• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.193-214
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• 2008

This paper is about to analyse Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh on textual evidences through the structure of perception and to apply this result to his theory of the others. In the first place, we study what he thinks of philosophical investigation and thus of the essence of philosophy. With this process, we find out that perception is more important than reflection in philosophical investigation. Differently from the objective or objectivistic viewpoint, the truth of perception is revealed to go beyond distinction between consciousness and object. This truth refers to reversibility which Merleau-Ponty thinks to be the ultimate truth. The reversibility of perception leads to chiasms which reveal and unreveal the beings. In the final analysis, the flesh as reversibility is the Being in the beings. When it comes to the problem of other minds, we are confirmed through the movement of flesh that self-presence is the presence to the differentiated world, namely the others.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.67-86
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to critically investigate John McDowell's naturalism, and propose an alternative direction of inquiry in order for his naturalism to have a more explanatory cogency. McDowell's main project is to settle a philosophical anxiety that has made traditional philosophy waver between mind and world. If one stands on the world side, he would appeal to "the unintelligible given," and on the other hand, if one stands on the mind side, he would fall into anarchistic relativism. In order to relieve the traditional philosophical anxiety, what McDowell has in mind is to reintroduce an empiricistic intuition into a pragmatic conceptual setting. Although McDowell is successful in that it could avoid methodological difficulties with which traditional philosophy has faced, his discussion seems to give rise to a charge of "the Myth of the Given," presenting perceptual judgement as a model of judgement. I propose that McDowell has yet to account for the relation between perceptual and abstract judgements in a more cogent way, which has been far better explained by the experientialist account of the nature and the structure of the embodied experience.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.130
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• pp.23-45
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• 2014

It can be said that Scheler's theory of perception is the theory of drive-conditioned perception, in more detail the theory of drive-motoric conditions of perception. Scheler tells us that Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach were mistaken in their assumption that sensations are purely receptive and primary in all experience. He claims that sensations are not primary but subsequent to a subliminal attention of vital drives(called 'Vor-Liebe und Vor-Interesse' by him). And because sense perception cannot take place without a vital energy of drives that account for the ongoing activity of perception, no object can be perceived unless it stimulates movement in an organism which exercises a count-movement against objects and thereby resisting objects. According to Scheler, an order of foundation such as the preexistence of images prior to perception; the priority of perception with regard to functions of senses; the priority of sense functions with regard to sensations has to be kept in mind. And it has to be kept in mind that the essence of life is pre-empirical, is pure becoming(Werden) and unbecoming(Entwerden), a process in which its two empirical sides are not yet separated. Then it is easy to see that perception is conditioned by vital drives. The drive-conditioned theory of perception is also supported by the fact that the motility of an organism determines its sensory apparatus, an organism has an alphabet of senses that can serve as signs of luring and noticing objects that are meaningful for its drive-motoric behavior. For example a lizard remains undisturbed by a gun shot but runs away from the slightest noise in the grass.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.52
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• pp.311-340
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• 2017

This research focuses on the theory of Zhi-jue(知覺) by Kim Chang-Hyup(金昌協) through comparison between Kim Chang-Hyup's and Zhu Xi(朱熹)'s. In the point of supervision, Zhu Xi considered that Zhi-jue is one of the conditions caused by supervision, one the other hand, it is the action that make possible supervision. Kim Chang-Hyup emphasize the concept of Zhi-jue itself, he considered that Zhi-jue is the action that make possible supervision, and separate Zhi-jue from Xing(性) or Qing(情). In this process, Zhi-jue became the subject itself about supervision, so the mix about relation between Zhi-jue and supervision is solved. But there is a problem about gap between Zhi-jue and the nature from separate between Zhi-jue and Xing. Kim Chang-Hyup intend to separate Zhi-jue and Qing as subject and object, so he considered that Xing is not a reason of Zhi-jue, but rules. It's not a answer about what is the reason of Zhi-jue. Yet Zhu Xi also considered that Xing is the rules of Zhu-jue, only in the case that Zhi-jue means the resulf of supervision, Zhi-jue is considered as the effect of Zhi(智). So the relation problem about Zhi-jue as a subject and the nature is brought up by Joseon scholar who attempted to arrange the concepts of neo-confucianism. Eventually, in case of the relation about Zhi-jue and Xing, King Chang-Hyup and Zhu Xi has a common point, only in case of the relation about Zhi-jue and supervision, Definding Zhi-jue as the subject of supervision is the character of Kim Chang-Hyup's theory of Zhi-jue.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.23
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• pp.181-216
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• 2008

