• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.113-131
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• 2011

Recently, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) announced the expansion of the number of generic top-level domains (gTLDs) beyond the current 22 gTLDs, and the gTLD Applicant Guidebook for ICANN's new gTLD program is now under consideration for approval. ICANN also introduces a "Trademark Clearinghouse" and the "Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS)" procedure to protect trademarks and expedite dispute resolution and save costs. The Trademark Clearinghouse is a central repository for information to be authenticated, stored and disseminated, pertaining to the rights of the trademark holders. Trademark holders would voluntarily provide data of their trademarks from all over the world, and it would assist a trademark watch service provided by the new gTLD registry for trademark holders and potential domain name registrants. The URS is a part of the new gTLD dispute resolution mechanisms created by ICANN to resolve cybersquatting disputes. A complainant in a URS proceeding must establish three elements that are very similar to the existing UDRP to succeed, but supposedly more expedited and cost efficient. Since the URS provides that it only protects court validated and registered trademarks, it is not clear whether unregistered marks used in commerce are protected under the URS. The URS escalates the complainant's burden of proof from a preponderance of evidence standard under the UDRP to a clear and convincing evidence standard. The notices to a respondent shall be sufficient if the URS Provider sends the notice of Complaint to the addresses listed in the Whois contact information. As registrants who wish to conceal their true identity often subscribe to the privacy/proxy service and the complainant's high rate of success in the UDRP proceeding is relevant to the respondents' default rate, the URS's simple notice requirement would deprive respondents of a fair opportunity to assert their rights over the disputed domain names.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.