• KLA journal
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.18-25
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• 1980

• KLA journal
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.2-13
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• 1980

• KLA journal
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.2-18
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• 1980

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.184-191
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• 2020

Using 850 disclosures of individual executive compensation from 2014 to 2017, this study examines the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation. The major findings as follow: First, Female auditors have positive effects on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance, implying that when auditors are appointed to be females who are more ethical, of high moral development, risk averse and conservative as well, they play an efficient monitoring role in aligning executive compensation to performance. Second, the monitoring effects of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance are significant when they are full time employed, suggesting that gender-based differences are more likely to be realized on the condition that they are in position to commit to their jobs for their owns. The results overall support that female auditors exercise efficient monitoring roles in aligning executive compensation to performance in Korean listed firms. The research contribute to complement the study of gender effects on corporate decision making, which have been focused on gender diversity of the board, by providing empirical evidence of the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation.

• Korean Architects
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• no.1 s.429
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• pp.51-63
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• 2005

을유년 새해가 밝았다. 우리 협회도 올해로써 불혹의 나이에 접어들었다. 인생으로 치면 황금기를 맞은 것이다. 그러나 회장의 불신임, 감사의 사퇴 등 얼룩진 여파가 지금도 계속되고 있는가 하면 원칙이나 냉철한 손익분석도 없이 지엽적인 것 때문에 중앙제와 연합제가 소용돌이치고 있는 현실이다. 40년간 20여분의 회장이 재임하였다. 굳이 이들의 개인별 평가를 하지 않더라도 협회의 성장과 쇠락, 단결과 분열 등은 회장의 철학과 리더십에 기인한다는 것은 보편적 사실이다. 이제 한 달 후면 새로운 회장을 선임하게 되고 대행체제의 막을 내린다. 다시는 이러한 일이 없도록 하기 위하여, 좀 더 나은 내일의 협회를 위하여 우리 협회의 이상적인 회장상을 그려보는 특집을 마련하였다. 지면상 많은 분의 글을 싣지는 못하였으나 우리 협회를 관심 있게 지켜보는 외부 인사를 포함하여 서울과 지방 등 다양한 의견을 듣고자 하였다. 입후보 예정자들은 이들의 바람과 스스로를 비견하여 진퇴를 명확히 해야 할 것이고, 회원들은 인터넷을 통한 협회 회원 토론방에 활발한 자기 의견을 개진해 줄 것을 당부한다. 그리하여 대의원들은 지역, 학교, 친불친을 떠나 회원들이 원하는 회장에 가장 가까운 후보자에게 투표해야 할 것이다. 이번 특집이 좀 더 나은 협회의 내일을 여는데 조금이라도 기여하기를 바란다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.95-131
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• 2012

This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The 'resignation' was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO's resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director's resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive's change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.