• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.241-247
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• 2021

This study analyzed the changes in explanatory power of the modified Jones model(1995) for estimating the amount of accruals for Korean Stock Market listed companies from 1990 to 2019. We hypothesized that if the properties of financial variables used in the existing model change over time or change in discretionary ratios, the model's explanatory power will change. As the result of regression models, I found that the explanatory power of the modified Jones model(1995) gradually declined over time. The results may be derived from the increase in accruals itself and the changes in the distribution of variables contained in the model. The results of this research's chronological approach are expected to give important implications to both academic researchers and accounting information users.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.45 no.3
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• pp.173-180
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• 2021

Although accounting is one of the core fields of corporate management, few studies have reported accounting phenomena involving shipping companies. In addition, although financial reporting is very important to shipping companies that use several financial tools such as ship finance and financial lease, it is difficult to identify studies investigating shipping companies' financial reporting, especially their earnings management. The purpose of this study is to analyze accrual earnings management behavior of shipping companies. Companies with high debt ratios and net losses are known to have incentives for earnings management. Due to the nature of the industry, shipping companies have a high debt ratio and often report net losses. Accordingly, shipping companies are expected to engage in substantial earnings management. Based on the analysis of KOSP I companies listed on the Korea Exchange from 2001 to 2020, it was found that shipping companies are engaged in higher levels of earnings management than non-shipping companies. Discretionary accrual was used as a proxy variable for earnings management. Discretionary accrual was measured using the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) and the performance matched model of Kothari et al.(2005). In this study, significant results were derived by comparatively analyzing the earnings management practices, which is one of the major accounting behaviors of shipping and non-shipping companies. Stakeholders such as external auditors, investors, financial institutions, analysts, and government authorities need to be aware of the earnings management behavior of listed shipping companies during their external audit, financial analysis, and supervision. Finally, listed shipping companies must conduct stricter accounting based on accounting principles.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.235-242
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• 2017

Earnings management is defined as an intentional act during the financial reporting process or a manager's choice of accounting policies to avoid earnings decreases or obtain some private gains. Shipping firms have a highly debt-intensive capital structure and a significant motivation in earnings management to avoid failure of a Debt Covenant. From this point of views, this paper tries to determine the relationship between the capital structure and discretionary accruals estimated using the re-modified Jones model (1995). The sample used to test the research models is made up of 87 Korean shipping firms during the period from 2007 to 2015. A histogram analysis, t-test and FGLS confirm the possibility of using earnings management, and it proved that Korean shipping firms manage their earnings to avoid financial loss. An analysis of the relationship between the capital structure and earning managements, shows it is difficult to support the Debt Covenant, shown as a negative relationship between the debt ratio and debt maturity as shipping firms' capital structure and discretionary accruals as earning management variable. An additional analysis presents a negative relationship between previous debt maturity and discretionary accruals, and the possibility of earning management in a highly increased debt ration group.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.877-886
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• 2009

Since 1982, the auditee have selected the auditor under market mechanism. Under the system on which the auditor have been chosen by client, there have been chances for opinion shopping, etc. To prevent those, some audit regulations have been introduced. Prior studies have documented the positive effect of these audit regulations. Those studies, however, had some limitations which they dealt with just short event period for empirical tests. This study examines the effect of Auditor Turnover Ratio on the Quality of Earnings using a sample of firms that were listed on Korea Exchange(KRX) from 1995 to 2004. The firms that change auditor frequently are expected to have low disclosure quality. The CEO with the incentives to manage or manipulate earnings could accomplish this purpose by replacing existing auditor with more friendly auditor, which could result in eventually lowering earning's quality of the firm. The result of empirical test shows that the accrual quality of firms which have high auditor turnover ratio are significantly lower than those of firms which have low ratio. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the more frequently a firm changes auditor, the lower the quality of earning is. This evidence might give the implication to policy-making supervisor.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.1-20
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• 2018

