• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.32
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• pp.215-249
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• 2011

This essay reflects on the modernity of Korea by examining the transformation of the traditional knowledge system from a historico-semantic perspective with its focus on the opposition and collision of the old and the new conception occurred in the early period(1890~1910) of the acceptance of the Western modern civilization. With scientific success, trick of reason, Christianity and evolutionary view of history, the Western modernity regarded itself as a peak of civilization and forced the non-Western societies into the world system in which they came to be considered as 'barbarism(野蠻)' or 'half-enlightened(半開).' The East Asian civilization, which had its own history for several centuries, became degraded as kind of delusion and old-fashioned customs from which it ought to free itself. The Western civilization presented itself as exemplary future which East Asian people should achieve, while East Asian past traditions came to be conceived as just unnecessary vestiges which it was better to wipe out. It can be said that East Asian modernization was established through the propagation and acceptance of the modern products of the Western civilization rather than through the preservation of its past experience and pursuit of the new at the same time. Accordingly, it is difficult to apply directly to East Asian societies Koselleck's hypothesis; while mapping out his Basic Concept of History, he assumed that, in the so-called 'age of saddle,' semantic struggle over concepts becomes active between the past experience and the horizon of expectation on the future, and concepts undergoes 'temporalization', 'democratization', 'ideologization', 'politicization.'The struggle over the old and new conceptions in Korea was most noticeable in the opposition of the Neo-Confucian scholars of Hwangseongsinmun and the theorists of civilization of Doknipsinmun. The opposition and struggle demanded the change of understanding in every field, but there was difference of opinion over the conception of the past traditional knowledge system. For the theorists of civilization, 'the old(舊)' was not just 'past' and 'old-fashioned' things, but rather an obstacle to the building of new civilization. On the other hand, it contained the possibility of regeneration(新) for the Neo-Confucian scholars; that is, they suggested finding a guide into tomorrow by taking lessons from the past. The traditional knowledge system lost their holy status of learning(聖學) in the process of its change into a 'new learning(新學),' and religion and religious tradition also weakened. The traditional knowledge system could change itself into modern learning by accepting scientific methodology which pursues objectivity and rationality. This transformation of the traditional knowledge system and 'the formation of the new learning from the old learning' was accompanied by the intersection between the old and new conceptions. It is necessary to pay attention to the role played by the concept of Sil(hak)(實學) or Practical Learning in the intersection of the old and new conceptions. Various modern media published before and after the 20th century show clearly the multi-layered development of the old and new conceptions, and it is noticeable that 'Sil(hak)' as conceptual frame of reference contributed to the transformation of the traditional knowledge system into the new learning. Although Silhak often designated, or was even considered equivalent to, the Western learning, Neo-Confucian scholars reinterpreted the concept of 'Silhak' which the theorists of civilization had monopolized until then, and opened the way to change the traditional knowledge system into the new learning. They re-appropriated the concept of Silhak, and enabled it to be invested with values, which were losing their own status due to the overwhelming scientific technology. With Japanese occupation of Korea by force, the attempt to transform the traditional knowledge system independently was obliged to reach its own limit, but its theory of 'making new learning from old one' can be considered to get over both the contradiction of Dondoseogi(東道西器: principle of preserving Eastern philosophy while accepting Western technology) and the de-subjectivity of the theory of civilization. While developing its own logic, the theory of Dongdoseogi was compelled to bring in the contradiction of considering the indivisible(道and 器) as divisible, though it tried to cope with the reality where the principle of morality and that of competition were opposed each other and the ideologies of 'evolution' and 'progress' prevailed. On the other hand, the theory of civilization was not free from the criticism that it brought about a crack in subjectivity due to its internalization of the West, cutting itself off from the traditional knowledge system.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
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• no.41
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• pp.5-38
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• 2020

The current state of performance halls in South Korea is closely related to the performance art and culture of the nation as the culture of putting on and enjoying a performance is deeply rooted in public culture and arts halls representing each area at the local government level. Today, public culture and arts halls have multiple management purposes, and the subjects of their management are in the public domain including the central and local governments or investment and donation foundations in overwhelming cases. Public culture and arts halls thus have close correlations with the institutional aspect of cultural policies as the objects of culture and art policies at the central and local government level. The full-blown era of public culture and arts halls opened up in the 1980s~1990s, during which multi-purpose performance halls of a similar structure became universal around the nation. Public culture and arts halls of the uniform shape were distributed around the nation with no premise of genre characteristics or local environments for arts, and this was attributed to the cultural policies of the military regime. The Park Chung-hee regime proclaimed Yusin that was beyond the Constitution and enacted the Culture and Arts Promotion Act(September, 1972), which was the first culture and arts act in the nation. Based on the act, a five-year plan for the promotion of culture and arts(1973) was made and led to the construction of cultural facilities. "Public culture and arts" halls or "culture" halls were built to serve multiple purposes around the nation because the Culture and Arts Promotion Act, which is called the starting point of the nation's legal system for culture and arts, defined "culture and arts" as "matters regarding literature, art, music, entertainment, and publications." The definition became a ground for the current "multi-purpose" concept. The organization of Ministry of Culture and Public Information set up a culture and administration system to state its supervision of "culture and arts" and distinguish popular culture from the promotion of arts. During the period, former President Park exhibited his perception of "culture=arts=culture and arts" in his speeches. Arts belonged to the category of culture, but it was considered as "culture and arts." There was no department devoted to arts policies when the act was enacted with a broad scope of culture accepted. This ambiguity worked as a mechanism to mobilize arts in ideological utilizations as a policy. Against this backdrop, the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts, a multi-purpose performance hall, was established in 1978 based on the Culture and Arts Promotion Act under the supervision of Ministry of Culture and Public Information. There were, however, conflicts of value over the issue of accepting the popular music among the "culture and arts = multiple purposes" of the system, "culture ≠ arts" of the cultural organization that pushed forward its establishment, and "culture and arts = arts" perceived by the powerful class. The new military regime seized power after Coup d'état of December 12, 1979 and failed at its culture policy of bringing the resistance force within the system. It tried to differentiate itself from the Park regime by converting the perception into "expansion of opportunities for the people to enjoy culture" to gain people's supports both from the side of resistance and that of support. For the Chun Doo-hwan regime, differentiating itself from the previous regime was to secure legitimacy. Expansion of opportunities to enjoy culture was pushed forward at the level of national distribution. This approach thus failed to settle down as a long-term policy of arts development, and the military regime tried to secure its legitimacy through the symbolism of hardware. During the period, the institutional ground for public culture and arts halls was based on the definition of "culture and arts" in the Culture and Arts Promotion Act enacted under the Yusin system of the Park regime. The "multi-purpose" concept, which was the management goal of public performance halls, was born based on this. In this context of the times, proscenium performance halls of a similar structure and public culture and arts halls with a similar management goal were established around the nation, leading to today's performance art and culture in the nation.