• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.727-757
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• 2013

This paper estimates the effects of Air Cargo companies' fuel surcharge collusion on the final airfreight prices. We show that the final prices have not been generally higher than the 'but-for prices,' and even been significantly lower for some companies. We analyze the possible reasons for such findings, and conclude that the collusion on fuel surcharges has not been successful due to the oil price hike in the cartel period. We also find that the oil price elasticities of fuel surcharges are significantly lower than 1.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.117-149
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• 2015

On May 16, 2014 the Supreme Court of Korea rendered its decision with respect to litigation filed by All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. ("ANA") for revocation of an order of correction and payment of a penalty imposed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC"). On or around September 2002, ANA and various airlines operating air cargo service from Japan to Korea were allegedly to have agree to introduce of fuel surcharge into their rates on cargo fares in an attempt to recoup falling profits from rising of oil price. As this hard core cartel was per se prohibited under Korean competition law (The Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act), KFTC began an investigation and consequently with fruitful results imposed an amount of penalty and issued an order of prohibition. ANA protested against this imposition by filing suit against KFTC under the reasons that (1) their agreement was simply pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations including Air Transport Agreement between Korea and Japan, (2) there was an administrative guidance from Japanese government to allow this agreement, (3) extraterritorial application of Korean competition law to the agreement in this matter was improper as it was made within Japan and targeted only for the shipment from Japan to Korea: accordingly there is not a direct and serious effect between the agreement and any result of anti-competitive. This article aims to review ANA's allegation and the judgement delivered by Korean court under some issues respectively; (1) whether there is an effectively actual anti-competitive cartel between airlines including plaintiff, (2) whether filed rate doctrine is reasonable and applicable in this case for precluding wrongfulness, (3) what is the reasonable limitation of boundaries in extraterritorial application of Korean competition law. Additionally, this article also suggests to concern particular features of air transport business as an regulated industry in judging the unfair restrain on competition.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.23-40
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• 2020

This study examined the background of IMO environmental regulations and countermeasures of domestic and foreign liner shipping companies and also analyzed the additional cost and profitability of container shipping companies by implementation of IMO 2020, when the fuel oil is converted to low sulfur oil. The results show that the national flag carrier would incur significant additional costs when using low sulfur oil, which would worsen its profitability in all scenarios. These analysis results suggest that for regional shipping companies need reasonable BAF setting standards, which is flexible to the price of fuel oil and also seek ways to co-exist through mutual cooperation among oil refiners, shippers and shipping companies.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.327-353
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• 2017

The issue submitted to the Court of Justice on the merits of case C---573/13 originated from a claim brought in the context of a dispute between Air Berlin and the German Federal Union of Consumer Organisations and Associations. The challenge concerned the way in which air fares were displayed in Air Berlin's computerised booking system. The system was organised in such a way that, after selecting a date and a departure airport, one would find all possible flight connections in a summary table. However, the final price of the ticket was displayed only for the clicked connection, and not for all connections, thus preventing customers from being able to compare such price with the prices of other connections. The German Federal Union took the view that this practice did not meet the requirements laid down by Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 1008/2008, which requires transparency in the prices set for air services. This led the German State to bring an injunctive action to cause Air Berlin to discontinue said practice. The claim was upheld at both the application and appeal stage of the relevant proceedings. Subsequently, Air Berlin submitted the matter to the German Federal High Court, which decided to stay the proceedings and ask for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice as to 1. whether Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 1008/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, during the computerised booking process, the final price to be paid must be indicated at all times when prices of air services are shown, including when they are shown for the first time; and 2. whether, during the computerised booking process, the final price must be indicated only for the air service specifically selected by the customer or for each air service shown. In a nutshell, the Court, by the here---discussed judgment determined that Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 1008/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a computerised air ticket booking system, the final price to be paid must be indicated not only for the air service specifically selected by the customer, but also for each air service in respect of which the fare is shown. Clearly the above judgment will place air companies under an obligation to update and adjust (when needed) their computerised ticket booking and payment systems, in consideration of the primary need for consumers to be aware at all times of the actual price payable for a ticket and be able to compare the price of the service selected with the prices for other air services in respect of which the fare is shown.