• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.133-142
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• 2012

Cournot model is one of representative models among many game theoretic approaches available for analyzing competitive market models. Recent years have witnessed various kinds of attempts to model competitive electricity markets using the Cournot model. Cournot model is appropriate for oligopoly market which is one characteristic of electric power industry requiring huge amount of capital investment. When we use Cournot model for the application to electricity market, it is prerequisite to assume the downward sloping demand curve in the right direction. Generators in oligopoly market could try to maximize their profit by exercising the market power like physical or economic withholding. However advanced electricity markets also have demand side bidding which makes it possible for the demand to respond to the high market price by reducing their consumption. Considering this kind of demand reaction, Generators couldn't abuse their market power. Instead, they try to find out an equilibrium point which is optimal for both sides, generators and demand. This paper suggest a quantitative analysis between market variables based on econometrics for estimating demand responses in smart grid environment.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.379-384
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• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.63-101
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• 2015

Banking and borrowing under the ETS may affect the low carbon technology investment level. If the indirect implementation measures are allowed, firms can gradually adjust their carbon reduction costs between implementation periods based on their carbon reduction costs and emission price forecasts. This implies that banking and borrowing may reduce or increase the level of low carbon technology R&D investment. In an oligopoly market, the effects of the measures are quite different from the ones in a perfectly competitive market. This is because the indirect implementation measures can shift market competition in Cournot competition model. The effects of banking and borrowing on the carbon reduction R&D investments depend on emission reduction costs, marginal production costs, discount rate, initial free allocation, and the cost reduction effects of R&D investment.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.838-839
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• 2007

전력산업의 시장구조는 과점형태의 불완전 경쟁의 구조로 해석하는 것이 일반적이다. 또한 전기의 물리적 특성상 송전선로에서는 전력손실이 발생하게 되는데, 본 논문은 과점시장 모델로서 쿠르노(Cournot)모델을 사용하여 손실을 포함한 내쉬 균형점을 해석한다. 지역별 한계가격(Locational Marginal Price ; LMP)와는 달리 계통한계가격(System Marginal Price ; SMP)는 손실에 대한 가격신호를 시장에 반영하기 어렵기 때문에 손실과 함께 한계송전손실계수(Marginal Loss Factor ; MLF)를 적용하여 균형상태의 시장거래가치를 비교분석한다.