• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.157-183
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• 2014

This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.38 no.3
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• pp.35-53
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• 2019

A standing auditor can perform the monitoring and control activities for the opportunistic behaviors of top manager. However, for this purpose she/he must have the independence from top manager. Thus, this study is designed to analyze the factors that influences the independence of standing auditor. The independence of standing auditor as dependent variable was measured in terms of school and company ties to top manager. The relationship between the shareholding of professional top manager and independence of standing auditor, and the moderating effects of the shareholdings of related-party, institutional investors, and foreign investors were examined by implementing multiple regression and conditional moderating effect analyses. The findings present a negative relationship between the shareholding of professional top managers and the independence of standing auditor. They also reveal a positive moderating effect of the shareholding of related-party on that relationship. On the other hand, the shareholdings of foreign and institutional investors did not significant change the relationship between the shareholding of professional top manager and the independence of standing auditor. The findings imply that professional manager might be able to lower the controlling mechanism by appointing a standing auditor having low independence. Related-party as an internal control mechanism might be beneficial to reduce this effect while institutional investors or foreign investors as an external control mechanisms might not. This is the first study that examine the antecedents of the independence of standing auditor in terms of the characteristics of ownership structure. It provides a guideline for selecting an effective standing auditor with the consideration for ownership structure.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.42
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• pp.57-65
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• 1999

일본의 공정취인위원회는 지난 1977년부터 일본 경제에서 큰 비중을 차지하고 있는 6대 대규모기업집단에 대한 기업집단 내의 소유지배관계, 자본$\cdot$인적 및 상품에 대한 내부거래 현황, 그리고 대규모사업추진에 따른 상호 협력관계 등 멤버기업간의 결합 실태를 조사하여 왔다. 이 글은 공정취인위원회가 지난 1996년 1월부터 1997년 6월 30일간에 결산기가 도래된 기업을 대상으로 한 제6차 경영행태 조사의 결과를 요약$\cdot$분석하여 일본 공정취인협회가 발간한 $\lceil$공정취인$\rfloor$(1998년 12월호)지에 게재한 것은 전문 번역 게재한 것이다. 우리나라에서도 대규모기업집단의 선단식 경영에 대한 폐해(물론 장점도 있지만)와 공정거래 위원회의 부당한 내부거래의 제재에 대한 논란이 이루어지고 있기 때문에 양국의 재벌급 기업집단의 경영 형태를 비교$\cdot$검토함으로써 정책 운용에 참고가 될 수 있도록 하였다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.3-36
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• 1992

"Corporate control by owners" characterizes the current structure of ownership, control and management of big business groups in Korea. It has become an ever more serious obstacle for the Korean economy to end its distinctive "personal capitalism" and to transform the current system into people's capitalism. The current issue, the deconcentration of ownership, through the course of heated debates should be treated from an integrated perspective. That is, the debate should center on the concentration of economic power and it effects on national economy, instead of sticking to the issue of ownership-control issue per se. This paper, by referring to the historical experiences and development paths which advanced countries have already traveled, analyzes the respective aspects of the concentration issue in a rather descriptive and taxonomist manner - market concentration, business diversification, ownership concentration, integrated management of conglomerates, i.e., managing in groups' unit, and the roles of financial institutions. The government policies against the concentration of economic power have so far focused on the size of big business groups and their diversification activities. The two major policy measures are restrictions on cross-ownership and excess capital investment by big business groups, and controls on their credit deals. This paper strongly suggests that the government should change its current priorities in targeting its policies against concentration. The government should reduce the regulations on size and diversification, and focus its policies on substantial dispersion of corporate ownership. The efficacy of government intervention in the management and control of business enterprises seems quite dubious and even anachronistic given the extent of maturity of Korean firms. Therefore, it should be noted that the current regulation-oriented stance taken by the government against the management style of big business groups should be suppressed, as it has assumed some a priori and typical pattern in advance in directing big business groups, such as independent and specialized management in respective firms' unit. This paper, also, raises the need for introducing new regulations on inter-sectoral diversifications between finance, industry and the press.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.149-215
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• 1996

