• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.25-43
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• 2019

This study analyzed the problem of the time difference of medicine price cut in Korea according to the administrative and judicial process and sought to present the amendment in the related law to achieve substantial fairness. We considered unfairness of medicine price cut caused by the administrative and judicial process in three situations, the approval-patent linkage system, realistic differences in the practice of administration and suspension of price cut execution. Based on it, we reasoned out the solution to get substantial fairness in the administrative and judicial process of medicine price cut in Korea. Although each step of the administrative and judicial process is lawful and reasonable, the time difference of medicine price cut according to the administrative and judicial process can result in damages or windfall to both of pharmaceutical company and National Health Insurance Service. In the present legal system of Korea, it is unable to be correct. Thus, we present the amendment to correct the damages and windfall when it happens.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.91-124
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• 2021

In May 2019, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety revised the "Pharmaceutical Determination and Adjustment Criteria" with the content of differentially calculating the price of generic drugs according to the registration of the drug substance and meeting the requirements for their own bioequivalence test. According to this revised rule, if their own bioequivalence test is not conducted, even the generic drugs that have already been approved would be lowered in price. I wondered whether this system was introduced with sufficient public legal considerations regarding its legislative purposes and means. Therefore, I reviewed the contents of the revised notice based on whether or not it is valid to determine and adjust the price of generic drugs in terms of the legitimacy of legislative purposes and the proportionality principle after introducing the history and background of the rule. First, I raised a question as to whether the purpose of preventing the overrun of generic drugs is indeed legitimate in terms of the legitimacy of the purpose. In order for the revised notice of "reduction of drug prices when the test requirements are not met," to meet the conformity principle, the premise that it is difficult to recognize safety and effectiveness through consignment (joint) bioequivalence test or that these tests are insufficient in safety and efficacy verification than their own test must be established. Nevertheless, it seems that suffficient review has not been carried out. In order to achieve the purpose of securing safety and effectiveness, the focus should be on 'reinforcement of the standards for bioequivalence test and the management of the bioequivalence test itself' rather than whether it is a their own test or a consignment (joint) test. Third, it is contrary to the necessity and substantiality principle that strict standards are uniformly applied to the products that can be considered to have been sufficiently verified for safety and effectiveness after a considerable period of time has passed after the product approval. In many cases, revised administrative legislations quickly enacted and amended in the state of lack of legal review or consensus, while the regulatory effects resulting from it are quite direct and specific to the regulated person. In this respect, I emphasized that the administrative legislative process also requires substantial review and prior control of the regulatory purposes and means, and that the participation of stakeholders in the legislative procedure is to be strengthened.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.3-28
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• 2022

Recently, the targets and clauses of negotiation between 'National Health Insurance Service (NHIS)' and Pharmaceutical companies has been expanded. Due to newly adopted 'Quality management clause', 'Compulsory supply maintenance clause' and 'Penalty for breach of contract clause', not only 'Ministry of Health and Wellfare (MOHW)'s 'drug listing' and 'Price cap' announcement, but also 'negotiation between NHIS and pharmaceutical companies' can be a legal sanction to the suppliers. Once secretary of MOHW order NHIS to negotiate with pharmaceutical company, NHIS notify this order to the company and enter into the negotiation. 'The order' exists in the public domain between the government (MOHW) and public institutions (NHIS) and does not constrain the legal rights of companies (Therefore companies cannot pile a lawsuit about the order). However, 'the notice' or 'negotiation' is an act which has a counterpart, can be a target of administrative litigation if the company get some disadvantages from the talks. Negotiations can be divided into four types according to "the target (whether it is listed on the insurance benefit list)" and "the purpose (whether the target is price or conditional)." In particular, negotiations on listed drugs, whose goal is to set unfavorable conditions for companies, can be illegal if there is no price. So we need to consider compensation for the company as an incentive to negotiate.