This thesis is based on two points in Min-yisheng's idea: 1, knowing, consciousness, and differentiation of mind, according to which 2, Zheng-jidou's dividually observe to the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness. Min-yisheng and the scholar on Yangming Theory named Zheng-jidou are arguing about the rights and wrongs of the Yangming Theory, the key concept of which is the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness. At the extension of this argument, Min-yisheng also argues with Jin-chagnxie about the same and different points of knowing and consciousness. When argue with Zheng-jidou about Yangming Theory, Min-yisheng disproves the saying of "mind is principle" and "syncretism of consciousness and behavior" as well as defines liangzhi, which is the key concept of Yangming Theory, as a consciousness different from the natural principle. While disputing with Zheng-jidou about the relation between liangzhi and consciousness, Min-yisheng begins to pay attention to the relation between knowing and consciousness focused in the academy at that time. And as a result of that he also has a dispute with Jin-chagnxie about the same and different points of knowing and consciousness. The dispute between Min-yisheng and Jin-chagnxie is actually about how to look at the relation of knowing and consciousness, from the point of "non-mixed" or the point of "inseparable". Jin-chagnxie emphasizes on the un-mixed of knowing and consciousness while Min-yisheng, from the point of "inseparable", sees the consistency of the two. This thesis focuses on the argumentation of "the same and different points of liangzhi and consciousness" and "the same and different points of knowing and consciousness", the difference of the two positions and the historical meaning of this argument in ideologies.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.215-242
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• 2008

Die Erkenntnistheorie von Berkeley entwickelt sich in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Lehren von Descartes und Locke, und sie ist als die idealistische Linie durch Hume mit dem deutschen Idealismus verbunden. Berkelez nimmt die Erfahrung als Ausgangspunkt der $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ des Denkens an, und bei ihm kann die Erkenntnis durch die radikale Untersuchung des Objekts zur Sicherheit gelangen. Durch diese Untersuchung will er den Skeptizismus und die Spekulation, die sich auf das innere, unerfahrbare Wesen der Dinge bezieht, vernichten. Wir $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ also bei ihm die Sinnesideen(ideas imprinted on the sense) als die Objekte der Erkenntnis, den Geist (mind) als das Subjekt der Erkenntnis und das $Ged{\ddot{a}}chtnis$ und die Einbildungkraft (memory and imagination) als die Vermittlung der Erkenntnis auffassen. Berkeley nennt solche Objekte die sinnlich von uns wahrgenommenen Dinge. Solche Dinge sind zwar wirkliche Dinge, aber sie bestehen als die durch die Sinne wahrgenommenen Ideen nicht $selst{\ddot{a}}ndig$ $au{\ss}erhalb$ der Geister, der sie wahrnimmt oder erkennt, existieren. Daher ist nach Berkeley 'esse'(das Sein solcher Dinge) 'percipi'(Wahrgenommenwerden): "esse est percipi".

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.36
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• pp.43-74
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• 2013

This paper aims to analyse Han Wonjin's criticism centered on Kim Changhyup's theory of Jigak(知覺). In the early 18th century, Kim Changhyup whose position considered as the leader of Rakhak(洛學) circle was the central figure in the debate on the controversial subject of Jigak. Han Wonjin as an opinion leader of Hohak(湖學)'s legacy was required to argue with his counterpart in order to establish his circle's standpoint. The main issue they discussed was the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak. Kim contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Gi(器). Similarly, the relation between Sim(心) and Sung(性) is that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigak is not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sung as the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Han argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to be a moral activity. In criticizing Kim Changhyup, Han maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigak as a blind function with no moral sense. If one admits Jigak can have moral contents on its own without the connection with Ji, then one would have to allow two moral foundation, which leads one's idea into heretical beliefs. Han holds that Jigak can a moral function only when it is grounded upon Ji. In conclusion, Han emphasizes Ji as the base of Jigak that enables Jigak to realize morality while Kim emphasizes the role of Jigak as the principal agent of moral activity.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.52
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• pp.281-310
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• 2017