현행 민영화정책이 공기업의 효율성제고를 최우선 목표로 설정한 것은 타당한 선택이었음에도 불구하고, 경제력집중 심화에 대한 우려와 주식시장의 제약 등을 이유로 민영화정책은 그 추진실적이 부진하고 향후 지속 여부가 불투명한 것이 현실이다. 본(本) 논문(論文)은 우리나라 공기업민영화를 둘러싼 논쟁의 핵심인 경제력집중(經齊力集中), 경쟁도입(競爭導入), 주식시장여건(株式市場與件) 등이 공기업민영화와 관련하여 어떻게 이해되어야 할 것이며, 바람직한 정책대응(政策對應)은 무엇인지를 논의하고 있다. 재산권이론(財産權理論)을 동원하여 주인(主人) 있는 경영(經營)의 의미를 재해석할 때, 기업지배(企業支配) 통제구조(統制構造)의 정착이 요원한 우리 현실에서 민영화가 기업효율을 제고하려면 민간대주주(民間大株主)의 지배(支配)를 인정하는 방식이 최선책(最善策)이며, 소유가 분산되고 전문경영체제(專門經營體制)를 도입하는 민영화방식은 지배구조(支配構造)의 실패가능성(失敗可能性) 때문에 차선책(次善策)이라고 평가된다. 그러나 효율성 차원의 최선책은 경제력집중이라는 국민경제적 비용을 초래하므로, 정부로서는 경제력 집중이라는 비용(費用)과 효율성이라는 편익(便益)을 조화시키는 방안을 모색할 수밖에 없다. 이 경우 정부가 고려할 보완책(補完策)으로는 감자후(減資後) 민영화(民營化)와 분할민영화(分割民營化)가 있다. 한편 자연독점의 특성이 뚜렷한 일부 네트워크사업분야를 제외하면, 민영화시 경쟁도입(競爭導入)은 기업효율성과 국민경제의 배분효율성을 제고하므로 정부로서는 당연한 선택일 것이다. 경쟁은 공기업의 인수자격규제에 있어서도 새로운 기준을 제시하는데, 민영화를 정부(政府)와 민간(民間)사이의 M&A로 이해하고 경쟁제한적(競爭制限的) 기업결합(企業結合)을 규제하는 공정거래법(公正去來法)의 정신(精神)이 인수자격규제기준이 되어야 하며, 업종전문화(業種專門化) 발상(發想)에 근거한 인수자격규제는 득보(得)다 실(失)이 클 것이다. 아직도 자생적 성장기반이 취약한 주식시장의 제약에 따라 민영화일정의 탄력적인 조정은 불가피하지만, 정부는 상장(上場)의 필요성(必要性)을 재검토하고, 매각(賣却)의 우선순위(優先順位)를 조정하며, 무엇보다도 양질(良質)의 주식(柱式) 공급(供給)이 수요(需要)를 창출하는 메커니즘을 개발해야한다. 이와 함께 본(本) 논문(論文)은 현행 추진체계(推進體系)에 내재된 민영화의 지연가능성이 심각한 문제임을 지적하였고, 대규모 공기업의 민영화가 대기업(大企業)의 새로운 전형(典型)을 창출하여 한국자본주의(韓國資本主義)의 건전한 발전을 앞당기는 역사적 기회라는 점을 강조하고 있다. 마지막으로 재벌인수가 가능한 경우와 규제되어야 할 각각의 경우에 대하여 민영화정책(民營化政策)의 '체크리스트'를 제시하고 있다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.33-59
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• 1999

