• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.8
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• pp.217-226
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• 2019

This study examines the effect of the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders on the implied cost of equity. Prior studies posit that controlling shareholder's voting rights exceeding cash flow rights causes expropriating minority shareholders. Using date from 793 group-affiliated Korean firms for 10 years from 2005 to 2016, the result shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between controlling shareholders' wedge and implied cost of equity. This result implies that investors regard the controlling shareholders' wedge as potential agency cost in which they require additional risk premium because controlling shareholders have a strong incentive to pursue their private interests trough tunneling practices.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.5558-5563
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• 2011

Using longitudinal data of 108 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2009, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on R&D investment. The study finds that control-ownership disparity is negatively related to R&D intensity. This empirical result suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights incent controlling shareholders' expropriation for their private interests, leading to decreased R&D investment which enhances firm value in the long term.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.69-100
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• 2006

We examine the effect of controlling shareholders ownership structure and related-party transactions(hereafter 'RPT') of publicly traded companies on their firm values during the post-IMF period. In the multivariate regression analysis using control variables such as firm size, capital structure, investment, dividend, profitability and industry dummy that might affect firm values, we find that there exists a significant negative relation between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values proxied by Tobin's Q, and also find that there is a significant negative relation between RPT and the firm values. Those evidences seem to support the controlling shareholders' expropriation hypothesis. Additionally, we investigate the relation between ownership structure and rim value through the piecewise regression analysis. We find a significant 'inverse' U-shape pattern between the controlling shareholders ownership structure and firm values. This result is quite different from the existing literatures that have usually reported an U-shape pattern. In conclusion, the findings in this study do not support the notion that the ownership concentration to the controlling shareholders does negatively affect the firm values monotonically.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.57-81
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• 2008

본 논문은 현재 존폐의 논란이 일고 있는 출자총액제한제도의 효과를 실증적으로 검토한다. 상호출자제한기업과 출자총액제한기업을 비교한 결과 차이가 없어 출자총액제한제도가 기업의 투자를 위축시켜 국내 대기업에게 불리한 경쟁 환경을 조성하고 있다는 재계의 주장은 지지되지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 한편 독립기업의 투자가 출자총액제한기업을 포함한 대기업집단 소속 기업의 투자보다 많은 것으로 미루어보아 투자 저해 문제는 출자총액제한제도만의 문제이기보다는 대기업집단을 규제하는 제도 전체의 문제로 인식해야 할 것으로 판단된다. 출자총액제한제도가 대규모기업집단의 순환출자구조를 개선시켜 소유-지배 괴리도를 낮추고 기업의 지배구조를 향상시킨다는 공정거래위원회의 주장도 지지되지 않았다. 따라서 출자총액제한제도의 유효성에 대한 재검토와 더불어 정책 목적을 달성하기 위한 새로운 제도의 도입을 고려해야 할 것으로 판단된다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.12 no.9
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• pp.280-292
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• 2012

In general, a venture capital invests in tech startups and helps them improve the corporate transparency through board of directors. With respect to venture capital investment and its impact on the corporate transparency of the newly public firms from 2004 to 2010 in Korea, we have made regression analysis. First, it was found that it was likely to be less transparent, the larger its asset size or the higher its debt ratio was. Second, lower level of ownership-control disparity resulted in higher transparency. Third, a shorter period to IPO and higher growth rate were more prominent in companies with lower degree of transparency. The above findings were not conclusive to prove whether or not venture capital directly increases the transparency level of its portfolio companies, but do insinuate the possibility of a negative impact on the transparency of its investee companies, as early IPO's were associated with less transparency. This is all the more persuasive as it was observed that companies with a lower level of transparency had generally raised more money from venture capitals, and that companies with a higher growth rate and/or higher PBR, have shown to be less transparent.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.189-219
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• 2003

