• Korean Journal of Soil Science and Fertilizer
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.293-300
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• 2012

This study was to investigate the unsuitable rate of the storage facilities, the changes in corrosion process over time after installation according to the status, the time to install the facilities, years elapsed after facilities installation, inspection of methods and motivation, and so on, based on the results of the inspection at the petroleum storage facilities conducted by domestic soil-relate specialized agency to derive optimal management plans which meet the status of soil contamination facilities. The results showed that the facilities more than 5 years after the initial leak test at the time of the installation need to be inspected periodically by considering costs of leak test and remediation of polluted soil. The inspection period can be decided by cost and leak test methods showing discrepancies for the results obtained from individual test whether it was direct or indirect. To compensate these matters, we suggested that the direct inspection method on regular schedule is recommended. On the other hand, the inspection can be voluntarily completed to ease burden of the results by inspection or equivalent level to this inspection method. Also, it may need improved construction supervision and performance test system to minimize the occurrence of the nature defects in installing the facilities as well as the upgrade program for the facilities during intervals of inspection period.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.31-57
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• 1991

Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.48
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• pp.259-285
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• 2016

As the need for anti-terrorism legislation has been continuously argued, Anti-terrorism act has been enacted and enforced. On the other hand, there still remain a lot of points to be discussed regarding the definition of the concept of terrorism, matters of human rights violations, strengthening authority of the investigation and intelligence agencies, and mobilization military forces for the suppression of terrorism. Also, reviewing Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft, this legislation seems to regulate terrorist groups like IS. If so, in the case of terrorism of North Korea or domestic anti-government organizations, whether this law would be applied could become an issue. In the case of terrorism of North Korea, Ministry of National Defense has a right of commandership in the military operations, however, it is also possible to apply the article 4 of Natural Security Act a crime of performing objective-or a crime of foreign exchange on Criminal law as legal grounds for not military terrorisms but general investigations. Therefore, it is necessary to involve consideration about this matter. Furthermore, in the view of investigation, Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft do not mention Supreme Prosecutors Office and Ministry of Justice that conduct investigations. In the case of terrorism, the police and prosecution should conduct to arrest criminals and determine crimes at the investigation stage, however, any explicit article related to this content in Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft was unable to be found. Although Anti-terrorism act is certainly toward preventive aspects, considering some matters such as prevention, actions on the scene, maneuver after terrorism, arresting terrorists, investigation direction, cooperation, and mutual assistance, it is necessary to reflect these contents in Anti-terrorism act. In other words, immediately after terrorists attacks, it is possible to mobilize the military operations by Integrated Defense act in order to arrest them in the case of military terrorism. Nevertheless, because both military terrorism and general one are included in the investigation stage, it needs to begin an investigation under the direction of the prosecution. Therefore, above all, a device for finding out the truth behind the case at the investigation stage is not reflected in the current Anti-terrorism act and its enforcement ordinance draft. Accordingly, if National Intelligence Service approaches information at the prevention level in this situation, it may be necessary to come up with follow-up measures of the police, the prosecution, and military units.