• Title/Summary/Keyword: 자본주의 진화과정

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An Analysis of the Dynamics of the Capitalism's Evolution with Systems Thinking (시스템사고를 통한 자본주의 진화과정의 동태성 분석)

  • Choi, Nam-Hee
    • Korean System Dynamics Review
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    • v.15 no.4
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    • pp.101-127
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    • 2014
  • This study aims to understand how and why each stage of capitalism grows and changes into the new direction in the moment of crisis, based on the systems thinking approach through the causal loop feedback structure. To achieve the research purpose, it classifies the evolution process of the capitalistic economic system into 4 types: Capitalism 1.0(Classical Laissez-Faire Capitalism), 2.0(Revised Capitalism), 3.0(Neo-liberalism), and 4.0(New Capitalism for the Future). This study focuses particularly on by which feedback structure the growth, crisis, and new transition of capitalism could be explained. The main research results are as follows. The intended positive feedback structure caused the growth at each early stage of capitalism. After that time, as a result of the uncontrolled growth, the negative feedback structure controlling its growth operated on the one hand, while the positive feedback structure amplifying the crisis did on the other hand. The study suggests the Resilient Capitalism as the new evolutional direction of Capitalism 4.0. It can contribute to strengthening its resilience by which all the economic players can recover promptly and flexibly from the crises such as the failure of competition and unemployment.

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The Cultural Circuit of Capital and the Evolution of Regional Development Policy in Korea: A New Form of Managerialist Governance in Action? (자본의 문화적 순환과 한국 지역발전 정책의 진화: 새로운 관리주의 거버넌스 형태의 등장?)

  • Lee, Jae-Youl
    • Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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    • v.25 no.2
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    • pp.237-253
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    • 2022
  • This article offers an account of how regional development policy in Korea has evolved under the influence of actor-networks comprising the cultural circuit of soft capitalism. In so doing, the roles played by transnational actor-networks forged between global consulting firms and national business media are emphasized. For this discussion, the waning of spatial Keynesianism in the country is contextualized in the first place, with particular attention to changing planning goals of key regional development policies including consultancies, influential policy gurus (e.g., Michael Porter and Richard Florida), and local business media outlet Maekyong are found to be key movers and shakers in the transition. These empirical findings call for striking a balance between dominant structuralist accounts and emerging actor-oriented approaches, and also help shed a new light on the dualistic conceptualization of managerialist and entrepreneurial governance in a way that the latter may be a new form of the former.

The Rated Self: Credit Rating and the Outsoursing of Human Judgment (평가된 자아: 신용평가와 도덕적, 경제적 가치 평가의 외주화)

  • Yi, Doogab
    • Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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    • v.19 no.1
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    • pp.91-135
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    • 2019
  • As we live a life increasingly mediated by computers, we often outsource our critical judgments to artificial intelligence(AI)-based algorithms. Most of us have become quite dependent upon algorithms: computers are now recommending what we see, what we buy, and who we befriend with. What happens to our lives and identities when we use statistical models, algorithms, AI, to make a decision for us? This paper is a preliminary attempt to chronicle a historical trajectory of judging people's economic and moral worth, namely the history of credit-rating within the context of the history of capitalism. More importantly this paper will critically review the history of credit-rating from its earlier conception to the age of big data and algorithmic evaluation, in order to ask questions about what the political implications of outsourcing our judgments to computer models and artificial intelligence would be. Some of the questions I would like to ask in this paper are: by whom and for what purposes is the computer and artificial intelligence encroached into the area of judging people's economic and moral worth? In what ways does the evolution of capitalism constitute a new mode of judging people's financial and personal identity, namely the rated self? What happens in our self-conception and identity when we are increasingly classified, evaluated, and judged by computer models and artificial intelligence? This paper ends with a brief discussion on the political implications of the outsourcing of human judgment to artificial intelligence, and some of the analytic frameworks for further political actions.

Technology, Labour, and Precarious Lives A Theoretical Reflection on the Relation Between Immaterial Labour and Precarity (테크놀로지, 노동, 그리고 삶의 취약성)

  • Chae, Suk Jin
    • Korean journal of communication and information
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    • v.79
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    • pp.226-259
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    • 2016
  • Drawing on the autonomist Marxist concepts of 'social factory', 'immaterial labour', and 'precarity', this paper discusses the changed nature of labour, life and social relations in contemporary informational capitalism. More specifically, it first traces back to the early autonomist (operasimo) theories of 'social factory' and 'class composition' and then discusses how these earlier theories were developed into the concept of 'immaterial labour' by a group of later autonomist theorists such as Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, Micheal Hardt, and Antonio Negri. Then, it reviews how the concept of immaterial labour was taken up to understand the nature of labour in digital economy within the tradition of Cultural Studies, closely intersecting with the critiques of 'creative labour'. Finally, it discusses how the changed nature of labour is interrelated with the neoliberal labour forces transformations such as casualization of employment and increasing insecurity in employment and life, which the autonomist explores with the concept of 'precarity', the material condition of immaterial labour.

