• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38B no.7
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• pp.543-552
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• 2013

For the safety messages in IEEE 802.11p/WAVE vehicles network environment, strict periodic beacon broadcasting requires status advertisement to assist the driver for safety. In crowded networks where beacon message are broadcasted at a high number of frequencies by many vehicles, which used for beacon sending, will be congested by the wireless medium due to the contention-window based IEEE 802.11p MAC. To resolve the congestion, we consider a MAC scheme based on slotted p-persistent CSMA as a simple non-cooperative Bayesian game which involves payoffs reflecting the attempt probability. Then, we derive Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in a closed form. Using the BNE, we propose new congestion control algorithm to improve the performance of the beacon rate under saturation condition in IEEE 802.11p/WAVE vehicular networks. This algorithm explicitly computes packet delivery probability as a function of contention window (CW) size and number of vehicles. The proposed algorithm is validated against numerical simulation results to demonstrate its stability.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.9
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.571-595
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• 2022

This study theoretically analyzes the cost allocation of replacement costs that occur when existing operators have to replace circuit breakers due to the entry of new generators. We adopt the sequential equal contributions rule as the cost allocation rule, which is widely used in cost allocation problems in cooperative game theory. We derive various cost allocation plans based on several criteria and examine to what extent each alternative meets various desirable axioms. According to the analysis, (i) the alternative that excludes the cost of the new operator, residual value, and network operator and (ii) the alternative that excludes the cost of the new operator, residual value, and includes network operator are relatively superior to other schemes. We also identify a realistic plan by taking into account practical factors and analyze its axiomatic characteristics.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.135-159
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• 2020

This paper analyzes and compares the effects of various government subsidies to improve labor productivity. Laborers are differentiated in learning ability, and duopsonists in the labor market sequentially determine the quality levels and wages of employed laborers in a two-stage noncooperative game under perfect information. If a subsidy is given to the advanced firm in quality and productivity of labor, that firm will prefer to intensify wage competition due to strengthening its competitiveness in the labor market, and attempt to lower its quality in order to reduce the degree of differentiation in quality. At that time, the other firm wants to avoid competition because of its weakened competitiveness, and may have an incentive to lower the quality level to expand the differentiation. If the government subsidizes low-quality and low-productivity firm, it is motivated to increase its quality level to reduce differentiation due to the strengthening of competitiveness, and its competitor has an incentive to improve the quality to expand the differentiation. And there is no significant difference in whether payments are made to laborers or firms.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.91-113
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• 2002

We report and analyze the Korean physicians' recent general strike over the implementation of the Separation of Prescribing and Dispensing Practice (SPDP) in which more than 18,000 private clinics and 280 hospitals participated. Utilizing game-theoretic models of bargaining we explain why the Korean physicians were so successful in organizing intense collective action against the government and securing very favorable policy outcomes. In particular, we highlight the role of distributional conflict among social actors in shaping the details of institutional reform. The introduction of the SPDP was a necessary first step in the overall reform of health care system in Korea. However, the SPDP was perceived to be a serious threat to the economic viability of their profession by the vast majority of Korean physicians who had long been relied on the profits from selling medicines to compensate for the loss of income due to the low service fee under the previous health care system. The strong political coalition among heterogeneous physicians enabled them to organize an intense form of collective action, the general strike. Thus, physicians were successful not only in dragging the government to a bargaining table, but also winning in the bargaining and securing an outcome vastly favorable to them. On the other hand, the lack of an overall reform plan in the health care policy area, especially the finance of the National Health Insurance and the need for maintaining an image as a successful reform initiator, motivated the government to reach a quick resolution with the striking physicians.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.313-333
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• 2020

This paper shows that when the exchange rate changes, there are conflicting effects on improving the quality and increasing market share of eco-friendly vehicles. In a vertically differentiated duopoly model consisting of high quality clean cars and low quality internal combustion engine cars, I set up a two-stage noncooperative game under perfect information that the quality levels and the prices of the cars are competitively determined. The vehicles are assumed to be produced in countries that use distinct currencies. When the exchange rate of the country that produces low quality cars rises, the producer prefers to intensify competition due to the relatively lowed cost, and the incentive for quality improvement arises from the intension of attempting to reduce the degree of differentiation of quality level. At this time, the clean car manufacturing firm tries to avoid competition due to weakened competitiveness, and increases the quality level to expand quality differentiation. However, in this case, the market share of eco-friendly vehicles shrinks. On the other hand, if the exchange rate changes in the opposite direction, the market share of eco-friendly vehicles is expected to increase, but the quality of both cars are deteriorated, causing a conflict effect.