• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.244-252
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• 2006

The main results of this study can by summarized as follows. First, the incremental effect of equity to shareholders is common in the sample of this study. The sample contains 46 non-listed firms that filed for legal management and had confirmed their reorganization plans. Second, the results of the regression model analyzing the determinants of incremental equity to shareholders in legal management show that it is negative related to the solvency(total debt/total asset), firm size, and weight of claims for secured creditors and banks significantly. But corporate reorganization period(from filing to confirmation)are not significant.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.12
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• pp.162-169
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• 2016

Using 1795 observations from the 5 year-359 firm panel data collected during the period from 2009 to 2013 in Chinese stock exchanges, this study examines the impact of the controlling shareholders' ownership on R & D expenditure. This empirical study finds that when firms are state-owned, the controlling shareholders' ownership has a U shaped relation with the level of R & D expenses. A non-linear relation is also found when piece-wise regression models are applied. This empirical study also finds that when firms are private-owned, the controlling shareholders' ownership is negatively related to the level of R & D expenses, and no structural changes in the relation are found when piece-wise regression models are applied. These results support the hypothesis that the effects of the controlling shareholders' ownership on R & D expenses may differ depending on the ownership type of the controlling shareholders. This finding suggests that the differences in the controlling shareholders' incentives due to their ownership type should be considered when exploring the relation between the controlling shareholders' ownership and corporate strategic decisions.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.327-332
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• 2006

Entering legal management, shareholders receive some payment. We call this phenomenon the deviations from absolute priority. This study focuses on incremental effect and determinants of equity to shareholders by wealth transfer from creditors to stockholders in the process of legal management. The main results of this study can by summarized as follows. First, the incremental effect of equity to shareholders is common in the sample of this study. The sample contains 46 non-listed firms that filed for legal management and had confirmed their reorganization plans. Second, the results of the regression model analyzing the determinants of incremental equity to shareholders in legal management show that it is negative related to the solvency(total debt/total asset), firm size, and weight of claims for secured creditors and banks significantly. but corporate reorganization period(from filing to confirmation)are not significant.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.20 no.3_4
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• pp.63-109
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• 1998

주주와 기업경영자의 대리인관계에서 대주주가 경영자를 감시 감독하는 역할을 항상 하는 것은 아니다. 기업의 주주는 동질적이 아닐 수 있으며, 특히 지배 대주주와 외부주주의 이해관계는 상이할 수 있다. 소유지분이 높아지고 기업에 대한 영향이 증가하는 경우 이를 이용하여 주주들이 자신들의 사익을 추구하고자 할 수 있다. 기업경영 및 의사결정을 자신들의 사적이익에 부합되는 방향으로 유도하기 위하여 주주들은 경영자에게 높은 보수를 제공하는 방법 등으로 경영자와의 담합관계를 추구할 수 있다. 대주주가 경영자와의 담합관계를 추구하는 경우 기업경영의 주목적이 기업주식가격상승 또는 배당금증가에서 멀어지므로 기업의 수익성은 감소할 수 있다. 본 연구는 1982년부터 1992년간 일본 제조업분야의 상장기업을 통해 기관투자자들의 소유지분과 경영자의 보수 그리고 기업성과와의 관계를 살펴보았다. 주거래은행을 중심으로 금융기관투자자는 기업의 주요 채권자인 동시에 소유주로서 일반주주와는 상반된 이해관계를 가지고 있다. 본 연구는 금융기관의 소유지분이 강화됨에 따라 기업경영자의 급여가 성과급이 아닌 고정급의 형태를 통해 증가함을 보여주고 있다. 또한 기업이 차입금에 대하여 지불하는 이자율이 상승할수록 기업경영자의 급여는 증가함을 보여준다. 그리고 금융기관의 소유지분이 높은 기업의 수익성이 낮음을 보여주고 있다. 이런 결과는 1980년대 자본 자유화와 더불어 자본공급자로서의 위치가 약해진 금융기관과 기업과의 관계를 시사하고 있다. 기업수익성보다는 금융기관에게 주요 채권자로서의 위치와 상대적으로 높은 수익성을 보장하도록 경영자의 인센티브급여계약이 설계되었음을 의미한다. 또한 많은 기업들이 주거래은행의 전직 경영자를 이사 또는 최고경영자로 임명하고 있는 사실을 고려할 때, 금융기관 경영자와 기업경영자간의 담합관계를 암시하기도 한다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.63-87
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• 2010

