• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권3호
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• pp.59-90
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• 2015

Since 1855, the federal courts of the United States have been empowered to assist in the gathering of evidence for use before foreign tribunals. Today, the source of that authority is 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ which permits the courts to order a person "to give [ ] testimony... or to produce a document ... for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal${\cdots}$ ." It was generally assumed, until the United States Supreme Court's decision of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. in 2004, that arbitration tribunals were not "foreign tribunals" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$. While the issue in Intel did not involve an arbitration tribunal, a statement by the Supreme Court in dicta has called into question the exact parameters of the words "foreign tribunal," resulting in a split of opinion among the federal courts of the United States. This article explores the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$, examines the United States Supreme Court decision in Intel, and discusses the split among the courts of the United States regarding the interpretation of "foreign tribunal." The article further surveys emerging issues: is an arbitration tribunal in a case involving foreign parties and seated in the United States a "foreign tribunal"; does agreeing to the use of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration circumscribe the use of 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$; can a party be ordered to produce documents located outside the United States; and is there a role for judicial estoppel in determining whether an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ${\S}1782$ should be granted?

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제32권3호
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• pp.29-46
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• 2022

Until recently, there has been a circuit split as to whether parties to foreign private arbitral proceedings could seek assistance from the U.S. courts for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether a private arbitral proceeding may be considered a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" in terms of the statute, which would ultimately allow or disallow judicial assistance in taking of evidence by the U.S. district courts for use in the requested proceedings. While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of §1782 in its Intel decision in 2004, it had not established a test as to what constitutes a foreign or international tribunal for the purposes of §1782, thereby leaving it open for lower courts to continue to interpret §1782 in their own ways, as requests for judicial assistance in taking of evidence are filed. In the recent decision of ZF Auto. US, Inc., v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court has finally clarified that in order for an arbitral panel to be a "foreign or international tribunal" under §1782, such panels must exercise governmental authority conferred by one nation or multiple nations. Therefore, private commercial arbitral panels are not "foreign or international tribunal(s)" for the purposes of §1782 because they do not constitute governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative bodies. Such holding is necessary and legitimate for interested parties in international arbitration, as well as, potential parties of arbitration who are contemplating alternative dispute resolution for their dispute(s).