• The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.29-39
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• 2010

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the advantages of with-profits and make a proposal for invigorating with-profits business. The data of life insurance companies in the U.K. is used and correlation and regression are employed. The implications are drawn from the analysis. The results and implications of this paper are summarized as follows. Firstly, the with-profits policies increase premium income. There is no positive relationship between with-profits policies and operating costs. The companies that are financially sound sell more with-profits policies than those not solvent. Secondly, with regard to implications for insurance companies, they can make full use of with-profits policies for marketing purpose and the main product in the product portfolio. Finally, with regard to implications for the policyholders, the with-profits policies are not expensive by comparison with the without-profits policies. The with-profits policies provide benefit to the policyholders on a solvency basis.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.147-181
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• 2007

Our article investigates the risk implication of ownership structure in life insurance companies. We set up a model to identify the priority structure of policyholder's and shareholder's cashflow claims, and to derive its implications. Current literature on this issue has focused on the agency paradigm or the risk-sharing efficiency. Fama and Jensen(1983a, 1983b) and Mayers and Smith(1981, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994) argue that the survival of both the corporate and the mutual form of organization is due in part to the relative efficiencies in controlling agency problems. With regard to insurance business, agency problems arise because of the three functions inherent in the organizations:manager, risk-bearer(owner), and policyholder. Stock insurers are characterized by the potentially complete separation of all three functions while mutual insurers merger the policyholder with the ownership function. Doherty and Dionne(1993) and Doherty(1991) concentrate their analysis on differences in the efficiency of risk sharing between participating and non-participating policies. They argue that when the undiversifiable risk has higher portion in business risk, combining policy and equity claims into a single package is a more efficient risk-sharing contract than a simple prepaid risk-transfer. Among various methods for assembling the policy/equity package, Doherty and Dionne(1993) and Doherty(1991) suggest that policy/equity package offered by the mutual is the most efficient risk-sharing arrangement. There has been a controversy on the property of participating policies sold by life insurance corporations in Korea. Some scholars argue that participating policyholders of Korean life insurance companies have shared the cashflow risk with shareholders. They emphasize that insurance firms have used dividend reserves to supplement for equity deficits. Thus, they argue that the economic entities of Korean life insurance companies are mutual companies though their legal entities are corporations. Our article explicitly sets up each stakeholder's cashflow claim in stock and mutual insurers, and thus identify risk differences in shareholder and policyholder. Using our model, we could derive direct implications on the controversy. Our model shows that life insurance companies would sell participating policies since policyholders would have the incentive to share the risk inherent in their primary claims with equityholders. And there exists a fundamental difference in shareholder's risk and equityholder's.