• Journal of architectural history
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.47-57
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyse the influence of Hegel on architectural historiography. With the point of view that Hegel is the origin of architectural history, this study try to find out how Hegel's philosophy and aesthetics deeply influenced the principle and method of architectural historiography. As a kind of meta-history Hegel's idealism played a important role in the interpretation of architecture and its historiography. We can call it Hegelian legacy and it gave a determinant idea in the discours of architecture, especially Modernism. With a critical view point this study tries to reveal the mythical character of the premise and hypothesis of Hegel's historicism and also reviews its positive aspects in the history of writing architectural history. Today Hegelian thinking in architectural historiography is seriously criticized and considered as a old way of writing history. But this study tries to find a possibility to recognize the contemporary architectural situation with Hegel's concept of universal history. The return of Hegel necessarily does not mean the idea of totality and universality in practice as like in Modernism, but to widen the recognition in contemporary practice and historiography.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.119
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• pp.323-345
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• 2011

Die Arbeit zielt darauf, die Positionen von Hegel und Habermas hinsichtlich der Religion ans Licht zu bringen. Hegels Denken richtet auf die Säkularisierung in dem Sinne, dass er die Religion als eine kulturelle Erscheinung und Gott als einen Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (nicht des Glaubens) ansieht. Im Gegensatz dazu laesst sich Habermas' Philosophie in der Hinsicht der Post-Säkularisierung lesen in dem Sinne, dass er der in dem Vorgang der Säkularisierung unterdrückten Religion eine bestimmte Rolle gibt, um z. B. das Problem des Sinnverlusts zu vermeiden, das mit der Säkularisierung hervorgerufen worden ist.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.75-97
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• 2017

This study purpose is to discuss critically the conception of history in Hegel and Marx by drawing on Merleau-Ponty's existential theory of history, finishing with concluding remarks. Merleau-Ponty insists that history is always history experienced. This thesis is his own principle in investigating human history. From this perspective, he begins to flesh out problems with history which Hegel and Marx had understood idealistically and materialistically respectively. He criticised that if Hegel grasps history in terms of teleology, he failed to explain the source and origin of historical meaning from which history makes sense. He failed to think that what gives history meaning comes from embodied consciousness. This means that history is not made of dialectical thinking. The thing is different from such an imaginative construal. History as it stands is not like that. It is not running around like Hegelian dialectical thinking. Marx understood historical behavior wrongly when he explained class struggle in terms of productive relations. He disregarded how class was sedimented or embodied in the minds of proletarians. Owing to this, Marx could not suppose that class consciousness is determined not causally or externally but by incarnated experience. It is affected in so far as it is affected by somebody, that is, the worker. At that moment only Class consciousness begins to work. Marx did not catch sight of this hidden fact.

• Lingua Humanitatis
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• v.8
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• pp.39-58
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• 2006

In Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik wird die Idee als Leben des Begriffes, objektive Vollendung und Einheit von Subjekt und Objekt bezeichnet. Die Idee ist die Einheit von Begriff und dessen Existenz und des weiteren die "allgemeine Bedeutung des wahren Seins". Die Idee ist nicht die Namensgebung einer Abstraktion der Sache als abstrakte Sache oder einer reinen Form, sondern 'das Werden zum Diesem' oder 'das Diese' des konkreten und realistischen Objektes 'Dies hier und jetzt'. Auf einer solchen logischen Bestimmung beruhend, behauptet Hegel in seiner ${\ddot{A}}sthetik$ die Gleichheit zwischen "$Sch{\ddot{o}}nheit$" selbst und der "Idee der $Sch{\ddot{o}}nheit$". "Das $Sch{\ddot{o}}ne$ selbst" ist gleichzusetzen mit der "Idee der $Sch{\ddot{o}}nheit$" und wenn die Idee in einer bestimmte Form hineinpasst, wird dies das Ideale genannt. Hier liegt der Grund, weshalb wir die Idee als Begriff, Begriff des Daseins oder Einheit des Objektes bezeichnen $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$. Die Idee ist die Einheit von Begriff und dessen $Realit{\ddot{a}}t$, jedoch ist die dominierende Kraft der Einheit der Begriff. Die Idee ist die $Totalit{\ddot{a}}t$ der subjektiven Bestimmung und nur das Werk dass mit dem Begriff passend Einheit und $Objektivit{\ddot{a}}t$ hervorbringt, ist wirklich $sch{\ddot{o}}n$. Umgekehrt gesagt bedeutet diese Aussage, dass etwas wirklich $sch{\ddot{o}}n$ ist, wenn dies zu dem Begriff passt, und dass das genau zum Begriff passende ist mit dem Begriff gleichzusetzen ist. Wie bereits $bewu{\beta}t$, hat Kant die $f{\ddot{u}}r$ den kognitiven Begriff verantwortliche bestimmende Urteilskraft und das ${\ddot{a}}sthetische$ Urteil treffende reflektierende Urteilskraft, differenziert. Im Gegensatz dazu $erkl{\ddot{a}}rt$ Hegel die Beziehung zwischen Sein und Denken, Dasein und Begriff, Begriff und Idee mit dem Blickpunkt dass das $Verm{\ddot{o}}gen$ und die Funktion der Urteilskraft selbst eine grundliegend auf Reflektion beruhende Bestimmung ist und eine auf Bestimmung beruhende Reflektion ist. Nach dieser Logik entsprechend $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ er die Beziehung zwischen der $sch{\dodt{o}}nen$ Sache und $Sch{\ddot{o}}nheit$ zusammen. In dieser $Erkl{\ddot{a}}rung$ verwirft Hegel Kants Begriffe wie Urteilskraft und Geschmack, und verwendet vorwiegend die von seiner Lehre vom Begriff auftauchende Begriffe. Die Zielsetzung dieser Arbeit ist, den Satz in Hegels ${\ddot{A}sthetik$ "Das $Sch{\ddot{o}}ne$ ist die Idee des $Sch{\ddot{o}}nen$" auf den Grund zu gehen. Um dieses Ziel zu verfolgen, wird das epistemologische $Verh{\ddot{a}}ltnis$ zwischen Dasein und Begriff, das logische $Verh{\ddot{a}}ltnisas$ zwischen Begriff und Idee betrachtet.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.115
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• pp.249-279
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• 2010

