• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.97-133
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• 2018

In his unpublished article, "Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?," $G{\ddot{o}}del$ criticizes what he calls the 'syntactical interpretation' of mathematics by Carnap. Park, Chun, Awodey and Carus, Ricketts, and Tennant have all reconstructed $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ arguments in various ways and explored Carnap's possible responses. This paper first recreates $G{\ddot{o}}del$ and Carnap's debate about the nature of mathematics. After criticizing most existing reconstructions, I claim to make the following contributions. First, the 'language relativity' several scholars have attributed to Carnap is exaggerated. Rather, the essence of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ critique is the applicability of mathematics and the argument based on 'expectability'. Thus, Carnap's response to $G{\ddot{o}}del$ must be found in how he saw the application of mathematics, especially its application to science. I argue that the 'correspondence principle' of Carnap, which has been overlooked in the existing discussions, plays a key role in the application of mathematics. Finally, the real implications of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ incompleteness theorems - the inexhaustibility of mathematics - turn out to be what both $G{\ddot{o}}del$ and Carnap agree about.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.1-38
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• 2011

Bernays has not drawn scholarly attention that he deserves. Only quite recently, the reevaluation of his philosophy, including the projects of editing, translating, and reissuing his writings, has just started. As a part of this renaissance of Bernays studies, this article tries to distinguish carefully between Hilbert's and Bernays' views regarding the axiomatic method. We shall highlight the fact that Hilbert was so proud of his own axiomatic method on textual evidence. Bernays' estimation of the place of Hilbert's achievements in the history of the axiomatic method will be scrutinized. Encouraged by the fact that there are big differences between the early middle Bernays and the later Bernays in this matter, we shall contrast them vividly. The most salient difference between Hilbert and Bernays will shown to be found in the problem of the uniformity of the axiomatic method. In the same vein, we will discuss the later Bernays' criticism of Carnap, for Carnap's project of philosophy of science in the late 1950's seems to be a continuation and an extension of Hilbert's faith in the uniformity of the axiomatic method.