• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.135-154
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• 2010

This paper considers a duopoly where switching costs exist. The analysis proves that temporal price reductions can be pure strategy equilibrium where firms earn more profit than in a regular price strategy. Greater profits result from price discrimination in temporal price reductions. The equilibrium is contrasted with previous studies, which explain temporal price reductions as a result of mixed strategy. In a given model with an assumption about forming switching cost, firms can control their range of loyal consumers by properly setting their regular and promotional prices. The model shows that temporal price reduction tends to raise the regular price and decrease the range of loyal consumers.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.1-22
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• 2005

The major objectives of this study are twofold. The first is to discover which in-store tactics influence store performance when a retailer implements category management in variety enhancer and fill-ins categories. The second is to analyze how and why specific in-store tactics achieve better or worse performance than other in-store tactics across categories. The data were collected using scanner data and direct observations in 'A' discount store which is one of the representative discount stores in Korea. The in-store tactics were measured by product assortment, temporary price discount, price and non-price promotion, and shelving. The store performance was measured by sales and gross margin return on inventory investmant(GMROI). Empirical results analyzed by multiple regression were as follows: In variety enhancer category, the significant factors affecting sales were product assortment, temporary price discount, price promotion, and shelving. Non-price promotion also influenced GMROI positively but product assortment impacted on GMROI negatively. In fill-ins category, the significant factors affecting sales and GMROI were product assortment and shelving. However, the other factors such as temporary price discount, price promotion, and non-price promotion had no significant influence on both sales and GMROI. This paper presents a number of theoretical and managerial implications of the empirical results and concludes by addressing limitations and future research directions.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.827-858
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• 2006

The paper presents game theoretic models for self-enforcing coalition formation in order to sustain effective international environmental agreements(IEAs). The model analyzes how the intrinsically strategic nature of a government's environmental policies(the emission allowance standard) calls for rules to sustain an IEA. Focusing on the recent theoretical developments in the infinitely repeated game, the paper introduces some mechanisms to show how self-interested sovereign countries are cooperatively able to maintain an IEA rather than defect to initially profit at the expense of a pollution heaven later on. For a more realistic case needed to sustain an IEA, an optimal international environmental policy with both signatories and non-signatories under imperfect monitoring is also explored. In this extension of the model, the derivation process for a critical discount factor, a trigger price level and the length of punishment period is briefly discussed.