• Economic Analysis
• /
• v.26 no.3
• /
• pp.48-70
• /
• 2020

Using data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey over the period 1994-2016, we estimate the coefficient of relative prudence in order to capture precautionary saving motive. To do this, we adopt a cohort approach, where we transform such microdata into sample cohort means. Together with initial income involving liquidity constraint, we estimate the relative prudence derived from the Euler equation. The two-stage least-squares (2SLS) between estimate of it obtained from the cohort panel data analysis is too small for the existence of precautionary saving motive, as in previous studies, while the 2SLS random effects estimate is so reasonable. Moreover, the liquidity-constrained cohorts tend to be more sensitive to uncertainty, relative to the unconstrained ones.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.19 no.4
• /
• pp.3-46
• /
• 1997

본 논문은 우리나라 저축률(貯蓄率)의 결정요인을 실증적으로 분석하는 데 목적을 두고 있다. 특히 본 논문은 생애주기가설/항상소득가설(生涯週期假說/恒常所得假說)에 바탕을 두고 거시(巨視)시계열자료와 미시(微視)횡단면자료를 모두 분석함으로써 개별경제주체의 저축행위와 경제전체의 저축간의 일관된 관계를 밝히려고 하였다. 표준적인 생애주기가설/항상소득가설에 의하면, 저축은 소득(所得)의 일시적 변동으로부터 소비(消費)를 독립시키려는 개별소비자의 합리적 선택의 결과이다. 따라서 개별소비자의 저축은 단기적으로는 소득이 일시적으로 높은 해(년(年))에, 그리고 보다 장기적으로는 일생동안 가장 높은 수준의 소득을 벌게 되는 장년기간중에 가장 크게 된다. 본 논문의 실증결과는 이러한 생애주기가설/항상소득가설의 예측이 실제자료와 대체로 일치함을 보여준다. 거시자료 분석결과에 의하면 우리나라 저축률의 연간변동은 소득성장률(所得成長率)과 인구연령구조(人口年齡構造)의 변동에 의해서 잘 설명되는 것으로 나타난다. 또한 미시자료 분석결과를 보더라도 소득이 일시적으로 높은 가계나 경제활동연령인구의 비중이 높은 가계일수록 더 많은 저축을 하는 것으로 나타난다. 따라서 생애주기가설/항상소득가설은 우리나라 저축률의 결정을 설명하는 데 매우 유용하다고 판단된다. 본 논문은 또한 소득성장률이나 연령구조 외에 이자율, 유동성 제약, 그리고 예비적 저축동기 등이 저축에 미치는 영향에 대해서도 살펴보았다. 실증결과에 의하면 실질이자율은 저축률을 다소 증대시키는 효과가 있으나, 기타 요인들의 효과는 유의하지 않은 것으로 나타났다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.32 no.1
• /
• pp.131-169
• /
• 2010

I develop a matching model in which risk-averse workers face borrowing constraints and make a labor force participation decision as well as a job search decision. A sharp distinction between unemployment and out of the labor force is made: those who look for work for a certain period but find no job are classified as the unemployed and those who do not look for work are classified as those out of the labor force. In the model, the job search decision consists of two steps. First, each individual who is not working obtains information about employment opportunities. Second, each individual who decides to search has to take costly actions to find a job. Since individuals differ with respect to asset holdings, they have different reservation job-finding probabilities at which an individual is indifferent between searching and not searching. Individuals, who have large asset holdings and thereby are less likely to participate in the labor market, have high reservation job-finding probability, and they are less likely to search if they have less quality of information. In other words, if individuals with large asset holdings search for job, they must have very high quality of information and face very high actual job-finding probability. On the other hand, individuals with small asset holdings have low reservation job-finding probability and they are likely to search for less quality of information. They face very low actual job-finding probability and seem to remain unemployed for a long time. Therefore, differences in the quality of information explain heterogeneous job search decisions among individuals as well as higher job finding probability for those who reenter the labor market than for those who remain in the labor force. The effect of the extended maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows is investigated. The benchmark benefit duration is set to three months. As maximum benefit duration is extended up to six months, the employment-population ratio decreases while the unemployment rate increases because individuals who are eligible for benefits have strong incentives to remain unemployed and decide to search even if they obtain less quality of information, which leads to low job-finding probability and then high unemployment rate. Then, the vacancy-unemployment ratio decreases and, in turn, the job-finding probability for both the unemployed and those out of the labor force decrease. Finally, the outflow from nonparticipation decreases with benefit duration because the equilibrium job-finding probability decreases. As the job-finding probability decreases, those who are out of the labor force are less likely to search for the same quality of information. I also consider the matching model with two states of employment and unemployment. Compared to the results of the two-state model, the simulated effects of changes in benefit duration on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows are quite large and significant.