The Law of the Heart, which appears in the chapter "B. The Actualization of Rational Self-consciousness Through its own Activity" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit represents that the self-certainty of the reason may be the another face of the Madness. The Reason's indubitable certainty is the testimony of the truth for Descartes, and it also plays a role as the moral maxim of the conscience for Kant. But this subjective certainty unavoidably leads to the Madness of self-conceit, which unifies the consciousness and the reality ignoring the difference between them. The typical attitude appearing in the reformer like Don Quixote and also romantic idealists reveals the fact that modern reason and the psychosis can be both faces of one and the same coin. The Mirror Stage, the Imaginary, and the Formula of the Desire in Lacan's Theory shows that the Image of completeness is the result of Mis-understanding. Even if the Mirror stage is necessary for the Formation of the subject, at the same time it should also lead to the next stage, i.e., the Symbolic Order. It is considered as the realm of the Otherness, which refers to the realm of language or that of law. If the Ego can't go through the symbolic castration acted on by the Name of the Father, he will be remained in the prison of the Imaginary. The Madness also shows the similar process. For Hegel the Discipline of the Labor or the Death as absolute Otherness that inevitably delays the Desire plays the same role as the name of Father. It may be the experience of Separation or that of Sublation of the individual towards the universal, which is equivalent to the experience of Symbolic castration in Lacan. Furthermore there may be the difference between Hegel and Lacan as the following; while in Hegel the experience of Separation is founded on the spontaneity of the Spirit, for Lacan it is to be compelled and structured by the absolute Other.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.165-192
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• 2017

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the difference between Heidegger's hermeneutical philosophy and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. The difference is to say that Heidegger's philosophy begins with Aristotle's theory of category and transcendental philosophy. On the other hand, the beginning of Gadamer's philosophical research is Plato's dialog, philosophy and Hegels dialectic. 2. Heidegger regards humanism as a variant of the modern ideal of human beings. On the contrary, Gadamer understands humanism as a place where romantism leads to the ideals of human education. 3. Heidegger says that the hermeneutical circle is still a logical and existential structure of the circle. On the contrary, Gadamer understands the circle as a circle between the whole and the part. This circle is the law of traditional hermeneutics derived from the tradition of rhetoric. 4. Heidegger says Plato's philosophy is the first beginning of the substance metaphysic, Hegel's philosophy the end of the subject metaphysic. On the contrary, Gadamer says the hermeneutical understanding and the hermeneutical interpretation is endless. 5. Heidegger's ontology is as Sein zum Tode a future oriented and eschatological. On the contrary, Gadamer's hermeneutic is as Sein zum Text always the way to a past, the infinite openness.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.23-45
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• 2016

This paper analyzes Paul Ricoeur's theory of mutual recognition with the concern for the establishment of a desirable relationship between cultures. Ricoeur tries to construct his own theory via Hegel and Honneth. He thinks, according to their theory, the state of being recognized could not arrive eternally. This means that the struggle for recognition could continue permanently. To put an end to the struggle for recognition, Ricoeur introduces the state of peace made possible by the exchange of ceremonial gifts. In other words, the struggle could be eliminated symbolically thorough the exchange of gifts. The mutuality established by this process however, can not accomplish its meaning without overcoming the original dissymmetry between one and the other in which phenomenology has a keen interest. To integrate the dissymmetry into mutuality, Ricoeur gives attention to 'between' the giver and the receiver in the system of gift exchange. He carries out this task by securing a just distance, or a distance in proximity.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.37
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• pp.329-355
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• 2021