This study aimed to examine earnings quality of firms selected as Global Champs project which has been promoted by the government since 2013 to support small and medium sized enterprises, for the screening year(t-1) and selected year(t). Earing quality is measured as the value of discretionary accruals estimated by Dechow et al.(1995) adjusted Jones model and Kothari et al.(2005) model, respectively. I analyze the differences of earning quality between the Global Champ firms and the paired firms selected through criteria of the similar total assets and the same industry in the screening year and the selected year. This study is motivated by the needs of measurement of the performance of the Project from the accounting transparent point of view. As the results of this study, major findings are summarized as follows. Firstly the earnings quality of the selected firms was lower than that of the paired firms. This can be explained as a result of motivation of earnings management by companies eager to meet the requirements to be selected for the Project. Secondly, in the selected year, the earnings quality was proved to improve, comparing to the screening year. This can be explained by the efforts of companies to reinforce management innovation and transparent management, which in turn led to positive effects on the earnings quality. These findings were found to be consistent in the additional analyses, where the earning quality of the reconstructed sample with only selected companies was compared for the screening year and the selected year, based on the year before the screening year(t-2).

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.173-188
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• 2023

This paper analyzed the Earnings management of firms selected as preliminary Unicorn. If a manager is selected as a preliminary unicorn firm, he can receive financial support of up to 20 billion won, creating a factor in managing the manager's earnings. The motive for management's earnings management is related to the capital market. Accounting information is used by investors and financial analysts, and corporate profits affect corporate value. Therefore, if the accounting earning is adjusted upward, the corporate value will be raised and investment conditions will be favorable. In this paper, earnings quality was measured by the modified Jones model of Dechow et al.(1995) by the ROA control model of Kothari et al.(2005) among the discretionary accruals estimated using an alternative accrual prediction model. Competing similar companies in the same market as the selected companies were formed, and the discretionary accruals were mutually compared to verify the research hypotheses, and only the selected companies were analyzed for the audit year and after the audit year. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the companies selected as preliminary unicorns had higher earnings management compared to the corresponding companies in question, which had a negative impact on the quality of accounting profits. It was found that the companies selected as preliminary unicorns continued to receive incentives for management's earnings management even after being selected. These results indicate that the companies selected as prospective unicorns are recognized for their value in the market through external growth rather than internal growth, and thus, incentives for management's earnings management to attract investment from external investors under favorable conditions are continuing. In the future preliminary unicorn selection evaluation, it was possible to present what needs to be reviewed on the quality of accounting earning. The implication of this paper is that the factors of management's earnings management eventually hinder investors and creditors from judging the reliability of accounting information. It was suggested that a policy alternative for the K-Unicorn Project, which enhances reliability were presented by reflecting the evaluation of earnings quality through discretionary accruals.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.169-184
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• 2016

Deferred tax assets (liability) in a company's financial statements are to reflect the temporary difference between taxable income and accounting income and therefore can provide useful information as a proxy for discretionary accruals. In addition, deferred tax assets allow a company to manage its earnings by reviewing the feasibility of the assets' recognition. As such, this study focused on deferred tax assets to examine their relationship with discretionary accruals, which were measured by a modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), and investigated the impact of audit quality on this relationship. In order to control for the effects of tax rate change and measurement credibility, deferred tax assets of 2,670 non-financial firms from 2009 to 2010 were collected as samples for the study. The results of the empirical analysis are as follows. First, the samples as a whole indicated that deferred tax assets have a negative relationship with discretionary accruals in a general sense, but a high-quality audit did not reveal a significant relationship between them. Second, the 1,379 samples with negative discretionary accruals did not reveal a significant relationship between deferred tax assets and discretionary accruals; however, the result showed a significant negative relationship under a high-quality audit. These findings suggest that in the case of negative discretionary accruals, a high-quality audit restricts an earnings management technique that utilizes deferred tax assets and that the assets can be a useful tool for detecting discretionary accruals. The present study is meaningful in that, unlike previous research, it combined the two contrasting roles of deferred tax assets-that of an earnings management detector and an earnings management tool-to examine their general relationship. The study also suggested that audit quality could influence the usefulness of deferred tax assets in providing information on discretionary accruals.