• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
• /
• v.32 no.3
• /
• pp.139-154
• /
• 2016

The port incentive scheme currently implemented in various Korean ports is used as a marketing tool to increase price competitiveness. Typically, ports implement piecemeal imitation strategies to enhance their competitiveness, rather than a precisely designed system. A precise analysis of the effectiveness of a port's system and scheme redesign are lacking because budget allocation is done without input from customers and freight groups. This study models the incentives faced by ports using a linear programming model. We use the Gwangyang port as the base case. Our analysis of the Gwangyang port reveals that there are insufficient incentives implemented when a traditional qualitative analysis is used. We also identify any excess, deficiency, or absence of the incentive effect for each type of customer and freight group. We find the overall budget of the incentive scheme to be more rational when ports allocate funds to minimize port mileage, and allocate 61.77 percent and 38.23 percent of the budget on existing and new (or increased) cargo inventory, respectively. Future studies can build on our work by further considering basic inputs, and by adding a system to estimate the input data of our model to identify constraints and thus provide a more accurate incentive scheme.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
• /
• v.29 no.1
• /
• pp.23-45
• /
• 2013

This paper aims to identify the problems of incentives and find a solution to them by empirically analyzing the port incentives and the development of cargo volume. The current method of paying performance incentives and cargo-increase incentives makes it is possible for shipping companies to get the maximum incentives just by regulating cargo volumes without increasing them. Since the processing volume of transshipment cargo of the Busan port is over the volume eligible for the maximum incentive determined by the tie-up of shipping companies, the transshipment cargo can decrease. The incentive of the Busan port based on the cargo record and increase does not affect the increase of transshipment cargo, only to suffer a loss, and thus a new incentive system is needed that does not allow shipping companies to regulate cargo volumes. Based on the result of this study, We have to apply the even-handed incentive rule which pays the incentive for the cargo volume of the pertinent year with the unit price per 1 TEU to avoid the chicken game among the ports.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
• /
• v.36 no.1
• /
• pp.91-104
• /
• 2020

Seosan-Daesan Port is the sixth largest port in Korea, and it promotes port infrastructure expansion, regular route development, overseas marketing, and port incentive systems for continuous growth. In addition, the port is planning to open a regular car ferry line to Weihai, China. This study aims to provide useful research data for effective decision making by analyzing the feasibility of opening the Chinese (Weihai) car ferry route of Seosan-Daesan Port. Currently, some car ferry routes that operate between Korea and China are open at Incheon Port, the Port of Pyeongtaek-Dangjin, and the Port of Gunsan. In order to estimate the volume of cargo that will be created when the car ferry route from Seosan-Daesan Port to Weihai opens, this research analyzes the domestic cargo volume from the Chungcheongnam-do region, where Seosan-Daesan Port is located, to each of the regions where the other ports are located. We estimated the volume of cargo that can be transported on the car ferry from Seosan-Daesan Port to Weihai. As a result, by 2020, about 76,000 passengers and about 50,000 tons of cargo could be created. Suggestions were made for policy strategies that would revitalize passenger numbers and secure the cargo volume of the car ferry, along with a discussion of and the port incentive system.