• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.135-154
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• 2010

This paper considers a duopoly where switching costs exist. The analysis proves that temporal price reductions can be pure strategy equilibrium where firms earn more profit than in a regular price strategy. Greater profits result from price discrimination in temporal price reductions. The equilibrium is contrasted with previous studies, which explain temporal price reductions as a result of mixed strategy. In a given model with an assumption about forming switching cost, firms can control their range of loyal consumers by properly setting their regular and promotional prices. The model shows that temporal price reduction tends to raise the regular price and decrease the range of loyal consumers.