparent digestibility of DM at the total tract was greater for the KSBM than for the CSBM, ASBM, RSM and CNM (p<0.05). Also, apparent digestibilities of N and digestible energy at the small intestine and total tract were greater for the KSBM than for the RSM and CNM (p<0.05). In conclusion, nutrient digestibility values of SBM preparations and RSM were relatively high compared to CNM.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.1-8
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• 2016

This paper provides an empirical assessment of the development of North Korea's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), and its influence on South Korea's maritime strategy. While research studies on North Korea's ballistic-missile capabilities and South Korea's ballistic-missile defense systems are proliferating, less analytical attention has been given to the way that the strengthening of North Korea's ballistic-missile capacities presents a critical threat to the ROK's navy and lines of communication. The authors of this paper identify the continuing development of unique ASBM capabilities by China and Iran, and determine that such processes are mutually interactive and in accordance with threat perceptions; furthermore, North Korea can enact the same process by learning lessons from these nations. The findings of this paper provide an implication for the formulation of South Korea's maritime strategy and the related assets in consideration of the ASBM as a future threat.

• Journal of Satellite, Information and Communications
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.54-62
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• 2017

China has invested for military satellite technology development to construct the space-based surveillance system from existing land-based and aerostat surveillance system since 1960s to react rapidly for deployment of marine force of United States and surrounding nations in west Pacific, south China sea and Indian ocean. China has also launched about 40 the Yaogan military intelligence satellites series for EO, SAR and ELINT fields since 2006 after the required technique with several technical experiment satellites launch and operational test. ELINT satellites transmit data from satellite to earth station in real time with construction space-based network around it. Those data are simultaneously delivered to Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile(ASBM) connected land-based C4ISR network for marine target attack. Therefore China has enhanced surveillance and attack capability to the surrounding marine nations with space-based network around it. In the future, It is considered that China will increase accurate location search, signal processing and analysis ability through a further study on its technology.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.196-223
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• 2017

The aim of this paper is to analyze China's naval strengthening and threat reflected in submarines, aircraft, destroyers and missile capabilities and US Navy's counter-forces. China is strengthening its naval forces in accordance with its three-step naval force build-up plan, and the introduction of Russian destroyers and submarines is a foothold for China's naval enforcement. The Chinese Navy also converted the concept of the First-Second Island Chain Defense, which it had already maintained, to the concept of maritime layer defense. Currently, the Chinese Navy maintains the concept of a Three-Maritime Layer Defense which includes the South China Sea, where artificial islands are being built by China, in the First Layer Defense and the East China Sea in the Third Layer Defense. Along with the advancement of Chinese Navy's submarines, surface vessels and aircraft's operational capabilities, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities become a major threat to the US Navy. If a crisis occurs in the East China Sea or in the Taiwan Waters, the US Navy will face more difficulties in employing the Carrier Strike Group to manage the crisis. Meanwhile, if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula, it will be a burden to dispatch Carrier Strike GroupS to the East and West Seas of the Korean Peninsula. For the stable future, the US Navy should develop a strategy to respond more effectively to the Chinese Navy, which is challenging new maritime supremacy in East Asia.