• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.475-478
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• 2003

본 논문에서는 쿠르노 모형을 적용한 양방향입찰 전력 풀시장에서 입찰에 참여하는 발전기가 최대 이익을 얻기 위한 입찰전략으로서 신경회로망의 오차 역전파 알고리즘을 이용하여 최적 입찰발전량과 입찰가격을 수립하는 기법에 관하여 연구한다. 전력시장 환경은 n 개의 발전기들이 참여하는 비협조적 불완전정보 시장으로 설정하고 Bayesian의 조건부 확률이론을 적용하여 상대 발전기들의 발전비용함수와 시장의 수요함수를 추정하여 발전기 상호간 쿠르노-내쉬균형점을 이루는 최적 입찰발전량을 예측한다. 그리고 이익을 극대화시키기 위해 오차 역전파 알고리즘을 이용하여 시장의 가격 탄력성과 쿠르노 시장균형가격에 연결가중치를 조절함으로써 입찰가격이 계통한계가격에 근접하도록 최적 입찰전략을 수립한다.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.379-384
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• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.119-131
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• 2004

A green market refers to a market that consists of environmentally aware consumers. A few researches have been carried out on the effects of environmental policy measures in a green market. These existing researches were based on a vertical differentiation model with firms' price-setting behavior, and derived that unit emission standard and environmental product taxes could not reduce the amount of pollution emission. This note considers a vertical differentiation model with firms' quantity-setting behavior, and shows that, contrary to the previous result, the amount of pollution emission is reduced by the introduction of unit emission standard. This implies the importance of the nature of firms' interaction in figuring out the pollution abatement effect of environmental policy measures in a green market.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.166-173
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• 1999

본 연구는 램지가격결정방식과 효율적요소가격결정방식을 이용하여 향후 국내 가스산업의 배관망공동이용시 발전용 천연가스의 가격 및 이용료 수준을 파악할 수 있는 천연가스 가격 결정의 이론적 모형을 도출하였다. 또한 사례분석을 통하여 램지가격결정방식(RCPR)과 효율적요소가격결정방식(ECPR)하에서 도출된 최적 가격 및 최적 이용료를 비교·분석하였고 결정변수들이 가격과 이용료에 미치는 영향에 대해서 분석하였다. 그 결과 RCPR에 의한 최적 이용료는 쿠르노 불완전 경쟁하에서 한계직접비용 보다 낮게 도출된데 반해서 ECPR에서는 한계직접비용보다 높게 도출됨으로써 가격결정방식에 따라 최적 이용료의 수준이 상이함을 보였다. 또한 도시가스용 및 발전용 가격은 RCPR 하에서 신규사업자 수가 증가할수록 하락하였고 이용료는 증가하여 한계비용에 접근하였다. 한편 최적 발전용 가격과 최적 이용료는 한계직접비용이 클수록 증가되었고, 역가격탄력성이 클수록 최적 발전용 가격은 증가하는 반면에 최적 이용료는 감소하였다.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.291-305
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• 1995

본 논문은 지역간의 경쟁을 통한 환경재의 획득과정에 대해서 분석하였으며, 특히 경쟁의 과정에서 자발적 참여집단 (critical mass)의 존재가 경쟁의 결과에 미치는 영향에 초점을 맞추고 있다. 환경재에 대한 지역간의 경쟁(지대추구경쟁)은 Katz-Nitzan-Rosenberg(1990) 모형을 기초로하여 분석하였으며 지역집단간의 경쟁에 있어서, 구성원은 비협조적 쿠르노-내쉬(Cournot-Nash) 방식에 의해서, 그 자신의 이익(지대)을 획득하기 위한 경쟁을 벌이는 것으로 가정하였다. 어떤 지역집단이 환경재 획득경쟁에서 이길 확률은 궁극적으로 그 지역에 유치될 환경재의 크기(화폐가치로 환산한)에서 받는 영향의 정도 ${\alpha}$( 단. $0{\leq}{\alpha}{\leq}1$)의 상대적 크기에 비례하여 결정된다. 그러나 환경재획득경쟁에서 발생하는 고정비용 M의 규모가 커지면, 그것이 특정지역의 자발적 참여집단의 최소규모 상향조정을 요구하게 되어, 자발적 참여집단의 수가 경쟁에 결정적 영향을 미칠 가능성이 많게 된다. 특히 환경재로부터 받는 영향의 정도인 ${\alpha}$의 값이 작은 집단은 큰 집단에 비하여 항상 더 많은 자발적 참여집단의 구성원 수를 요구받게 되며, 고정비용 M의 값이 계속 커짐에 따라 이러한 최소한의 자발적 참여집단의 구성원수의 증가속도도 경쟁집단에 비하여 점점 더 커지게 된다.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.66 no.1
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• pp.16-22
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• 2017

In order to reduce costs of electricity energy at periods of peak demand, there has been an exponential interest in Demand Response (DR). This paper discusses the effect on the participants' behavior in response to DR. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the equilibrium point of the electricity market with DR is derived by modeling a DR curve, which is suitable for microeconomic analysis. Cournot model is used to analyze the electricity market of imperfect competition that includes strategic behavior of the generation companies. Strategic behavior with DR makes it harder to compute equilibrium point due to the non-differential function of payoff distribution. This paper presents a solution method for achieving the equilibrium point using the best response function of the strategic players. The effect of DR on the electricity market is illustrated using a test system.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.29-60
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• 2016

Research and Development(R&D) investment is an issue of central importance in any economy. In this paper we analyze the relationship between R&D spillovers and trade-related variables, using a two-stage model where duopolists simultaneously decide on R&D in the first stage and engage in Cournot competition in the second stage. We characterized and compared the free-trade and trade-restriction R&D equilibrium in a two-stage game of R&D investment followed by Cournot market competition. We also assessed the impact of varying the R&D spillover on the equilibrium outcomes and tariff. We showed for both free trade and protection cases that there exists a unique symmetric solution(subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). As the solution, while analytical, cannot be stated in closed form, we resorted to numerical experiments to investigate the equilibrium results. Our estimates indicate for both free trade and protection cases that the level of R&D investment and the rate of R&D expenditure decrease as the degree of R&D spillovers increases, and that there is an inverse relation between the degree of R&D spillovers and level of protection. The latter implies that the larger the degree of R&D spillovers, the lesser the level of protection.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

Traditionally, tariffs have been used to protect domestic industries. In particular, a country with more bargaining power makes a punitive threat to maintain a certain level of market share in the market of other country. In this paper, we study the effect of punitive tariffs on an irrelevant industry. In particular, when a country tries to achieve a market share or quantity target in an industry, we examine the effect of threats to impose tariffs on the major export of another industries which are irrelevant to the targeted industry. Using a simple duopoly model, we show that there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which supports that a country has an incentive to resolve a trade dispute voluntarily to protect its major export industry under the credible treat of punitive tariffs. This result is mainly due to the fact that the trade policy of a country concerns the aggregate benefits from trade over all its export industries. To obtain this result, this paper employs the linkage between the targeted and irrelevant industries by using the lobby of the irrelevant industry to curb the targeted industry. A lot of recent bilateral trade agreements can be applied to our results.