• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.3-43
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• 2018

Auf die ganze Welt macht unbemannte $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$(sog.Drohnen) in vielen Bereichen rasch Fortschritte und Anwendungen gezeigt. Nachdem ferngesteuerte Drohnen $urspr{\ddot{u}}nglich$ $prim{\ddot{a}}r$ $f{\ddot{u}}r$ $milit{\ddot{a}}rische$ Zwecke entwickelt wurden, $erh{\ddot{o}}cht$ sich derzeit ihre zivile Nutzung sowohl im Freizeit- als auch im Dienstleistungsbereich(Paketdrohnen, Drohnen-taxi) stetig. Mit der vermehrten Drohnennutzung steigen allerdings auch die damit verbundenen Risiken und Herausforderungen. In Zusammenhang damit stellt sich dann die Frage, ob $gegenw{\ddot{a}}rtige$ Vorschriften im Bereich von Luftrecht zurecht gekommen sind. Es sieht sich gerade der zwei Schwerpunkt $gegen{\ddot{u}}ber$. Erstens kann $Passagierebef{\ddot{o}}rderung$ mit unbemanntem Luftfahrzeug(mehr als 150kg) im $gegenw{\ddot{a}}ritigen$ Luftrecht keine Anwendung finden. Denn das kor. Luftsicherheitsgesetz und sein Durchsetzungsverordnung definieren die Terminologie von unbemannten Luftfahrzeugen und unbemannten $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$ als "wenn eine Person nicht an Bord geht und ferngesteuert wird". Also soll Drohne nach dieser gesetzlichen Definition nur "ohne Person" geflogen werden. Das besagt ohne Piloten und ohne Passagiere. Zweitens ist unbemannte $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$(weniger als 150kg) nicht auf Handelsgesetz anzuwenden, auf das ${\ddot{u}}ber$ Anspruchsgrundlage und Zurechnungsnorm des gewerblichen Luftverkehr geregelt ist. Der unbemannte Luftfahrzeuglieferdienst bringt nicht nur die Gefahr einer $Besch{\ddot{a}}digung$ des Frachtguts mit sich, sondern auch die Gefahr von $Bodensch{\ddot{a}}den$ durch Dritte. Gemäß ${\S}$ 896 des Handelsgesetzes ist aber die Anwendung von unbemannte $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$(weniger als 150kg) $hierf{\ddot{u}}r$ begrenzt, weil unbemannt $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$ $einschl{\ddot{a}}gig$ in Ultralight $Flugger{\ddot{a}}t$ ist, die im Handelsgesetz ausschließlich besteht. Technische Fortschritt und die dadurch $erm{\ddot{o}}glichten$ kommerziellen Anwendungen werden die Nachfrage nach unbemannter $Flugger{\ddot{a}}te$ wecken. Die Umsetzung der $bez{\ddot{u}}glichen$ Vorschriften sollte auch diese Entwicklung aktiv begleitet und $fr{\ddot{u}}hzeitig$ kommuniziert und erarbeitet werden, damit Hersteller und Nutzer $fr{\ddot{u}}hzeitig$ Planungssicherheit haben.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.23 no.4 s.82
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• pp.7-16
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• 2005

Rejected Takeoff Accidents are not common. but if occurred, it leads to big disaster From the year of 1959, when Jet Transport service opened, to the year of 2000, Rejected Takeoff accidents/incidents occurred total of 94 cases. All cases led to overrun, and major cause is to initiate stopping maneuvers over $V_1$, takeoff decision speed, according to National Transport Safety Board of America. Similar results are represented in Aviation Safety Reporting System of National Aeronautics and Space Administration. So I believe that it is worth studying if Airplane Flight Manual, which is the reference Performance criteria, is appropriate to operations of line pilots. The definition of $V_1$ has been revised a couple of times and Rejected Takeoff Certification Standards for Transport Airplanes was changed in 1998. It shows that up to now there are some portions unreasonable. This study focused on gathering the pilot's tendency for current Rejected Takeoff Procedures of K airlines and analyze the factors they concern. I chose B777 airplane and actually measured the recognition and reaction time of the rejected takeoff transitions through Simulators. And compared the results with the data of flight test and Airplane Flight Manual.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.43 no.6
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• pp.420-428
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• 2019

