• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.518-526
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• 2017

This study analyzed the impact of family firms and their characteristics on how they use debts to analyze the decision-making process of Korean family firms. For analysis, we classified the characteristics of family firms into three categories, through the influence of the relationship between the lack of funds and net debt issuance, which was confirmed as the 'packing order theory' of family firms. There was a total of 4,503 enterprises in the Korean Exchange (KRX). The period of analysis was 10 years, between 2004 and 2014. To summarize, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) validated the packing order theory by presenting a model of family businesses that showed greater applicable to higher packing order theory than a model of non-family businesses. Moreover, the results also confirmed the application of the packing order theory by the family stronger corporate governance and ownership structure. The ownership and governance characteristics of the ruling family has also shown the applicability of higher packing order theory.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.25-44
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• 2009

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants which cause a price differential between common and preferred stock. Prior studies have shown that variables like liquidity, size, the number of outstanding shares issued can explain the price differential between common and preferred stock price. Based on year 2006 through year 2008 data, we analyzed the determinants using regression model. Dummy variables representing large/small company and KSE/KOSDAQ respectively are added and analyzed as independent variables. The firm size, trade volume turnover, and the number of preferred shares to total outstanding shares were proved to make influence on the price differential under the 5% significance level. Especially, we have found the number of preferred shares to total outstanding shares provide the most strong relationship with the price differential. This means that a high ratio of preferred stock to total outstanding shares leads to relatively high value of common stock and causes a big price differential.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.313-325
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the process of determining control in a situation where investors hold less than a majority of the voting rights of the investee through case. Design/methodology/approach - In this study, the various and complex considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 'Consolidated Financial Statements' were systematically classified and stratified. Findings - First, the agreement to delegate voting rights does not necessarily have to be documented, but it can be said to be substantive rights right only if it is not of the nature that one party can discontinue at any time. Second, if it is clear that investors do not have power due to the relative size of voting rights and the degree of stock dispersion, there is no need to review the past shareholders' meeting resolutions and additional facts and circumstances. Research implications or Originality - This study expects to minimize errors in applying the standards by classifying and stratifying the various considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 into first and subsequent considerations. In addition, it is expected to contribute to reducing practical confusion in determining control by presenting a step-by-step review through case on whether or not to have power to judge control when holding voting rights of less than a majority.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.183-191
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• 2022

The Korea Stewardship Code 'Principles on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors' was introduced in 2016 and the National Pension Service adopted it in 2018. the National Pension Service casted 'dessent' vote on the agenda which is able to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder in general meeting. This paper examines whether 'dissent' voting affected on the ownership interest of shareholder or not. The 'dissent' vote on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, appointment or compensation of director and auditor, approval of financial statements ect. The proxies of earnings management is discretionary accruals calculated by modified Jones model. The control variablies are size of assets, liabilities per assets, returns on assets. The results of this study are as followings. First, the 'dissent' voting on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, M&A, approval of financial statements ect. are not significant because their sample size is too small, Second, the 'dissent' voting on appointment of director and auditor affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. So the National Pension Service activism shall affect on increasing the ownership interest of shareholder. Third, the 'dissent' voting on compensation of director and auditor is not affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. This results show that 'unconditional dissent voting' on the agenda in general meeting is not to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder.