• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.113-123
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• 2012

This study introduces a new type of a modal split model that use zonal data instead of cost data as independent variables. It has been indicated that the ones using cost data have deficiencies in the multicollinearity of travel time and cost variables and unpredictability of independent variables. The zonal data employed in this study include (1) socioeconomic data, (2) land use data and (3) transportation system data. The test results showed that the proposed modal split model using zonal data performs better than the other does.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.115-116
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• 2007

본 논문은 실시간 수급균형 및 안전도 유지를 책임지는 계통운영자가 효율적인 시장운영을 위한 보조서비스 확보를 위해 체계적인 보조서비스 제도 수립에 근간이 되는 보조서비스의 가치산정 및 적정보상에 대한 합리적 근거를 제시한다. 보조서비스 개선방안에 따른 시장참여자의 정산영향 평가 및 분석을 위한 비용분담, 수익배분 시뮬레이션을 수행하였다. 보조서비스 비용요소를 발굴하여 비용산정에 반영하고 비용분담 방안을 제시함으로써 전력계통운영에 필수적인 보조서비스 공급에 대한 유인이 확대될 것이다.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.3-19
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• 2010

Anyang-cheon(stream) runs through southern metropolitan area of Seoul to Han-river in Korea. Due to fast growth of Seoul, the water quality and quantity problems in Anyang-cheon have occurred. To cope with the problems, the Integrated Watershed Management program for Anyang-cheon was adopted and a KRW 26.1 billion (USD 21.8 million) pilot project (construction of 4 facilities such as reservoir) is suggested for 4 sub-watersheds of Anyang-cheon, which cost will be shared by the 12 local governments (LG). Three cost division schemes are compared. By Scheme 1, if the cost is borne by the LG in a watershed where the facilities are constructed (no cost division scheme), the LG in I is to bear 0.58% of the total construction cost, LG in watershed II 29.54%, LG in IV 0%, LG in V 69.88%. In particular, LG in IV in this scheme bears no cost because no facility is constructed, even though watershed IV is the major beneficiary of the facility construction. Scheme 2 is to share the cost by length of streams in each sub-watershed and the suggested cost share for each sub-watershed is 13.76% by I, 7.34% by II, 45.87% by IV, and 33.03% by V. However, this cost division scheme is fair only under the false assumption that the bargaining powers of group of LGs are identical. To suggest a better and fair division rule, Shapley Value, a cooperative game solution, is used to suggest Scheme 3. In Scheme 3, Shapley Value measures the summation of average marginal contribution of each player in all possible coalitions as cost division scheme and is known to provide a fair division considering bargaining power. In the context of Anyang-cheon, LGs in upper stream have superior bargaining position. The result suggests the cost division is fair under Scheme 3, when the cost shares are 0.29% by I, 14.77% by II, 50% by IV, and 34.94% by V, respectively.

• Water for future
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.61-70
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• 1998

• Journal of the Korean Society for Railway
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.205-211
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• 2009

There is need to reform the road-based logistic transportation system into the railway-based logistics transportation system in order to decrease the total social cost related with logistics transportation. And new transportation modes such as dual mode trailer (DMT) are under consideration, which are expected to decrease current market share of road. But, most of current studies about estimating economical efficiency are focused on developing the probabilistic choice model and then estimating the market share of each mode. We present an approach to compute the optimal market share of each mode in terms of total social cost. To do so, we suggest an optimization model capturing both user choice to maximize his utility and subsidy policy intended to minimize total social cost, simultaneously. Using this model, we present the optimal modal split of container freight.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.155-162
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• 2003

In this paper, we investigate the selection of transport route for import-export container cargo based on the sacrifice model and environmental cost of transport route. At first, the sacrifice model, environmental cost of transport, the volumes and the transport share of import-export container cargo are investigated briefly. And next, the transport time and cost, the environmental cost which is caused by cargo transport are investigated for the transport of import-export container cargo from Busan Port to Seoul. And also we calculate the sacrifice of each route by using the sacrifice model including the environmental cost. Finally we decide the transport route of import-export container cargo by using the sacrifice of each transport route. From the research results, we confirm that the road transport share decreases and the coastal transport share increases when the environmental coast of transport is considered.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2003.05a
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• pp.304-310
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• 2003

In this paper, we investigate the selection of transport route for import-export container cargo based on the sacrifice model and environmental cost of transport route. At first, sacrifice model. environmental cost of transport, the transportation and the transport share of import-export container cargo are investigated briefly. And next, the transport time and cost, the environmental cost which is caused by cargo transport are investigated for the transport of import-export container cargo from Pusan Port to Seoul. And also we calculate the sacrifice of each route by using the sacrifice model including the environmental cost. Finally we decide the transport route of import-export container cargo by using the sacrifice of each transport route. From the research results, we confirm that the road transport share decreases and the coastal transport share increases when the environmental coast of transport is considered.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1995.04a
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• pp.375-375
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• 1995

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.132-143
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• 2014

This study discusses factors that affect on female workers' stress from nurturing. Referring to the first research (2008) and the second research (2009) of KLoWF, the study analyzed the data of 218 female workers with one or more preschool children. The results from the analysis are as the following. First, the female workers who acknowledge her image as a traditional woman are more likely to be exposed to greater stress. Therefore, now working mothers need to free themselves from the traditional idea. Second, since it was clearly observed that husbands' who share family responsibilities has a significant impact on women's stress from nurturing, a new focus should be on the effectiveness of husband's sharing of family responsibilities, whereas it has been mainly focused on education of working mothers. Third, considering the result that nurturing expense variable showed a significant statistics, there is a desperate need of a political task to support nurturing expenses.