본 연구는 부실기업의 갱생에 있어 중요한 요인인 청구권자들 사이의 정보불균형 및 이해갈등 문제에 초점을 맞추어 부실채권 정상화를 위하여 채권자주도로 시도되는 M&A의 성공여부에 영향을 미치는 요인을 실증적으로 분석하였다. 로지트(logit)모형에 의하여 M&A의 성공여부를 회귀분석한 결과, '청산가치비율'(+)은 1%의 유의수준에서, '구경영진 부실경영책임여부 가변수'(-)와 '파산이후 순이익 정리계획안 계획대비 달성률'(+)은 5%의 유의수준에서 관련성을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 '광고연구개발비율'(+) 및 '파산이후 매출액증가율'(+)은 1%의 유의수준에서 관련성을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 따라서 채권자가 주도하는 M&A의 성공요인으로 파산전후 청구권자들 사이의 정보불균형 문제가 적은 부실기업일수록 그리고 '광고연구개발비율'이 높은 부실기업으로서 상대적으로 무형적인 자산의 가치가 높고, 전문적인 제품을 생산하는 기업은 M&A의 성공 가능성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 부실기업에 대한 부채조정 등 재무구조의 변화에 따라 '파산이후 매출액증가율'이 높은 기업일수록 M&A의 성공가능성이 높다고 추론할 수 있을 것이다 그러나 '담보권 있는 금융기관 수 비율'(+), '금융비용부담률'(-)과 '대주주지분율'(-) 등은 비유의적인 것으로 나타나서 부실기업의 부채조달내역의 우선권 구조, 재무구조 불안정성 및 소유구조 등은 M&A의 성공여부와 관련성이 거의 없는 것으로 나타났다.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.61-72
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• 2023

In December 2020, the Fair Trade Act related to South Korea's separation of industrial capital was amended, and it was announced that the amendments would come into effect one year later, on December 30, 2021. The amendment's content involved breaking the previous principle of separating industrial capital from financial market penetration, allowing for the ownership of shares in general holding companies, small business startup investment companies, and technology business finance specialist companies. While the previous law was based on total issued shares' ownership, there were fluctuations in the subsequent trends of annual establishment and investment counts, as well as strategic investment counts of CVC (Corporate Venture Capital) before and after the law's amendment. CVC and IVC (Independent Venture Capital) are characterized differently based on their investment purposes, fund management types, and investment types. In this regard, the relaxation of the separation of industrial capital law is expected to have a positive impact on the future of the venture investment ecosystem and innovation ecosystem. In this study, we analyze the trends in the establishment count, investment count, and strategic investment count of domestic CVC from 2018, before the law amendment, to May 2023. Using 2021, the year the amended separation of industrial capital law was implemented, as a reference point, we examine changes in the trend. The analysis results indicate a significant increase in domestic CVC in 2021 compared to the previous year, along with an increase in investment counts, strategic investment counts, and the amount of investment in strategic investments. Based on these findings, this study suggests directions for further research related to future domestic CVC investment, strategic investment, and the activation of the venture investment market.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.95-109
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• 2020

The source of value-added creation in modern times has been transformed from material to man's value-added generating power, and ownership of the means of production has been converted from a particular landlord, capitalist to a person with value-added capacity, and a system of capital participation is needed beyond the profit-sharing system or performance incentive system in which workers of an enterprise participate in simple profits if they significantly increase the added value of the company. It is also necessary to introduce our private stock system as a means of addressing the problem of capital bias and for the stable development of capitalism. The purpose of Employee Stock Ownership Plans is to improve the economic and social status of workers and promote labor-management cooperation by allowing workers to acquire and hold shares of the stock company in which the employee ownership association is established through the employee ownership association, but the reality is that our stock ownership system has failed to achieve its purpose due to insufficient protection against the employee. In terms of welfare, the acquisition of our company shares should include active government support for the welfare of workers' ownership on a social welfare level rather than on the logic of the capital market, and in terms of investment, it would not be appropriate to apply the regulation for investor protection to see workers' acquisition of our company shares as 'investment' in the view of workers' willingness to own shares on the stock market. Therefore, as a way to support and deregulate employee's stock acquisition, 1. Expanding direct support, such as tax support, 2. As employee's stock ownership association is being discussed as a division's nature, it is less effective in terms of various management, not investment, and 3. Those who own stocks with 1% of the company's shares and 300 million won in face value will be classified as major shareholders. As a way to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, As a measure to reduce the risk of management of our company owners and cooperative funds, only our employee shareholders' association shall manage the fund in a long-term deposit, and even though our employee's stock is managed by the association or company after the end of the deposit period, the management of each employee shall be allowed and In terms of improving the utilization of our company's stock and fund, 1. Employee's stockholders are prohibited from lending during the deposit period, but it is necessary to improve profitability by allowing them to borrow under strict restrictions, 2. It is necessary to make the use of the employee's welfare funds available for the preservation of losses, and to stipulate the redemption obligations of unlisted companies in order to improve the redemption system of our company.