• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
• /
• 제21권11호
• /
• pp.320-332
• /
• 2021

본 연구는 국내 주식시장에서 개별종목의 주가급락위험을 과거 1년간 일별수익률의 VaR(Value-at-Risk) 통계량으로 정의하고, 주가급락위험이 기대수익률에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 결과는 다음과 같이 요약된다. 첫째, 전체 종목을 전월의 주가급락위험의 크기 순으로 10개의 포트폴리오로 나눈 후, 주가급락위험이 가장 높은 포트폴리오를 매수하고 가장 낮은 포트폴리오를 공매도하여 매월 구성한 무비용 포트폴리오는 월평균 -2.29%의 수익률(주가급락위험 프리미엄)을 나타낸다. 둘째, Fama-MacBeth 횡단면 회귀분석에서 기업규모, 장부가대시장가비율, 시장베타, 유동성, 최대수익률, 고유변동성, 왜도 등의 다양한 기업특성변수를 통제한 후에도 전월의 주가급락위험은 금월 수익률에 대해 유의한 음(-)의 설명력을 갖는다. 셋째, 최근 1개월 이내에 주가급락폭이 큰 종목일수록 다음 달 수익률이 더 낮다. 넷째, 전월 시장수익률의 변동성과 주가급락위험 프리미엄의 크기는 음(-)의 상관관계를 갖는다. 이러한 결과는 주가급락위험에 대해 투자자들이 과소반응하는 경향으로 인해 주가급락위험이 높은 종목일수록 주가가 고평가된다는 행태재무학적 관점에서의 가설을 지지한다.

• 디지털융복합연구
• /
• 제20권1호
• /
• pp.41-46
• /
• 2022

선진국의 자본시장과 비교해 중국 자본시장의 주요한 문제점으로 주가급락 사태를 꼽을 수 있다. 따라서 주가급락 위험을 줄일 수 있는 요인에 관한 연구는 상당히 중요한 의미가 있다. 본 연구는 최대주주의 보유주식 비율에 초점을 두고, 지분율이 증가함에 따라 기업의 경영자를 감독할 유인이 더 높아지는 지와 이를 통해 경영자의 기회주의적 행동이 감소 되는지 검토해보고자 한다. 이를 위해 2009년부터 2019년까지의 중국 상장기업 자료를 수집하고, 실증분석을 통해 최대주주 지분율과 상장기업의 주가급락 위험 간의 관계를 분석하였다. 연구결과에 따르면 국유기업의 최대주주 지분율이 높을수록 기업의 주가급락 위험이 유의하게 낮아진 것으로 나타났다. 이는 국유기업의 최대주주는 정부 기관으로서 경영자에 대한 정부의 감독이 비국유기업의 최대주주보다 더 엄격하기 때문으로 보인다. 본 연구는 최대주주의 지분율이 높을수록 경영자의 기회주의 행위가 감소하며, 기업과 주주 간의 정보비대칭이 완화될 수 있음을 시사한다.

• 한국전자거래학회지
• /
• 제22권2호
• /
• pp.153-168
• /
• 2017

최근 주식의 수익률과 거래량을 설명하는 요인 중 하나로 투자자들의 관심이나 주식관련 정보 전파의 효율성 등이 중요하게 인식되고 있다. 또한 기업관련 정보가 투자자들에게 투명하게 전파되지 않을 때 기업 주가의 급락(crash) 위험을 증가시킨다는 연구 결과들이 축적되고 있다. 본 연구에서는 네이버 트렌드를 이용하여 포털에서의 검색 강도가 증가하는 것이 주식 수익률의 급락에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 분석하였다. 다양한 주가급락 위험의 측정변수와 검색 강도 측정치를 이용한 분석에서 포털 검색강도가 상대적으로 높은 기업-연도에서 주가 급락의 위험이 감소하는 것으로 관찰되었다. 이러한 결과는 기업 관련 정보 전파가 투자자들에게 효율적으로 이루어지지 않을 때 미래의 주가급락을 초래한다는 논의와 일치하는 결과이다. 또한 이러한 결과는 분석에 발생가능한 내생성을 통제한 후에도 유의하게 성립하는 것으로 관찰되었다.