This paper is a reflective study of contemporary Korean scholars' claims that they criticize the explanation of Zhu Xi(朱熹, 1130-1200)'s psychology in which he explains that the 24th Hexagram of $F{\hat{u}}$[復卦] shows the state that the mind has not happened yet[未發]. Zhu Xi explains the 24th Hexagram of $F{\hat{u}}$[復卦] with the theory of no mind yet[未發說]. Several scholars in modern Korea, however, raise the question of whether "thoughtless[思慮未萌] but being not dark to perception[知覺不昧]" of the 24th Hexagram of $F{\hat{u}}$ is enough to explain the state of no mind yet. And they think that "thoughtless[思慮未萌]" is appropriate to explain the state in which the mind has not yet occurred, but it is not to "being not dark to perception". In this study, we would like to show that Zhu Xi's interpretation of the 24th Hexagram of $F{\hat{u}}$[復卦] fully explains the fact that "thoughtless[思慮未萌] but being not dark to perception[知覺不昧]" explain the theory of no mind yet[未發說]. Zhu Xi's 'the theory of no mind yet[未發說]' is divided into two periods, a period of 'old theory on $zh{\bar{o}}ngh{\acute{e}}$[中和舊說]' and a period of 'new theory on $zh{\bar{o}}ngh{\acute{e}}$[中和新說]'. He develops 'the theory of no mind yet[未發說]' on the basis of 'the theory that nature is body and mind is action[性體心用說]' during the period of old theory, and develops the theory[未發說] based on 'the theory that mind controls nature and feelings[心統性情說]' during the new theory. Between the two periods, the status of the mind changes from "the mind has already happened[已發]" to "through which the mind has not yet arisen and the mind has already risen[未發已發]". And its role also changes from 'what nature is happened' to 'presiding on nature and emotion.' This change affects the interpretation of the idea that the mind has not yet happened, that thoughts have not budged yet[思慮未萌], perception is not dark[知覺不昧].

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.81-104
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• 2016

Given that the goal of study lies in the pursuit of truth and that philosophy asks questions about the origin of being, dealing with existence rather than essence is distant from the original meanings of philosophy. In spite of this, people talk about existence because it is closely related to the academic goals of phenomenology. It is true that phenomenology is Wesenswissenschaft ("the science of essences") in that it tries to restore the original nature of philosophy and establish philosophy as a strict science, but it cannot be ignored in phenomenological research that essence starts from existence. The purpose of this study is to examine the issues that traditional philosophy has sought after and missed by focusing on the issue of "existence." Existence is man's participation in the world, thus being expressed as being-to-the-world. All that has been perceived is understood in total unity and accordingly cannot be restored to ideological essence. In the end, the issue of existence should make a new start at the root of perception. Man is a thinking being and, at the same time, acting being. Here, an attempt to determine the priority between thinking and acting will be meaningless, indeed, and make an issue where there is none. Human beings will not thus stay at Descartes cogito argument' and try to go out into the world through the door opened by cogito. With these reasons in mind, this study examines the issue of existence with a focus on a phenomenal field and body.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society for Cognitive Science Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.189-193
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• 2002

의식에 관한 가장 흥미 있는 최근의 과학적 작업들 중 철학적으로 문제가 되는 다수는 시각으로부터 나왔으며 그 중 특히 맹시 현상은 심리철학에 있어서 의식, 지각, 그리고 지향성의 개념에 문제를 제기한다. 맹시 환자들은 후두엽 피질의 두뇌 손상으로 인하여 생긴 암점(Scotoma) 때문에 현상적으로 의식적인 과정을 경험할 수 없으면서도 그들의 보이지 않는시야 영역에 대하여 보통 시각을 가진 사람들과 상당히 비슷하게 기능을 발휘한다. 이러한현상은 의식이 행동을 제어하는 데에 과연 인과적 역할을 하는지에 대한 문제들, 심리철학에서 뿌리깊게 논의되어왔던 의식의 기능과 부현상론에 대한 문제를 제기한다. 즉, 맹시 현상은 현상적 의식이 실재하지 않는 것이거나, 존재하더라도 어떤 인과적 효력을 가지지 않는 부수현상적인 것이라는 견해를 강하게 지지하는 것 같다. 이와 함께 인간과 동일한 물리적 구성과 행동을 가지지만 의식적 경험을 결여하는 피조물인 좀비(zombie)의 이론적 가능성이 제기된다. 이를 지지하기 위해서 초맹시(super-blindsight)의 개념과 사례가 제안된다. 이 논문은 맹시 현상을 통해서 현상적 의식의 실재성을 부정하려는 논변들을 반박하고, 의식은 행위의 수행에 관련될 뿐만 아니라 인지에 있어서 중요한 역할을 한다고 논한다. 따라서, 역설적으로 맹시 사례가 오히려 현상적 의식이 인과적 역할을 가진다는 감각질 실재론의 견해를 지지할 수 있다고 논증할 것이다.