본 연구는 한국증권거래소의 현금배당락조치 폐지 이전과 1998년 7월 현금배당락 조치 폐지 이후의 표본을 이용하여 인위적인 거래소의 배당락조치 변경이 배당락일의 주가행태에 미치는 효과를 분석하였다. 실증분석 결과 현금배당락조치 폐지 이후 거래소 배당락기준가격의 오차는 예상대로 더욱 확대된 것으로 나타났다. 두 기간 모두 배당락일의 주가가 금기예상실효배당금과 거래소가 배당락조치를 위해 인위적으로 산정한 배당금과의 차이인 거래소 배당락기준가격의 오차를 반영할 수 없었다. 또한, 김성민(1997)과 일관되게 단기차익 거래의 유용성은 표본그룹에 관계없이 금기예상실효배당금에 대한 정보소유자가 연말 폐장일에 배당부종가로 구입하여 배당락일인 연초 개장일에 배당락 종가로 매도하는 것이 배당락 시가로 매도하는 것보다 더 효과적임을 알 수 있었다. 그리고, 이러한 차익거래를 통한 보유기간 세후 수익률은 현금배당락조치 폐지 이전인 1997년(4.7%)에 비해 현금배당락조치 폐지 이후 현금배당락을 시키지 않은 $1998{\sim}1999$년(8.9%) 기간에 더 증가하였다. 단기차익을 위한 차익거래가 실질적으로 이루어 졌는지 연초 배당락일 주변의 초과거래량을 분석한 결과 $1997{\sim}1998$ 회계년도의 배당락일에는 유의적인 양(+)의 초과거래량이 발생하였지만 1999 회계년도의 배당락일에는 유의적인 음(-)의 초과거래량이 발생하여 이에 대한 결론을 내릴 수 없었다. 본 연구는 금기예상현금배당에 대한 완전예측을 가정함으로써 배당락일의 주가하락과 주주총회에서 실현될 주당배당금의 괴리는 차익을 제공할 수 있으나 무위험 차익거래 기회가 아님을 밝혀 둔다.효과적인 것으로 판단되었다. 조사한 모든 일중 및 1일(overnight) 투자수익률에서 옵션 거래량의 상대적 비율에 의거한 투자전략은 통계적으로 유의한 투자수익률의 차이를 가져왔다.e 측정치에 의해 평가했을 때, 회사채가 주식보다 더 우수한 것으로 평가되었으나 Treynor 측정치에 의한 평가를 했을 때는 정기예금이 가장 우수했다. 그리고 Jensen 측정치에 따라 투자대상을 평가했을 때는 회사채와 국채가 주식보다 앞섰다. 마지막으로, 종합적인 평가를 했을 때는 회사채가 주식보다 우수했고 정기예금은 주식과 동일한 수준으로 평가되었다. 유의성은 없었다.의 선도효과가 지배적임을 발견하였다.적 일정하게 하는 소비행동을 목표로 삼고 소비와 투자에 대한 의사결정을 내리고 있음이 실증분석을 통하여 밝혀졌다. 투자자들은 무위험 자산과 위험성 자산을 동시에 고려하여 포트폴리오를 구성하는 투자활동을 행동에 옮기고 있다.서, Loser포트폴리오를 매수보유하는 반전거래전략이 Winner포트폴리오를 매수보유하는 계속거래전략보다 적합한 전략임을 알 수 있었다. 다섯째, Loser포트폴리오와 Winner포트폴리오를 각각 투자대상종목으로써 매수보유한 반전거래전략과 계속거래 전략에 대한 유용성을 비교검증한 Loser포트폴리오와 Winner포트폴리오 각각의 1개월 평균초과수익률에 의하면, 반전거래전략의 Loser포트폴리오가 계속거래전략의 Winner포트폴리오보다 약 5배정도의 높은 1개월 평균초과수익률을 실현하였고, 반전거래전략의 유용성을 충분히 발휘하기 위하여 장단기의 투자기간을 설정할 경우에 6개월에서 36개월로 이동함에 따라 6개월부터 24개월까지는 초과수익률이 상승하지만, 이후로는 감소하므로, 반전거래전략을

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.9 no.7
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• pp.53-59
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• 2018

Purpose - This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology - 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control-ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO -UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-flow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control-ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005-2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders' ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions - Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.