• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
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• no.23
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• pp.5-36
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• 2011

The purposes of this treatise are to compare theories of theatre in 'Kwandaega' with theories of theatre in 'Poongjahwajun', to recognize differences of theories between the former and the latter, and to find out the comparative characteristics of theories of Korean theatre. There are four differences between the former and the latter. These are as follows; Firstly, in the aspect of contents, the former is consisted of discussions about nature of theatre, discussions about acting, discussions about staging, and the latter is consisted of discussions about nature of theatre, discussions about acting, discussions about staging, discussions about origin, and discussions about dramaturgy. Secondly, in the aspect of nature, the nature of theatre in the former is recognition and practice as 'homo performans', the nature of theatre in the latter is realization of 'flower[花]'. Thirdly, in the aspect of acting, discussions about acting of the former are consisted of 'Sachae' theory'(Inmulchirae, Sasulchirae, Dekm, Nerumsae), discussions about acting of the latter are consisted of method of training per ages, method of training per role playings, trainings in everyday life. Fourthly, in the aspect of staging, the focus of staging in the former is realization of an endless series of changes[千變萬化], the focus of staging in the latter is realization of 'flower[花]'. There are four characteritics in the theories of Kwangdaega. These are as follows; Firstly, the contents of kwangdaega are consisted of discussions about nature of theatre, discussions about acting, discussions about staging. This theory is theory centered on actor/actress. Secondly, the nature of thestre in Kwangdaega is recognition and practice as 'homo performans', supporting of self-generational values, supporting of folk, new interpretation about secularism. Thirdly, the discussions about acting are consist of 'Sachae Theory'. Fourthly, the discussions about staging are consisted of realizations of an endless series of changes[千變萬化]

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.105-113
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• 2015

The theory of landscape architecture applies environmental ethics in order to secure an ecological status. However, environmental ethics that focus on nature conservation excludes landscape architecture as artifacts. In the process, it is hard to identify what landscape architecture insists on as the middle position between humans and nature. Rather, landscape architecture pretends to be an 'agent of nature' and pushes the traditional moral values 'for people.' Therefore, the purpose of this study is to reestablish the anthropocentrism moral position of landscape architecture through critical analysis. Hargrove's weak anthropocentrism' of several environmental ethics branches accepts natural aesthetics(such as landscape architecture) as an ethical virtue. But environmental ethics makes landscape architecture a critical target. For that reason, this study looked into critical contents and objects that in a position to moral, aesthetic and landscape architecture. Critical details are as follows: First, nature is an absolute as an aesthetic and moral value, but landscape architecture is an imitation and takes a relaxed attitude about nature. Second, nature is full of aesthetic substance because it is self-creative, but landscape architecture is designed nature covered human flaws through imagination. Third, environmental management granting techniques in nature generate a moral nihilism. As an argument, environmental ethics overlooked the moral practices of landscape architecture beyond nature another moral aspect of creation and the imagination-and moral aspects of environmental management as 'care' because they rule out 'moral autonomy' and simplify what is considered 'good.' As a result, conservation cannot be the only virtue why the problem of nature in reality cannot be separated from human life. The moral position of landscape architecture based on a 'good life' is more appropriate under anthropocentrism than as a middle position.