The objective of this paper is to reveal that the formation of Deleuze's system is a result of a back flow of the 'ideal of pure reason' in Kant's system. I will try to seize upon the keyword in his main book, Difference and Repetition, and examine the aspect of mutual transformation between Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and Kant's transcendentalism. When analyzing Deleuze's system, most researchers tend to focus on anti-Hegelianism, but it is proper that Kant be adopted as the start when tracing the way of deployment directly. Fundamentally, Deleuze is different from Hegel in his approach to observing entire ground of thought. Even if Deleuze surely has the capability of becoming in the dialectical context, his systemic environment wherein dialectics is applied is different even at the onset. While Hegel follows the way of origin and copy or a system that begins from a preceding point of origin, Deleuze follows a way of copy and recopy or a system that begins without a point of origin. This characteristic of Deleuze's system originates directly from idealistic play. In fact, we can anticipate and identify in his book that he refers to Kant who accepted the tradition of empiricism. Therefore, the main contents of this paper is to present an overview of Kant's influence on Deleuze's system. While tracing ideas back to Kant's system, the cohabitation of empiricism and rationalism, which Kant felicitously revoiced, there emerges a definitude of world recognition. This occurs through cohabitation, and this is both deconstructed and integrated by Deleuze, and therein definitude is turned into a vision of prosperity. To the vision of prosperity that spans definitude to recognition, a philosopher has the right to select a philosophical system because selection methodology in philosophy is not a problem of legitimacy so much as the needs of the times. Deleuze's choice resulted in the opening of pandora's box in an abyss and secret contents have in turn risen sharply.

• Communications of Mathematical Education
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• v.12
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• pp.67-82
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• 2001

발생적 원리는 수학을 공리적으로 전개된 완성된 것으로 가르치는 형식주의의 결함을 극복하기 위하여 제기되어온 교수학적 원리로, 수학을 발생된 것으로 파악하고 그 발생을 학습과정에서 재성취하게 하려는 것이다. 특히, 수학을 지도함에 있어서 역사적으로 발생, 발달한 순서를 지켜 지도해야 한다는 것이 역사-발생적 원리로, 수학이 역사적으로 발생, 발달 되어온 역동적인 과정을 학생들이 재경험해 보게 하기 위해서는 이러한 일련의 과정을 효과적으로 설명할 수 있는 교수-학습 방법이 필요하다. 변증법적인 방법론은 헤겔에 의해서 꽃을 피운 철학으로, 정일반일합(正一反一合)의 원리에 따라 사물의 발생과 진화 과정을 역동적으로 설명할 수 있는 방법론이다. 따라서, 본 연구는 초등학교에서 역사-발생적 원리에 따라 수학을 지도할 수 있는 방법으로 변증법적인 방법을 고찰하여, 역사-발생적 원리의 수학 교수-학습 방법에 대한 시사점을 얻고자 한다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.315-339
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• 2014

Diese Abhandlung untersucht Jacobis ${\ddot{U}}ber$ die Lehre Spinoza und den von diesem veranlassten Spinoza-Streit. Damit sie $enth{\ddot{u}}llt$ zuerst Jacobischen Zusammenhang zwischen transzent und immanent und folgt auf seine Wirkungsgeschichte in der Moderne. Ich rekonstruiere den Streit zwischen Jacobi und Lessing und danach interpretiere dessen Rezeption durch Hegel und Schleiermacher. Lessing stellt anstatt der traditionellen Begriffe der Gottheit ἑν ${\kappa}{\alpha}{\iota}$ ${\pi}{\alpha}{\nu}$ auf. $Demgegen{\ddot{u}}ber$ behauptet Jacobi Salto mortale um ihn ${\ddot{u}}berschreiten$ zu $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$, indem er Lessing als Pantheist und Atheist bestimmt. Salto mortale bei Jacobi ist der Sprung zu dem ${\ddot{U}}bernat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ und dem Glaube. Der Streit zwischen Jacobi und Lessing ist der zwischen dem Naturalismus und ${\ddot{U}}bernaturalismus$ und $dar{\ddot{u}}berhinaus$ der zwischen dem Athismus und Theismus. $W{\ddot{a}}hrend$ die Natur der Inbegriff der Bedingten ist, ist Gott der absolute Anfang der Natur $au{\ss}erhalb$ des Naturzusammenhangs. $W{\ddot{a}}hrend$ Spinoza Gott im $nat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ Zusammenhang begreift, $fa{\ss}t$ Jacobi den im ${\ddot{u}}bernat{\ddot{u}}rlichen$ auf. Deus sive natura bei Spinoza $ver{\ddot{a}}ndert$ sich Gott im Menschen bei Jacobi. Gott im Menschen ist nichts anders als das Prinzip des Lebens und das aller Vernuft. In diesem Zusammenhang $fa{\ss}t$ Hegel Gott als Geist denn Subjekt des Lebens auf und $h{\ddot{a}}lt$ das Wesen des Geistes $f{\ddot{u}}r$ die sich selbst vermittelnde Bewegung. Dies zeigt sich als die Spinoza ${\ddot{u}}berbietende$ Immanenzphilosophie. $Demgegen{\ddot{u}}ber$ behauptet Schleiermacher die Einheit des Endlichen und Unendlichen in der $religi{\ddot{o}}sen$ Anschuung. Die Verbindung von Mensch und Gott ist die im Endlichen immanent bleibende Anschauung der $g{\ddot{o}}ttlichen$ Eigenschaft. Dies zeigt das transzendente im immanenten.