• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 1973

Needless to say, the management of national forest in all countries is very important in view of the national mission and management purposes. Korean national forest is also in particular significant in promoting national economy for the continuous increasing of the demand for wood, conservation of the land and social welfare. But there's no denying the fact that the leading aim of the Korean forest policy has been based upon the conservation of forest resources and recovery of land conservation function instead of improvement of the forest productive capacity. Therefore, the management of national forest should be aimed as an industry in the chain of the Korean national economy. And the increment of the forest productive capacity based on rationalized forest management is also urgently needed. Not only the increment of the timber production but also the establishment of the good forest in quality and quantity are to bring naturally many functions of conservation and other public benefits. In 1908 Korean national forest was historically established for the first time as a result of the notification for ownership, and was divided into two kinds in 1911-1924, such as indisposable national forest for land conservation, forest management, scientific research and public welfare, and the other national forest to be disposed. Indisposable forest is mostly under the jurisdiction of national forest stations (Chungbu, Tongbu, Nambu), and the tother national forests are under custody of respective cities and provinces, and under custody of the other government authorities. As of the end of 1971, national forest land is 19.5% (1,297,708 ha) of the total forest land area, but growing stock is 50.1% ($35,406,079m^3$) of the total forest growing stock, and timber production of national forest is 23.6% ($205,959m^3$) of the year production of total timber in Korea. Accordingly, it is the important fact that national forest occupies the major part of Korean forestry. The author positively affirms that success or failure of the management of national forest controls rise or fall of forestry in Korea. All functions of forest are very important, but among others the function of timber production is most important especially in Korea, that unavoidably imports a large quantity of foreign wood every year (in 1971 import of foreign wood-$3,756,000m^3$, 160,995,000 dollars). So, Korea urgently needs the improvement of forest productive capacity in national forest. But it is difficult that wood production meets the rapid increase of demand for wood to the development of economy, because production term of forestry is long, so national forest management should be rationalized by the effective investment and development of forestry techniques in the long view. Although Korean national forest business has many difficulties in the budget, techniques and the lack of labour due to outflow of rural village labour by development of national economy, and the increase of labour wages and administrative expenses etc. the development of national forest depends on adoption of the suitable forest techniques and management adapted for social and economical development. In this view point the writer has investigated and analyzed the status of the management of national forest in Korea to examine the irrational problems and suggest an improvement plan. The national forestry statistics cited in this study is based on the basic statistics and the statistics of the forest business as of the end of 1971 published by Office of Forestry, Republic of Korea, and the other depended on the data presented by the national forest stations. The writer wants to propose as follows (seemed to be helpful in improvement of Korean national forest management). 1) In the organization of national forest management, more national forest stations should be established to manage intensively, and the staff of working plan officials should be strengthened because of the importance of working plan. 2) By increasing the staff of protection officials, forest area assigned for each protection official should be decreased to 1,000-2,000 ha. 3) The frequent personnel changes of supervisor of national forest station(the responsible person on-the-spot) obstructs to accomplish the consistent management plan. 4) In the working plan drafting for national forest, basic investigations should be carefully practiced with sufficient expenditure and staff not to draft unreal working plan. 5) The area of working-unit should be decreased to less than 2,000 ha on the average for intensive management and the principle of a working-unit in a forest station should be realized as soon as possible. 6) Reforestation on open land should be completed in a short time with a debt of the special fund(a long term loan), and the land on which growing hardwood stands should be changed with conifers to increase productivity per unit area, and at the same time techical utilization method of hardwood should be developed. 7) Expenses of reforestation should be saved by mechanization and use of chemicals for reforestation and tree nursery operation providing against the lack of labour in future. 8) In forest protection, forest fire damage is enormous in comparison with foreign countries, accordingly prevention system and equipment should be improved, and also the minimum necessary budget should be counted up for establishment and manintenance of fire-lines. 9) Manufacture production should be enlarged to systematize protection, processing and circulation of forest business, and, by doing this, mich benefit is naturally given for rural people. 10) Establishment and arrangement of forest road networks and erosion control work are indispensable for the future development of national forest itself and local development. Therefore, these works should be promoted by the responsibility of general accounting instead of special accounting. 11) Mechanization of forest works should be realized for exploiting hinterlands to meet the demand for timber increased and for solving lack of labour, consequently it should promote import of forest machines, home production, training for operaters and careful adminitration. 12) Situation of labour in future will grow worse. Therefore, the countermeasure to maintain forest labourers and pay attention to public welfare facilities and works should be considered. 13) Although the condition of income and expenditure grows worse because of economical change, the regular expenditure should be fixed. So part of the surplus fund, as of the end of 1971, should be established for the fund, and used for enlarging reforestation and forest road networks(preceding investment in national forest).

