• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.3-21
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• 2010

By the significant structural change in 1999, a partial privatization has occurred in Korean fossil-fuel power generation sector. Under the current price scheme wholesale electricity price is dependent on output size, and hence, may not satisfy the assumption of price-taking producers. The purpose of our study is constructing the productivity change measurements of Korean power generation sector taking into account possibly imperfect competition and variable returns to scale. Our approach based on Harrison (1994) and Levinsohn (1993) derives the plant-level productivity measurements of the period between 2001 and 2007, as well as the measurements of mark-ups and returns to scale. It is shown that the mark-up size is dependent on the plants' fuel type and is decreasing over time. Allowing for imperfect competition and variable returns to scale adjusts the productivity measurements substantially.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.11
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• pp.7788-7793
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• 2015

Both export and import sides of grain trade market are analyzed and compared in terms of the static levels and dynamic trends to make new empirical inference on the imperfect competition degree. Export concentration level is high compared to import concentration level. And such states have been sustained since 2001 until 2014. Unlike public concerns, the concentration level of export side seems to be easing by small degree. However, the grain trade market remains imperfect competitive market. Furthermore, overall imperfective competition condition over 2002-2014 has been worsened compared to 2001 level. It is because the reduction level of imports concentration is higher than that of the export concentration. Gini and Atkinson Inequality Index based on Lorenz Curve are newly utilized to analyze market concentration level, instead of the commonly used concentration ratio.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.173-204
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• 2012

This study examines the equilibrium investment on the pollution abatement when firms are facing Cournot competition in the output market while the pollution permit market is perfectly competitive. Unlike standard perfect competition scenario, the abatement investment delivers an indirect effect in which it reduces other firms' equilibrium output. Consequently, compared with the socially optimal level, overinvestment arises. I also overview the potential inefficiencies that imperfect market structure induces under the emission trading scheme, presenting policy implications.

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
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• v.20 no.7 s.225
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• pp.50-52
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• 1988

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.63-101
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• 2015

Banking and borrowing under the ETS may affect the low carbon technology investment level. If the indirect implementation measures are allowed, firms can gradually adjust their carbon reduction costs between implementation periods based on their carbon reduction costs and emission price forecasts. This implies that banking and borrowing may reduce or increase the level of low carbon technology R&D investment. In an oligopoly market, the effects of the measures are quite different from the ones in a perfectly competitive market. This is because the indirect implementation measures can shift market competition in Cournot competition model. The effects of banking and borrowing on the carbon reduction R&D investments depend on emission reduction costs, marginal production costs, discount rate, initial free allocation, and the cost reduction effects of R&D investment.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.291-319
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• 2002

This Paper investigates imperfect competition and economy of scale on Korean energy markets based on computable general equilibrium model. Some industries like energy sector have exhibited that their economies have strong economies of scale and imperfect competition. Thus these industrial organization facts should be incorporated into CGE model. In our model, non-competitive markets are adopted and compare these results with convention perfect competition model.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.17-40
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• 2012

We study externality costs of capital investment under limited commitment. We solve for the constrained efficient allocation with a limited commitment environment and find positive externality costs of capital investment provided that full-risk-sharing is not feasible. In a decentralized version of limited commitment environment, a one unit increase of capital investment by an agent increases all individuals' autarky values in the economy and generates externality costs in the economy. This externality cost provides a rationale for positive capital taxation even in the absence of government expenditure. In order to internalize this costs, the government use a positive rate of linear capital tax in the decentralized economy.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.442-448
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• 2002

오늘날의 경영환경은 불완전할 뿐만 아니라 경쟁이 심화되어 기업간 경쟁의 범위를 벗어나 공급사슬간의 경쟁으로 옮겨가고 있으며, 정보기술관리과 eBusiness가 급격히 발전하면서 공급사슬관리(SCM)를 최적화하기 위해서는 기업의 경쟁전략과 공급사슬전략 그리고 제품 특성을 반영하여 공급사슬이 설계되고 운영되어야 한다. 본 연구에서는 제품의 특성을 수요 측면을 중심으로 혁신적 제품과 기능적 제품으로 특징지을 수 있는 제품의 혁신성을 측정하고, 제품의 혁신성이 공급사슬 전략에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 알아보기 위하여 각 공급사슬관리(SCM)의사결정영역에서의 공급사슬관리가 어느 정도 이루어지고 있는가를 살펴봄으로써 전략에서의 차이점을 규명하고자 하였다. 본 연구를 통해 제품의 혁신성이 공급사슬관리(SCM)의사결정영역에 미치는 영향을 검증함으로써, 기업들에게 자사 제품에 대한 전략적 분석 필요성의 개념적 근거를 제시하고자 한다. 또한 제품특성, 제품 전략, 공급사슬 전략, 기업경쟁전략의 연계적 개념을 제공하고 자사의 공급사슬의 효율성과 반응성을 진단할 수 있는 프레임워크를 제공하고자 한다.

• Proceedings of the KAIS Fall Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.140-143
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• 2002

연속 이온교환 평형 모델을 개발하여 원자력발전소 탈염기의 성능을 평가한 결과 특정이온의 누출 현상과 유입수 및 유출수중 이온농도 비율이 운전조건에 따라서 달라짐을 확인하였다. 본 모델은 국부 불완전 평형을 고려할 수 없으나 다성분 존재하의 경쟁적 이온교환을 묘사할 수 있는 장점을 가지고 있다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.21 no.7
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• pp.1299-1305
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• 2017

In this paper, we consider a beamforming game between the transmitters in a two-user multiple-input single-output interference channel using limited feedback and investigate how each transmitter is able to find a modified strategy from the quantized channel state information (CSI). In the beamforming game, each of the transmitters (i.e., a player) tries to maximize the achievable rate (i.e., a payoff function) via a proper beamforming strategy. In our case, each transmitter's beamforming strategy is represented by a linear combining factor between the maximum ratio transmission (MRT) and the zero forcing (ZF) beamforming vectors, which is the Pareto optimal achieving strategy. With the quantized CSI, the transmitters' strategies may not be valid because of the quantization errors. We propose a modified solution, which takes into account the effects of the quantization errors.