Although marine structures are a risk factor interfering with the passage of ships, there are no obvious guidelines on the required safety distance between ships and marine structures under regulations and laws. In this study, the width of the shipping route width was set based on the AIS data to analyze the separation distance between marine structures and ships, and the ships were classified by the length of each ship. By analyzing the distribution at marine structures, this study confirmed that the ships' traffic volume was in the form of normal distribution. To statistically analyze the separation distance between the traffic distribution results and the normal distribution of ships in this study, the traffic pattern analysis around the marine structures was performed. As a result, the traffic pattern was different by length and the recommended safety distance for each length is presented accordingly. Referring to the IMO (International Maritime Organization) the standard turning circle and reference of safety separation distance between ships and offshore wind turbines of the CESMA (Confederation of European Shipmasters' Associations) and P IANC (World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructures), the analysis was conducted on ships that did not follow the set distance among the AIS data by setting the distance within the recommended ship safety distance to 5-7 overall length. As a result, the 5.5 length over all of the safety recommendations were selected as appropriate, and based on the above results, the two cases recommending ship safety distance were proposed.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Fisheries and Ocean Technology
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.97-112
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• 1978

The rule 15, 16 and 17 of International Regulations for Preventing collisions at Sea direct actions to avoid collision when two power-driven vessels are crossing. But these rules do not present the safety minimum approaching distances outside which a give- way vessel deeps out of the way of a stand-on vessel. In this paper, the author analyzed the ship's collision avoiding actions from a viewpoint of ship kinematics as the method to calculate this distance. The author worked out mathematic formulas for calculating the safety minimum approaching distances outside which the give-way vessel takes the actions to avoid collisions in accordance with the cross angles of the crossing vessels' courses. Figuring out actually the values of maneuvering indices of the M. S. Koan Ack San (GT: 224tons), the training ship of the National Fisheries University of Busan and the M. S. Golden Clover (GT: 101, 235tons) of the Eastern Shipping Co., Ltd. through their Z test, the author applied these values to the calculating formulas and calculated the safety minimum approaching distances. The results of calculations are as follows; 1. The greatest distance is to be kept by the give-way vessel to avoid collision when the cross angle of courses is 90$^{\circ}$ or near it. In such case the safety minimum approaching distance of a small vessel must be more than 5 times of her own length and that of a large vessel more than 11 times of her own length. 2. Collision danger is greater when crossing angle is obtuse than in an acute angle, therefore greater distance is to be kept by the give-way vessel to avoid collision in the case of the obtuse angle. 3. The actions to be taken to avoid collisions by the give-way vessel in Rule 16 and by the stand-on vessel in Rule 17(a)(ii) of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, must be done outside the above safety minimum approaching distance. When inevitably such actions are to be taken within the safety minimum approaching distance, they should be accompanied with engine motions.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.115-136
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• 2008

The development of the aviation technology is beyond the people's imagination. For example, with some exaggeration, If the autopilot engage upon take off, You will realize that you are on the centerline of the foggy JFK runway 13R after 15 hours with only once or twice of intervention. But the more aviation technology develops, the more responsible the pilot will be who has the final authority of the aviation safety. In the JAL 706 accident caused by unidentified reason, the pilot increased pitch abruptly and overrode the control from the autopilot. The result of this process made the death of a flight attendant and some injuries of a few passengers. The district court found the pilot not guilty at the first trial on the ground that the control override was not connected to the possibility of foresight and avoidance of the human death. The pilot was proved to be innocent through the analysis of the DFDR and ADAS that the override did not precede the unidentified pitch up motion. The judicial precedent related to aviation accidents in Korea requires pilots' absolute and extended care compared to the ordinarily prudent or reasonably careful behaviors in the vehicle and medical accidents. Although there is some controversy about the standard care, the care required in the actual operation of high tech aircraft by a pilot should include objective and standard care and be judged by analysis of the scientific data. Although the pilot maintained the unusual hi speed that doesn't have safety margin and descended under turbulence in case of the JAL 706 accident, the court negatived its relation to the cause of pitch up. Also, the override of the control after initial pitch up might have caused the possibility of the death and injury, but the court denied it. Because of this complex cause of the aviation accidents, it is important for a court to figure out the core reason of the event and casual relationship with the pilot Now, It is required that the judgement of negligence in the aviation accidents should include an objective care with scientific data from simulated circumstances(or a simulator) as the Japanese court not from the theory of vehicle's negligence.