This paper empirically examines whether ownership disperses when a venture firm its IPO (initial public offerings). The data for this study were collected from 91 firms that were initially listed on KOSDAQ between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007. We explored the influence of the underpricing of IPO on the change of large shareholders. The first finding of this investigation is that the number of shareholders of the venture firms who underpriced IPOs still increased after the closing of lockup. This is consistent with the findings of Booth and Chua(1996) and Brennan and Franks(1997). Second, the share of the large stockholders of the venture firms that a venture capital company invested decreased significantly after the end of lockup. Third, the venture businesses with higher ratio of flotation showed a significant decreasing of shareholders after the closing of lockup.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.9
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• pp.5829-5835
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• 2015

This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance structure on the firm's debt costs under different governance environments. We find that after the 2008 banking crisis, family firms with controlling shareholders benefit from lower debt cost through the strong control rights of dominating large shareholders, compared with the firms with diversified minority-shareholders. Foreign investors are related statistically to the higher cost of debt. Before the 2008 banking crisis, cash flows and growth potentials are positively associated with the firm's cost of debt.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.41-46
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• 2022

Chinese stock market often rises and falls sharply. The impact of the stock price crash risk has become a hot research field to maintain financial stability. This study starts from the perspective of the proportion of largest shareholders holding shares, and studies whether largest shareholders have more incentive to supervise management and reduce self-interest behavior of management. We use the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as a sample, and study the relationship between largest shareholders and share price crash risk. Empirical research shows that the higher the proportion of largest shareholders of state-owned enterprise, the company's stock price crash risk can be significantly reduced. This study suggests that the higher the share of the largest shareholder, the lower the opportunistic behavior of managers and that information asymmetry between the company and the shareholders can be alleviated.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.3-54
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• 1999

1997년의 경제위기는 근본적으로 많은 차입금에도 불구하고 장기간에 걸쳐 낮은 수익성을 보인 기업들이 불황에 직면하여 도산위험이 급증함으로써 발생한 것으로 판단된다. 그러면, 기업들의 수익성은 왜 이렇게 낮은 것일까? 본 연구는 지배대주주와 소액주주간의 갈등이 기업의 수익성을 저하시킨 한 원인으로 작용했다는 가설을 실증적으로 규명하고자 한다. 우리나라 기업들, 특히 기업집단의 경우 지배대주주의 개인소유지분은 높지 않지만 기업경영에 대한 통제력은 매우 강하다. 기업경영에 대한 감시와 책임경영이 확립되지 않는 경제에서 지배대주주가 기업자산을 개인적 이익에 따라 운영하는 경우 편익은 독점하지만 이에 따른 수익성 하락 등의 비용은 다른 주주와 소유 지분율에 따라 공유하게 되므로 사적이익을 추구할 유인이 크다. 본 연구는 1992년부터 1997년까지의 공기업 및 금융기관을 제외한 외부감사대상기업의 재무자료를 기초로 영업이익률, 경상이익률, 그리고 순이익률이 주주간의 이해상충에 의해 어떻게 영향을 받았는가를 분석하였다. 수익성 분석에 있어 상장여부, 자산운영(관계회사 및 비관계회사에 대한 투자), 재벌소속 여부, 기업규모, 재무구조 그리고 산업적 특성 및 기업의 경영 및 사업 전략적 특성을 제어하였다. 다른 조건이 동일하다고 가정하면 상장된 기업의 수익성은 비상장기업보다 낮다. 상장기업의 경우는 대주주의 소유지분이 낮은 반면에 외부주주의 비중이 높기 때문에 대주주가 개인의 이익을 추구하고자 하는 유인이 강하게 작용한 결과로 판단된다. 또한 재벌에 소독된 기업의 수익성은 독립기업들의 수익성보다 낮을 뿐만 아니라 계열회사의 유가증권 및 대여금 등에 대한 투자가 증가할수록 기업의 경상이익률 및 순이익률이 낮아진다. 반면에 비관계회사에 대한 투자자산은 경상이익률 및 순이익률을 높이는 것으로 나타났다. 재벌에 소속된 상장회사가 관계회사에 투자하는 경우는 투자기업의 수익성이 더욱 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 관계회사에 대한 투자는 수익성에 기초한 투자가 아니며 대주주의 지분이 낮은 상장기업에서 소액주주의 이익에 반하여 계열사에 대한 투자형태로 자원이 이전되고 있음을 시사한다. 본 논문의 분석 결과는 외부주주와 내부주주간의 이해상충이 기업의 수익성을 저하시킨다는 가설과 일관된다. 따라서 대주주가 개인적 이익을 추구하고자 하는 유인을 견제하고 소액주주의 권리를 강화하도록 지배구조를 확립해야 할 것이다.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.