• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.31-50
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• 2009

The demarcation of Maritime Boundary is directly related to the expansion of jurisdiction and the securing of resources. Resource diplomacies of the three countries Korea, China and Japan represent a major task for the national administrations : to secure resources as well as to stablize and sustain resources for future national economies. At the sea area around Korea as well, countries are fiercely competing to secure resources and to expand jurisdiction. This is evidenced by the fact that various principles and logics which are beneficial to each own country are presented through international precedents, agreement between countries and the theories of the international law scholars. They say that the conclusion of demarcation of maritime boundary for the Yellow Sea would be easy from the point that there is no dispute related to island dominion in the waters of the Korean Peninsula especially the Yellow Sea, but still we need to have a strategic approach to this issue from the point that the factors used for claiming maritime boundaries may expand the waters of a country over much. For example, the continental shelf boundary in consideration of the distribution of sedimentary deposits in the Yellow Sea which is being raised by China began from the hypothesis that the inflow of sedimentary deposits to the Yellow Sea through the rivers of China represents absolute majority, but the results of the latest studies raised questions on the hypothesis. Especially, the studies done by Martin and Yang revealed that the inflow of sedimentary deposits to the Yellow Sea from the Yellow River is approximately less than 1% of total sedimentary deposits in the Yellow Sea, and also the result of analysis on the causes and counter policy measures on the environment of Bohai, China supports the reliability of the results of such studies. From a legal aspect, the sedimentary deposits of rivers which are claimed by China represent extremely weak ground for the claim for the title of the continental shelf. The siltline claimed by China seems to be based on the Article 76-4-(a)(i) of UNCLOS. This is, however, not the definition on the title of the continental shelf but it is only a technical formula to utilize in a case where a country desires to expand the continental shelf to over 200 nautical miles. Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf also confirm this point through the Article 2.1.2 of the Guideline. The only case in which sedimentary deposits of rivers were referred to as concrete demarcation of maritime boundary was in the which was concluded in 1986 between India and Myanmar at the Andaman Sea. In the said case, India acknowledged the boundary up to the isobath of 200m which Myanmar claimed based on the sedimentary deposits of the Irrawaddy River. It has limits as a case for acknowledging the sedimentary deposits, however, because in fact India's acknowledgment was made in exchange for the condition that Myanmar gave up the dominion of two islands which they had been claiming from India up until that time.