• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.303-311
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• 2022

Recently the telemedicine platform firms which have been temporarily permitted since COVID-19 outbreak have increasingly provided online prescription drugs delivery, causing concerns among incumbent providers of medicine, some of whom began to take aggressive actions again them. In this study, using game theoretic market entry - deterrence model, we show that although the incumbent medicine provider can effectively deter entry by the telemedicine platform firms by its preemptive action, accommodation could be a optimal action when telemedicine platform firms already have penetrated the market with their being permitted to do business due to the COVID-19. However, for the incumbent to cooperate for the successful change in the retail market for medicines, policies like placing a ceiling on the maximum number of taking prescriptions by the pharmacists a day in the telemedince platform network, providing favorable exposure of community pharmacists on the telemedicine platform user interface, and allowing community pharmacies to participate as shareholders of the telemedicine platform firms in its initial public opening of capital, are suggested.