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Neoliberal Urbanization and Urban Enclosure (I): A Theoretical Intervention (신자유주의 도시화와 도시 인클로저(I): 이론적 검토)

  • Kim, Yongchang
    • Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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    • v.50 no.4
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    • pp.431-449
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    • 2015
  • Philosophical roots and discussion frames of neoliberalism are very heterogeneous and approaches to neoliberalism including anarchism, post-neoliberalism also take diverse stances. Even if neoliberalism is losing legitimacy and stability through the global financial crisis, 2008, spatial perspective is becoming more and more important as neoliberalism constantly evolve with creating immense variations. Especially, urban space has become strategically crucial arenas as spatio-temporal strategies and generative nodes for reproduction of neoliberalism. Urban enclosure plays a key role in the specific process of neoliberal urbanization as a kind of capitalist formal and real subsumption. Contemporary capitalism continuously has been sustaining the accumulation by dispossession based on urban enclosure through reshaping the primitive accumulation mechanism. These enclosures are embodied by the change of public use concept from public ownership to economic benefits and public-private taking for private capital. Urban enclosure promotes reification deepening the separation and alienation of workers from the means of production and survival, and interdiction from free place appropriation, transformation of urban economy to patrimonial forms. Also it is pervasive in a daily life space and everyday experience in the city, and private tangled social rules dominate public space and the publicity of space.

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Chinese Socialism and Nationalism (중국식 사회주의와 민족주의)

  • Cho, Bonglae
    • The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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    • no.27
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    • pp.223-254
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    • 2009
  • This thesis is aimed at researching the formation of democracy in socialist China. Due to a sense of cultural superiority on the basis of their developed civilization, they already formed a strong cultural nationalism, which has come to firm up into "Sinocentrism" through long periods of time. However, there arose a sense of crisis due to the Western invasion after the Opium War and the intellectuals in China happened to seek the solution to rescuing their mother land from ruin; in the midst of this process, the theory of social evolution of the West was introduced and accepted. The acceptance of this theory of social evolution gradually transformed in confrontation with a logical limit that China defeated in international competition could not but be plundered by imperialism after all, but it contributed to Chinese intellectuals' forming the concept of the modern state nationalism of the West deviating from cultural Sinocentrism. After the Russian Revolution, a large number of Chinese progressive intellectuals developed their socialist movement with the recognition that Marxism was a practicable alternative to rescue China from its crisis. The Chinese Communist Party was under guidance of the Comintern from the early process of its formation, in which they emphasized the fact the national liberation struggle in colonialized countries was an indispensable element in the world communist movement under the condition of the control of the world by imperialist capital at that time and subsequently, Marxism characterized by resistant nationalism in China gained its cause. Afterwards, the People's Republic of China was established by the Chinese Communists which came to get widespread support from the Chinese through anti-imperialism &feudalism in the process of the Sino-Japanese War, and thus China equipped with a full-blown socialism system set sails. However, with the relations with the Soviet Union getting worse under the international conditions of a cold war, the development of the Chinese socialism couldn't but resort to the concentrated power of its people, which was linked to the boost of continuous patriotism of the Chinese Communists. Particularly, due to the newly-emerging contradictions after reform & opening [gig kifng], China underwent disruption; thus, as an ideology to integrate such disruptive elements, Sinocentrism based on China's cultural pride re-appeared. Recently, a very strong form of Sinocentrism has come to the fore as their superiority of traditional cultures is emphasized in China whose international position as an economic power has been raised.

Korean Wave, Korean Drama, and Women's Fandom (한류와 한국 드라마, 그리고 여성의 팬덤)

  • Shim, Doo-Bo
    • Journal of Broadcast Engineering
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    • v.12 no.5
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    • pp.414-422
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    • 2007
  • This paper aims to find the reasons for Korean television drama being popular in Asia. In particular, the author argues that the role of women's Korean drama fandom is important in the popularity of Korean television drama. What is the role of fandom? How is the gender identity related to women's television viewing? What is the communicative process between the Korean drama producers and fans? What problems does the Korean Wave face recently? These are the questions dealt with in the paper.

The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea (경제력집중(經濟力集中) : 기본시각(基本視角)과 정책방향(政策方向))

  • Lee, Kyu-uck
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.31-68
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    • 1990
  • The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

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Corona 19 Crisis and Data-State: Korean Data-State and Health Crisis Governance (코로나19 위기와 데이터 국가: 한국의 데이터 국가와 보건위기 거버넌스)

  • Jang, Hoon
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.26 no.3
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    • pp.125-159
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    • 2020
  • Amid global pandemic of covid-19, Korean government's response has drawn wide attention among social scientists as well as medical studies. The role of Korean state and civil society has attracted particular attention among others. Yet, this paper criticizes extant studies on Korean case which focus on the extensive intervention of the strong state and subjective attitude of Korean citizens in coping with covid-19. The concept of the strong state lacks social scientific specification and subjective citizens do not match with Korean realities. This article argues that Korean state's capacity in collecting and mobilizing digital data may offer better understanding for the successful responses to the pandemic. First, Korean state is the ultimate coordinator in collecting, analyzing and applying big data about the expansion of covid-19 with its huge network of dataveillance. Also, such role has been largely based upon relevant legal framework and well prepared manuals and cooperation with civic actors and companies. In other words, Korean digital dataveillance had demonstrated its transparency and cooperative governance. Second, such dataveillance capacity has deep roots in the long-term development of Korean state's big data management. Korean state has evolved about thirty years while enhancing digital data network within governments, companies and private sectors. Third, the relationship between Korean state's dataveillance and civil society can be characterized as a state centered push model. This model demonstrates highly effective governmental responses to covid-19 crisis but fall short of building social consensus in balancing individual freedom, human rights and effective containment policies. It means communitarian solidarity among citizens has not been a major factor in Korea's successful response yet.