• 아태비즈니스연구
• /
• 제10권4호
• /
• pp.77-86
• /
• 2019

The purpose of this study is to examine how the characteristics of family firms affect stock price crash risk. Prior studies argued that the opacity of information due to agency problem causes a plunge in stock prices. The governance characteristics of family firms can increase information opacity which leads to crash risk. Therefore, this study verifies whether family firms have a high possibility of stock price crash risk. We use a logistic regression model to test the relationship between family firms and stock price crash risk using listed firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange during the fiscal years 2011 through 2017. The family firm is defined as the case where the controlling shareholder is the chief executive officer or the registered executive. If the controlling shareholder's share is less than 5%, it is not considered a family business. We found that family firms are more likely to experience a plunge in stock prices. This supports the hypothesis of this study that passive information disclosure behavior and information opacity of family firms increase stock price crash risk.

• 산경연구논집
• /
• 제8권5호
• /
• pp.87-93
• /
• 2017

Purpose - This paper investigates whether managerial overconfidence is associated with firm-specific crash risk. Overconfidence leads managers to overestimate the returns of their investment projects, and misperceive negative net present value projects as value creating. They even use voluntary disclosures to convey their optimistic beliefs about the firms' long-term prospects to the stock market. Thus, the overconfidence bias can lead to managerial bad news hoarding behavior. When bad news accumulates and crosses some tipping point, it will come out all at once, resulting in a stock price crash. Research design, data and methodology - 7,385 firm-years used for the main analysis are from the KIS Value database between 2006 and 2013. This database covers KOSPI-listed and KOSDAQ-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for overconfidence is based on excess investment in assets. A residual from the regression of total asset growth on sales growth run by industry-year is used as an independent variable. If a firm has at least one crash week during a year, it is referred to as a high crash risk firm. The dependant variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a high crash risk firm, and zero otherwise. After explaining the relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk, the total sample was divided into two sub-samples; chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms. The relation between how I overconfidence and crash risk varies with business group affiliation was investigated. Results - The results showed that managerial overconfidence is positively related to crash risk. Specifically, the coefficient of OVERC is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. The results are strong and robust in non-chaebol firms. Conclusions - The results show that firms with overconfident managers are likely to experience stock price crashes. This study is related to past literature that examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on the stock market. This study contributes to the literature by examining whether overconfidence can explain a firm's future crashes.

• 유통과학연구
• /
• 제15권8호
• /
• pp.47-54
• /
• 2017

Purpose - According to agency theory, managers have incentives to adjust firm revenues to meet earnings expectations or delay bad news disclosure because of performance-based compensation and their reputation in the market. When the bad news accumulates, stock prices fail to reflect all available information. Thus, market prices of stocks are higher than their intrinsic value. After all, bad news crosses the tipping point, it comes out all at once. That results in stock crashes. Auditors can decrease stock crash risk by reducing agency costs through their informational role. Especially, stock price crash risk is expected to be lower for firms adopting high-quality audits. We focus on distribution and service industry to examine the relation between audit quality and stock price crash risk. Industry specialization and auditor size are used as proxies for auditor quality. Research design, data and methodology - Our sample contains distribution and service industry firms listed in KOSPI and KOSDAQ during a period of 2004-2011. We use a logistic regression to test whether auditor quality influences crash risk. Auditor quality was measured by industry specialist auditor and Big4 / non-Big4 dichotomy. Following the approach in prior researches, we use firm-specific weekly returns to measure crash risk. Firms experiencing at least one stock price crash in a specific week during year are classified as the high risk group. Results - The result of analyzing 429 companies in distribution and service industry is summarized as follows: Above all, it is shown that higher audit quality has a significant negative(-) effect on the crash risk. Crash risk is alleviated for firms audited by industry specialist auditors and Big 4 audit firms. Therefore, our results show that hypotheses are supported. Conclusions - This study is very meaningful as the first study which investigated the effects of high audit quality on stock price crash risk. We provide evidence that high-quality auditors reduce stock price crash risk. Our finding implies that the risk of extreme losses can be reduced through screening of high-quality auditors. Therefore investors and regulators may utilize our findings in their investment and rule making decisions.

• 산경연구논집
• /
• 제9권7호
• /
• pp.53-59
• /
• 2018

Purpose - This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology - 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control-ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO -UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control-ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005-2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders' ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions - Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.