• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.29 no.1
• /
• pp.199-236
• /
• 2014

This paper analyses from the perspective of distributive justice the legal mechanisms for international allocation of orbital slots, which are of co-owned nature and thereby limited natural resources in outer space. The allocative function is delegated to the International Telecommunication Union. The Radio Regulation, amongst such other legal instruments as the Constitution and Convention, by which the ITU and contracting States thereof abides, dictates how the orbital positions are distributed. Thus, the RR is thoroughly reviewed in the essay. The mechanisms are in a broad sense categorized into two systems: 'a posteriori system' where the 'first come, first served' principle prevails; and 'a priori system' designed to foster the utilisation of the slots by those who lack space resources and are, in especial, likely to be marginalised under the former system. The argument proceeds on the premise that a posteriori system places the under-resourced States in unfavourable positions in the securement of the slots. In contrast with this notion, seven factors were instantiated for an assertion that the degradation of the distributive justice derived from the 'first come, first served' rule, which lays the foundation for the system, could be either mitigated or counterbalanced by the alleged exceptions to the rule. However, the author of this essay argues for counterevidences against the factors and thereby demonstrating that the principle still remains as an overwhelming doctrine, posing a threat to the pursuit of fair allocation. The elements he set forth are as in the following: 1) that the 'first come, first served' principle only applies to assignments capable of causing harmful interferences; 2) the interoperability of the principle with the 'rule of conformity' with the all the ITU instruments; 3) the viability of alternative registrations, as an exception of the application of the principle, on the condition of provisional and informational purposes; 4) another reference that matters in deciding the priority: the types of services in the TFA; 5) the Rule of Procedure H40 proclaiming a ban on taking advantage of coming first to the Register; 6) the technical factors and equity-oriented norms under international and municipal laws along with; 7) the changes of 'basic characteristics' of registered assignments. The second half of this essay illustrates by examining the relevant Annexes to the Regulation that the planned allocation, i.e., a priori system, bear the structured flaws that hinder the fulfillment of the original purpose of the system. The Broadcasting and Fixed Satellite Systems are the reviewed Plans in which the 'first come, first served' principle re-emerges in the end as a determining factor to grant the 'right to international recognition' to administrations including those who has not the allotted portions in the Plan.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.35 no.1
• /
• pp.181-202
• /
• 2020

The Non-Appropriation Principle was stipulated in the OST and the MA. However the MA, creating CHM in international law for the first time, attempted to further limit the prohibitions to include ownership of resources extracted from celestial bodies, its rejection by the U.S. and most of the international spacefaring community prevented it from serving as a binding international treaty. Individuals or private enterprises intending to perform space exploitation must receive approval from the nation and may not appropriate outer space or celestial bodies. In the course of this space activity, each party will be liable. Articles 6 and 7 of the OST and the Liability Convention of 1972 deal with matters concerning those problems. The CSLCA of 2015 and Luxembourg Space Resources Law of 2017 allows States to provide commercial exploration and use of space resources to their own nationals and to companies operated by other countries within their territory. These laws do not violate Article 2 of the OST. In the case of the CSLCA of 2015, the law clearly states that it cannot claim ownership, sovereignty or jurisdiction over certain celestial bodies. Even if scholars claim that the U.S. CSLCA and Luxembourg Space Resources Law violate the non-appropriation principle of the OST, they cannot prevent these two countries from extracting the space resources on "the first come, first served" basis. The legal status of outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies is res extra commercium, like the high seas, where the fishing vessels from each country catch and sell fish without occupying the sea. Major space-faring nations must push for the adoption of an international regulatory committee which will oversee applications and issue permits based on a set of robust, modern, and forward-thinking ideals that are best equipped to govern and protect outer space as individuals, businesses, and nations compete to commercialize space through mining and the extraction of space-based resources. The new Corpus Juris Spatialis on the development of space resources, whether it is a treaty or a soft law such as recommendation and declaration, in the case of the Moon and Mars, will cover a certain amount of area to develop, and the development period by the states should be specified.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.35-59
• /
• 2018

Professor Bin Cheng said that outer space was res extra commercium, while the moon and the other celestial bodies were res nullius before the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST). However, Article 2 of the OST made the moon and other celestial bodies have the legal status as res extra commmercium, not appropriated by any country or private enterprises or individual person, but the resources there can be freely available, as those on the high seas. The non-appropriation principle was introduced to corpus juris spatialis internationalis. Whether or not the non-appropriation principle is binding for the non-parties of the OST, many scholars see this principle as an international customary law, even developing into jus cogens. Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement(MA) reconfirms the nonappropriation principle of Article 2 of the OST, but it has much less effect than the OST because the MA binds only the 18 parties involved. The MA applies only to the moon and celestial bodies other than the Earth in the Solar System, the OST's application scope extends to the Galaxy because the OST has no such substantive enactment. As referred to in the 2015 CSLCA of USA or Luxembourg's Law of Space Resources, allowing individuals and enterprises run by other countries to commercially explore and utilize the space resources, the question may arise whether this violates the non-appropriation principle under Article 2 of the OST and Article 11 of the MA. In the case of the CSLCA, the law explicitly specifies that sovereignty, possessory rights, and judiciary rights to a specific celestial body cannot be claimed, let alone ownership. This author believes that this law respects the legal status of outer space and the celestial bodies as res extra commmercium. As long as any countries or private enterprises or individuals respect the non-appropriation principle of outer space and the celestial bodies, they could use, exploit it. Another question might be raised in the difference between res extra commercium on the high seas and res extra commercium in outer space and the celestial bodies. Collecting resources on the high seas and exploiting space resources should be interpreted differently. On the high seas, resources can be collected without any obstacles like fishing, whereas, in the case of the deep sea-bed area, the Common Heritage of Mankind principles under the UNCLOS should be operated by the International Seabed Authority as an international regime. The nature or form of the sea resources found on the high seas are thus different from that of space resources, which are fixed on the moon and the celestial bodies without water. Thus, if individuals or private enterprises collect these resources from outer space and the celestial bodies, they might secure a certain section and continue collecting or mining works without any limitation. If an American enterprise receives an approval from the U.S. government, secures the best location and collects resources on the moon, can other countries' enterprises access to this area? How large the exploiting place can be allotted on the moon? How long should such a exploiting activity be lasted? Under the current international space law, these matters might be handled according to the principle of "first come, first served." As a consequence, the international community should provide a guideline or a proposal for the settlement of any foreseeable disputes during the space activity to solve plausible space legal questions in the near future.