• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제32권2호
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• pp.129-153
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• 2017

항공분야에서 공정경쟁(Fair Competition)에 대한 논의는 항공자유화가 시작된 1970년대부터 ICAO 세계항공운송회의 및 항공운송 심포지움 등 다양한 운송 분야 회의에서 지속적으로 이루어지고 있다. ICAO는 항공운송에서의 '경쟁'이란 '항공사 혹은 그룹들이 이익을 얻기 위한 제품과 서비스의 가격과 품질을 이용하여 투쟁하는 것'으로 정의하고 있다. 또한 보다 넓은 의미에서 합리적이고(Reasonable), 공정하고(Fair), 효과적이며(Effective), 제한적이지 않은(Unrestricted) 경쟁을 모두 포함하고 있다. 최근 몇 년 동안 항공운송에 대한 경쟁법과 규정의 적용은 빈도뿐만 아니라 다양한 이슈로 나타나고 있다. 가령 반독점 면제, 인수와 항공동맹체, 우월 지위의 남용, 덤핑 그리고 약탈적 가격 결정 판매 마케팅, 공항에 대한 과세 및 요금, 정부 지원 및 대출 보증 등이다. 항공사간 혹은 국가간 항공산업의 '경쟁'은 이제 '협력'의 차원으로 높아지고 있다. 항공운송사업자는 국경을 초월하여 단순 이익공유부터 합작회사까지 '경쟁'에서 살아남기 위한 '협력'의 수준을 높이고 있다. 앞으로 우리나라 항공산업 정책을 '국가차원의 산업생태계' 관점으로 전환하고, 이에 대비하는 '공정경쟁' 정책을 마련하여야 할 것이다. 이를 위해서는 첫째, 향후 중국, 일본 등 주변국과 크게는 중동 지역 등과 항공자유화를 추진하는 과정에서 공정법의 적용과 이를 이행할 수 있는 법령 및 제도의 마련이 필요할 것이다. 둘째, 항공운송사업의 실질적 소유와 실효적 지배의 기준을 새롭게 검토해야 할 것이다. 셋째, 대외적으로는 항공협정과 자유화에 대비하면서, 내부적인 항공산업 차원에서 우리나라도 항공사 및 공항운영에 대한 엄밀한 항공시장 구조분석을 통해 경쟁과 협력 문제를 연구 검토할 필요가 있다. 넷째, 인수 합병에 대비한 운수권 배분과 항공사 인수합병 승인기준 및 인수 합병에 따른 파급효과 분석 등 선제적인 정책 수립을 통해 지속적인 항공운송의 발전과 경쟁력 향상을 위한 공정한 항공운송환경 조성이 반드시 필요하다.

• 한국항공운항학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.