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Journal of agricultural medicine and community health
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.141-158
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• 1994

To provide better health care services to the rural population, the government has made the Community Health Practitioner(CHP) a regular government official from April 1, 1992. This study was carried out to study the impact of officialization of CHP on the activities and management system of Primary Health Post(PHP). Fifty PHPs were selected by two stage sampling, cluster and simple random, from 595 PHPs in Kyungnam and Kyungpook provinces. Data were collected by a personal interview with CHPs and review of records and reports kept in the PHPs. The study was done for the periods of January 1-March 31, 1992 (before officialization) and January 1-March 31, 1993 (after officialization). Ninety-six percent of the CHPs wanted to become a regular government official in the hope of better job security and higher salary. The proportion of CHPs who were proud of their iob was increased from 24% to 46% after officialization. Those CHPs who felt insecure for their job decreased from 30% to 10%. Monthly salary was increased by 34% from 802,600 Won to 1,076,000 Won and 90% of the CHPs were satisfied with their salary, also more CHPs responded that they have autonomy in their work planning, implementation of plan, management of the post, and evaluation of their activity. There were no appreciable changes in such CHPs' activities as assessment of local health resources, drawing map for the catchment area, utilization of community organization, grasping the current population structure in the catchment area, keeping the family health records, individual and group health education, and school health service. However, the number of home visits was increased from 13.6 times on the average per month per CHP to 27.5 times. More mothers and children were referred to other medical facilities for the immunization and family planning services. Average number of patients of hypertension, cancer, and diabetes in three months period was decreased from 12.7 to 11.6, from 1.5 to 1.2, and 4.3 to 3.4, respectively. Records for the patient care, drug management, and equipment were well kept but not for other records. The level of record keeping was not changed after officialization. The proportion of PHPs which had support from the health center was increased for drug supply from 14.0% to 30.0%, for consumable commodities from 22.0% to 52.0%, for maintenance of PHP from 54.0% to 68.0%, for supply of health education materials from 34.0% to 44.0%, and supply of equipment from 54.0% to 58.0%. Total monthly revenue of a PHP was increased by about 50,000 Won; increased by 22,000 Won in patient care and 34,700 Won in the government subsidy but decreased in the membership due and donation. However, there was no remarkable changes in the expenditure. The proportion of PHPs which had received official notes from the health center for the purpose of guidance and supervision of the CHPs was increased from 20% to 38% during three months period and the average number of telephone call for supervision from the health center per PHP was increased from 1.8 to 2.1 times(p<0.01). However, the proportion of PHPs that had supervisory visit and conference was reduced from 79% to 62%, and from 88% to 74%, respectively. The proportion of CHPs who maintained a cooperative relationship with Myun Health Workers was reduced from 42% to 36%, that with the director of health center from 46% to 24%, that with the chief of public health administration section from 56% to 36%, and that with the chairman of PHP management council from 62% to 38%. Most of the CHPs (92% before and 82% after officialization) stated that the PHP management council is not helpful for the PHP. CHPs who considered the PHP management council unnecessary increased from 4% to 16%(p<0.05). Suggestions made by the CHPs for the improvement of CHP program included emphasis on health education, assurance of autonomy for PHP management, increase of the kind of drugs that can be dispensed by CHPs, and appointment of an experienced CHP in the health center as the supervisor of CHPs. The results of this study revealed that the role and function of CHPs as reflected in their activities have not been changed after officialization. However, satisfaction in job security and salary was improved as well as the autonomy. Support of health center to the PHP was improved but more official notes were sent to the PHPs which required the CHPs more paper works. Number of telephone calls for supervision was increased but there was little administrative and technical guidance for the CHP activities.