• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.29-57
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• 2014

Using unemployment insurance and income-contingent loan (ICL) that conditions repayment by debtors upon their incomes this paper characterizes an efficient income support system for the unemployed, which maximizes their lifetime utilities by effectively enhancing inter-state and inter-temporal consumption-smoothing subject to incentive constraints on the part of the beneficiaries. This paper also emphasizes the generality of the argument for a mix of ICL and subsidy that may be applied potentially to many types of government welfare program.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.89-112
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• 2014

This paper characterizes an optimal combination of grant and income-contingent loans (ICL) from efficiency and equity points of view as a government subsidy program for higher-education. In particular, we show that it is always desirable to introduce ICL for students regardless of their household incomes, and also provide arguments for the superiority of tax-financing system to loans with risk-premium as a financing mechanism of ICL. From policy point of view, this paper suggests a need for the extended coverage of our ICL system, while justifying its current tax-financing system.